Updated September 25, 2020
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
Cuba; increased U.S. economic sanctions; and the
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
economic decline associated with the Coronavirus Disease
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The Economist Intelligence
isolating the government.
Unit is forecasting an 8.3% economic contraction in 2020.
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift
Cuba’s public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic
moving away from sanctions toward engagement and the
appears to have been effective. As of September 24, 2020,
normalization of relations . Changes included the rescission
the country reported 118 deaths, with a mortality rate of
of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international
1.04 per 100,000 people (among the lowest rates in the
terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of diplomatic
hemisphere), according to Johns Hopkins University. Cuba
relations (July 2015); and an easing of restrictions on travel,
has provided international assistance to respond to the
remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and
pandemic by sending over 3,700 medical professionals to
financial services (2015 and 2016, accomplished through
almost 40 countries worldwide, including in Europe, Africa,
amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations,
and Latin America and the Caribbean.
administered by the Treasury Department, and the Export
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
Administration Regulations, administered by the Commerce
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June
Department). The restoration of relations led to increased
2017 that introduced new sanctions, including restrictions
government-to-government engagement, with over 20
bilateral agreements and numerous bilateral dialogues.
on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
military. The State Department issued a list of “restricted
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
entities” in 2017, which has been updated several times,
2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back some
most recently in June 2020. The list includes 229 entities
efforts to normalize relations. By 2019, the Trump
and subentities, including 2 ministries, 5 holding companies
Administration had largely abandoned engagement by
and 53 of their subentities, 111 hotels, 2 tourist agencies, 5
increasing economic sanctions significantly to pressure the
marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 41 entities serving
Cuban government for its human rights record and support
defense and security sectors.
for the government of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.
Since 2019, the Administration has imposed a series of
Cuban Political and Economic Developments. In April
increasingly strong sanctions against Cuba for its poor
2018, Miguel Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice
human rights record and its support for the Maduro
president, succeeded Raúl Castro as president, but Castro
government. In addition to the sanctions noted below, the
continues to head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021.
Administration has increased efforts (including visa
The selection of Díaz-Canel, now 60 years old, reflected the
restrictions) to call attention to allegations of coercive labor
generational change in Cuban leadership that began several
practices in Cuba’s foreign medical missions, a major
years ago and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban
foreign exchange earner for Cuba. In May 2020, the State
revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government.
Department (pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export
While in power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to
Control Act) also added Cuba to its annual list of countries
implement significant economic policy changes, moving
certified as not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism
toward a more mixed economy with a stronger private
efforts, the first such certification for Cuba since 2015.
sector, but his government’s slow, gradualist approach did
not produce major economic improvements.
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba.
Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed
In a February 2019 referendum, Cubans approved a new
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels
constitution that introduced such changes as an appointed
that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. In July 2019, it
prime minister to oversee government operations; limits on
sanctioned Cuba’s state-run oil import/export company.
the president’s tenure (two five-year terms) and age (60,
Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective
beginning first term); and market-oriented economic
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file
reforms, including the right to private property and the
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property
promotion of foreign investment. However, the new
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
constitution ensures the state sector’s dominance over the
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
economy and the predominant role of the Communist Party.
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
In October 2019, Cuba’s National Assembly appointed
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time
Díaz-Canel as president under the new constitution. In
of the confiscation. To date, 26 lawsuits have been filed
December 2019, Díaz-Canel appointed tourism minister
Manuel Marrero Cruz as prime minister.
against U.S. and foreign companies, including cruise
ship operators, airlines, travel booking companies, and
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by Venezuela’s
hotels; several lawsuits have been dismissed by federal
economic crisis, which has reduced Venezuela’s support for
courts or by plaintiffs. Previous Administrations had
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
suspended, at six-month intervals, the right to file such
human rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders listed 132
lawsuits pursuant to the provisions of the law. Secretary
political prisoners, with 74 imprisoned for reasons of
Pompeo cited Cuba’s repression of its own people and
conscience; Amnesty International designated six of these
its support for the Maduro regime in Venezuela as
as prisoners of conscience in 2019. After six months of
reasons for the implementation of Title III. The
detention, José Daniel Ferrer, leader of the opposition
European Union and Canada criticized the
Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU), was released in April
Administration’s action, vowing to ban enforcement or
2020 to house arrest after receiving a 4½-year sentence on
recognition of any judgement, allow counterclaims, and
assault charges that critics assert were trumped up.
potentially seek action in the World Trade Organization.
