Updated September 29, 2020
Iraq and U.S. Policy
Al Kadhimi Government Facing
hundreds of thousands seeking systemic change. Protests
Numerous Challenges
subsided in early 2020 amid COVID-19 mitigation
In May 2020, Iraq’s parliament confirmed Iraqi National
measures, but protestors’ demands for reform and an end to
Intelligence Service director Mustafa al Kadhimi as Prime
corruption and foreign interference remain unsatisfied.
Minister, and in June finished confirmation of his cabinet
As protests intensified in late 2019, the parliament (Council
members, bringing months of political deadlock over
of Representatives, COR) adopted a new election law to
government leadership to a close. Upon taking office, Al
replace Iraq’s list-based electoral system with an individual
Kadhimi declared that his government would serve in a
candidate- and district-based system. As of September
transitional capacity and would work to improve security
2020, leaders had not taken required steps to finalize the
and fight corruption while preparing for early elections.
law. Some voting systems experts warned that the proposed
Iraqi authorities have instituted curfews and travel
system changes alone would not ensure implementation of
restrictions in response to the Coronavirus Disease-2019
governance improvements that protestors seek. Authorities
(COVID-19) pandemic, which threatens public health, the
are likely to avoid electoral arrangements that could require
economy, and public finances.
a controversial census given intermittent unrest, security
Prime Minister Al Kadhimi’s priorities include:
disruptions, and unprecedented public health threats.
mobilizing resources to fight the COVID-19 pandemic;
Figure 1. Iraq
“restricting weapons to state and military institutions”;
addressing what he calls “the worst economic situation
since the formation of the Iraqi state”; and
“protecting the sovereignty and security of Iraq,
continuing to fight terrorism, and providing a national
vision on the future of foreign forces in Iraq.”
Al Kadhimi has called for early elections in June 2021
under a revamped electoral system, but fiscal pressures,
political rivalries, and limited institutional capacity present
serious hurdles to reform. A series of high profile
assassinations in 2020 of protest leaders and of a prominent
security researcher have intensified public scrutiny of Al
Kadhimi’s credibility and his government’s ability to act
against armed groups operating outside state authority.
Ongoing rocket and improvised explosive device (IED)
attacks against U.S. and Iraqi facilities and convoys further
underscore these concerns. Islamic State insurgents also
remain active, especially in rural areas.
To date, Al Kadhimi’s administration has focused on
COVID-19 risks and responding to related economic and
Sources: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
fiscal fallout. The Prime Minister visited the United States
Iran-U.S. Tensions Grip Iraq
in August 2020 for strategic dialogue talks. Throughout
U.S.-Iran confrontation also has continued to amplify
September 2020, resurgent reform demands from Iraqi
underlying disputes among Iraqis over government
activists and U.S. pressure for action against Iran-backed
leadership and Iraq’s international orientation and security
armed groups dominated the policy agenda in Iraq, as
partnerships. Following escalating Iran-linked threats in
COVID-19 infection rates continued to rise.
2018 and 2019, a January 2020 U.S. air strike in Iraq killed
Demands of Protest Movement Unmet
Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force
Al Kadhimi’s predecessor, Adel Abd Al Mahdi, resigned in
Commander General Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi Popular
November 2019, after just over a year in office and
Mobilization Forces (PMF) leader Abu Mahdi al Muhandis.
following deadly attacks by some security forces and
Iran launched missiles at Iraqi bases hosting U.S. forces in
militias that killed hundreds of protestors and wounded
retaliation for the U.S. strike, injuring U.S. personnel. In
thousands across central and southern Iraq. Abd Al Mahdi
addition, the COR voted to direct then-acting Prime
served in a caretaker role while political blocs grappled
Minister Abd Al Mahdi to remove foreign forces from Iraq,
over identifying his replacement. A spirited protest
but he deferred pending the seating of the new government.
movement, of unprecedented scope in Iraq’s post-2003
The U.S. operation eliminated key figures in Iran’s efforts
history, had erupted in October 2019 and mobilized
to shape Iraqi security and politics, but also led to the
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Iraq and U.S. Policy
temporary suspension of security cooperation and training.
and governance gaps in territory disputed between the
Some security cooperation activities have resumed, but
Kurdistan region and the rest of Iraq.
some Iraqi armed groups continue to conduct rocket and
IED attacks against Iraqi and U.S. facilities and convoys.