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. In June
According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy
2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-to-
community members suffered a series of unexplained
people educational travel and the Commerce
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
Department generally prohibited cruise ships, private
incidents occurred in late 2016 and 2017, but two occurred
and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from
in May 2018). The State Department maintains that the U.S.
going to Cuba. In September 2019, the Treasury
investigation has not reached a definitive conclusion
Department capped family remittances (not previously
regarding the cause or source of the injuries. Cuba strongly
limited) to $1,000 per quarter per Cuban national and
denies responsibility for the injuries. In September 2017,
eliminated the category of donative remittances. The
the State Department ordered the departure of
Transportation Department suspended commercial
nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to
flights to cities other than Havana in December 2019;
minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff
charter flights to cities other than Havana in January
was reduced by about two-thirds. The staff reduction has
2020 (which were capped to 3,600 flights annually in
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing.
June 2020); and all private charter flights to Havana,
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued
effective October 13, 2020 (public charter flights to and
to fund Cuba democracy assistance and U.S.-government
from Havanan remain permitted).
sponsored broadcasting to Cuba: $20 million for democracy
programs and $29.1 million for broadcasting in FY2019
On September 23, 2020, President Trump announced
(P.L. 116-6) and $20 million for democracy programs and
further sanctions, including a prohibition against U.S.
$20.973 million for broadcasting in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94,
travelers, including those visiting family, from staying at
Division G). P.L. 116-94 (Division J) included benefits for
over 400 hotels linked to the Cuban government
U.S. government employees and dependents injured while
(essentially all Cuban hotels) and at privately owned
stationed in Cuba. For FY2021, the Administration
residences for rent (casas particulares) if they are
requested $10 million for democracy programs and $12.973
controlled by a prohibited Cuban government official or
million for broadcasting. The House-passed version of the
Communist Party member (or a close relative of either);
FY2021 foreign aid appropriations bill, Division A of H.R.
the State Department subsequently issued a list of the
7608 (H.Rept. 116-444), approved July 24, 2020, would
prohibited Cuban accommodations. Authorized U.S.
provide $20 million for democracy programs and fully fund
travelers to Cuba also were prohibited from bringing
back alcohol or tobacco from Cuba for personnel use.
the broadcasting request. In other legislative action, the
Senate approved S.Res. 454 in June 2020, calling for the
Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September
release of democracy activist José Daniel Ferrer.
2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn
transactions, which allowed banking institutions to
Among other bills , several would ease or lift U.S. sanctions:
process certain funds transfers originating and
H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R. 1898/S. 1447
terminating outside the United States. In October 2019,
(U.S. agricultural exports); H.R. 2404 (overall embargo);
the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to
and H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel). H.R. 4884 would reinstate
leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de
the Cuban Family Reunification Program. S. 3977 would
minimis rule (from 25%) requiring a third country-based
require the State Department to report on countries with
company exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10%
Cuban medical missions. S. 4635 would require an annual
U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and imposed
report on Cuba’s medical missions and reinstate the Cuban
licensing requirements for the export of certain donated
Medical Professional Parole program. Several resolutions
items to organizations controlled by the Cuban
would address the following: Cuba’s medical missions
government or Communist Party and items for
(S.Res. 14/H.Res. 136); U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba
telecommunications infrastructure.
(H.Res. 92/S.Res. 232); religious/political freedom in Cuba
(S.Res. 215); the release of José Daniel Ferrer (H.Res. 774);
Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa
Las Damas de Blanco human rights organization (S.Res.
restrictions on Raúl Castro in September 2019 for gross
531); and the 35th anniversary of broadcasting to Cuba.
violations of human rights in Cuba and Venezuela.
Also see CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the
Further visa restrictions were imposed on Cuba’s
116th Congress and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S.
Interior Minister (November 2019) and Cuba’s defense
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.
minister (January 2020) for human rights violations.
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
IF10045
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
policy concern for many years. As of August 3, 2020, the
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permissio n of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 73 · UPDATED