Partnership with the United States
Some attacks have killed and injured U.S. and coalition
Since 2017, the Trump Administration has sought to
personnel, along with Iraqi personnel and civilians.
promote Iraqi unity and stability, prevent an IS resurgence,
and limit Iranian influence in Iraq. Iraqi protestors’ calls for
In September 2020, the Trump Administration reportedly
improved governance, reliable local services, more
threatened to close the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad if Iraqi
trustworthy and capable security forces, and greater
authorities do not act more comprehensively against groups
economic opportunity broadly correspond to stated U.S.
threatening U.S. personnel and facilities. A closure of the
goals. During the peak period of unrest from October 2019
Embassy could limit U.S. diplomatic, consular, and
to March 2020, U.S. officials advocated for protestors’
assistance activities and could potentially be a prelude to
rights to demonstrate and express themselves, while urging
U.S. military strikes against hostile Iraqi armed groups,
Iraqi leaders to respond seriously to protestors’ demands
with or without Iraqi government support.
and to prevent attacks against unarmed demonstrators.
Pandemic Worsens and Economy Suffers Iraqi and U.S. leaders have engaged in a high-level strategic
Since March 2020, Iraq’s government has instituted travel
dialogue in 2020 to renew shared understandings about
restrictions and internal curfews while mobilizing the
bilateral security cooperation and U.S. assistance. Meeting
country’s limited health resources to fight the COVID-19
in August, Iraqi and U.S. officials endorsed continued
pandemic. Iraq’s public and private health systems have
security cooperation, including a U.S. military presence.
significant shortcomings and limited capacity. According to
U.S. Central Command subsequently announced that U.S.
the World Bank, Iraq has approximately 0.8 physicians and
force levels in Iraq would decline from 5,200 to 3,000.
1.3 hospital beds per 1,000 people (below the global
The drawdown announcement follows U.S. assessments
averages of 1.5 and 2.7, respectively). Data is incomplete,
that Iraq’s security forces increasingly are capable of
but reported infections have increased steadily since April,
independent operations again the remnants of the Islamic
with more than 4,000 new cases reported daily by August.
State group. In 2020, remaining U.S. forces have
As of September 28, Iraq had recorded more than 353,000
consolidated on fewer Iraqi facilities, returning a number of
COVID-19 cases with more than 9,050 deaths.
bases and facilities used for operations and training to full
COVID-19 mitigation measures have deepened an
Iraqi control. U.S. military remain in Iraq pursuant to a
economic contraction that had already begun in urban areas
2014 exchange of diplomatic notes under the 2008 bilateral
paralyzed by protests in late 2019 and early 2020. In
Strategic Framework Agreement. The U.S. Consulate in
parallel, a precipitous drop in global oil prices has slashed
Basra remains closed due to security concerns. The U.S.
state finances. Iraq remains dependent on oil exports for
Consulate in Erbil remains operational.
more than 90% of its budget revenue, much of which pays
Congress has authorized U.S. train and equip programs for
salaries and benefits to state employees and retirees. The
Iraq through December 2020, including aid to KRG forces,
draft 2020 budget assumed an oil export price of $56 per
and has appropriated defense funding for the train and
barrel, but the COR has not adopted it or an alternative. Iraq
equip programs through September 2021. Since 2014,
has been forced both to accept lower prices and reduce
Congress has appropriated more than $6.5 billion for train
output in accordance with decisions reached by the
and equip programs for Iraqis. The Administration seeks
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
$645 million for these programs for FY2021.
and non-OPEC countries (OPEC+), including Russia.
The United States provides foreign aid in Iraq in support of
Protests have followed cabinet-approved public sector
de-mining programs, public sector financial management
spending cuts.
reform, U.N.-coordinated stabilization, and other goals. The
Views from the Kurdistan Region
U.S. government has obligated more than $365 million in
Leaders of Iraq’s federal Kurdistan Reg
stabilization aid to liberated areas of Iraq since 2016,
ional Government
(KRG) recognized Arab protestors’ concerns and criticized
including funds to aid religious and ethnic minority
repressive violence during the 2019-2020 protests. They
communities. Congress allocated $451.6 million for U.S.
also convened to unify positions on proposed reforms that
foreign aid programs in Iraq in FY2020. The Trump
some Kurds fear could undermine the Kurdistan region’s
Administration has requested $124.5 million for FY2021.
rights under Iraq’s constitution. The two largest Kurdish
The United States is the top humanitarian funding donor for
parties, the Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
Iraq and has provided more than $2.7 billion in
and the Suleimaniyah-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
humanitarian aid for Iraq programs since 2014. Nearly 1.4
(PUK), hold significant numbers of COR seats and won the
million Iraqis remain internally displaced and many more
most seats in the KRG’s September 2018 regional election.
remain in need of aid.
KDP leader Masrour Barzani serves as KRG Prime
Congress may seek to clarify the Trump Administration’s
Minister. His cousin Nechirvan Barzani is KRG President.
KRG leaders continue to consult with Baghdad on several
goals for strategic dialogue with Iraq and offer its own
outstanding oil export, budget, and security issues, and have
perspectives during consideration of FY2021 aid requests
instituted local COVID-19 containment and curfew
and the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act.
measures. Islamic State insurgents have exploited security
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Iraq and U.S. Policy
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs
IF10404
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