Updated September 18, 2020
Crisis in Mali
The military seizure of power in August 2020 has
of parliament whom regional mediators asked to step down;
heightened political uncertainty in Mali amid severe
Kéïta also dissolved parliament when he resigned.
security, governance, and humanitarian challenges. Security
Figure 1. Mali at a Glance
conditions have worsened steadily in recent years as
Islamist insurgents have expanded from the north into
central Mali. A 2015 peace accord with northern separatists
remains largely unimplemented. Ethnic militias, some of
which appear to enjoy state backing, have massacred
civilians in the rural center and northeast. Bamako (Fig. 1),
while comparatively secure, has seen large terrorist attacks
in recent years, such as a hotel siege in 2015 that killed 19
civilians, including one American. Rebel, terrorist,
communal defense, and criminal networks often overlap.
These complex threats and security dynamics have impeded
socioeconomic development and humanitarian relief efforts
in a landlocked country with limited arable land. More than
287,000 Malians were internally displaced as of July 2020,
almost double the previous year, and at least 142,000 were
refugees in neighboring countries as of early 2020, per U.N.
figures. The novel coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic
has brought new health and economic difficulties.
Foreign troops have deployed to Mali since 2013 to try to
Source: CRS graphic. Data from CIA World Factbook and
improve stability and counter terrorism. MINUSMA, a
International Monetary Fund; 2020 estimates unless noted.
U.N. peacekeeping operation, comprises up to 15,209
Some protest leaders applauded the CNSP and pledged to
uniformed personnel. France has about 5,100 troops
work with it. West African leaders, for their part, decried its
deployed in West Africa’s Sahel region, including Mali,
actions and imposed trade and financial sanctions on Mali,
under Operation Barkhane, a French-led counterterrorism
calling for a civilian-led transitional administration that
mission to which the United States provides logistical
would govern for no more than a year prior to elections. In
support (as authorized by Congress under 10 U.S.C. §331)
mid-September, the CNSP issued plans for an 18-month
and intelligence sharing. The European Union (EU) runs
transition; it did not commit to handing power to civilians.
programs to train and restructure Mali’s military and build
Background
the capacity of its civilian security forces. In 2017, the
Mali has been mired in crisis since 2012, when state
countries of the G5 Sahel—Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
institutions nearly collapsed in the face of a northern
Burkina Faso, and Chad—initiated a “joint force” to
separatist rebellion, a military coup, and an Islamist
coordinate military operations in border regions.
insurgent advance. After junior military officers seized
Military seizure of power. On August 18, after months of
power from an elected president, northern rebels—fueled
growing anti-government protests, a group of military
by arms from Libya and bolstered by fighters with ties to
colonels led by Col. Assimi Goïta, a member of Mali’s elite
Algerian-led Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—
special forces battalion, seized power. The self-described
declared an independent state of “Azawad.” By mid-2012,
National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP)
AQIM and two loosely aligned groups had outmaneuvered
detained civilian officials including President Ibrahim
the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
Boubacar Kéïta, who resigned on television and later left
(MNLA) to assert control over most of the north. France
the country for medical care. Popular opposition to Kéïta,
intervened militarily against the Islamists in early 2013, at
who was reelected to a second term in 2018, had built for
which point the MNLA and other factions (re-)asserted
over a year, spurred by alleged interference in legislative
control in some areas. MINUSMA deployed in mid-2013,
elections held in early 2020, corruption scandals, worsening
and Kéïta won elections later that year, marking the end of
insecurity, militia violence, and economic hardships. In
Mali’s post-coup political transition. The 2012 coup leader,
June 2020, a loose alliance of politicians, civil society
Capt. Amadou Haya Sanogo, faces charges for the murder
actors, and followers of an influential Bamako religious
of rival soldiers, but his trial has been delayed repeatedly.
leader called for Kéïta to resign, provoking a violent state
Stalled Peace Accord
crackdown. Regional heads of state attempted to mediate,
In 2015, Kéïta’s administration signed a peace deal with
unsuccessfully. The National Assembly speaker (Kéïta’s
two northern armed coalitions: one led by ex-separatists,
constitutional successor) was among 31 disputed members
and one by pro-unity groups with ties to Bamako. Mediated
by Algeria with broad international backing, the so-called
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Crisis in Mali
Algiers Accord aimed to address northern political
fatalities in violent attacks by far. As of mid-2020, nine
grievances, reestablish state authority in the north, and
U.S. staff officers were serving in MINUSMA. MINUSMA
isolate designated jihadist groups, which were not party to
is not explicitly authorized to pursue counterterrorism, but
the talks. Implementation has lagged, however, while
can provide logistical support to the G5 force if reimbursed.
conflicts have multiplied and spread.
U.S. Policy and Aid
Today, state actors remain absent from much of the north
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale
and, increasingly, central Mali (which is outside the scope
testified to Congress in early 2020 that U.S. “diplomatic
of the accord). Signatory armed groups have not disarmed,
efforts are focused on supporting the 2015 Algiers Peace
and maintain parallel administrative structures in some
Accord, which remains the best mechanism for achieving a
areas. Jihadist groups have acted as spoilers, and maintain
peaceful and reconciled Mali.” He stated that broader U.S.
ties to some formerly allied signatory groups. U.N.
engagement in the Sahel “promotes inclusive and just
sanctions monitors have also reported the involvement of
political systems; advances regional security by combatting
signatory group members in drug trafficking, ethnic
violent extremists and traffickers; and encourages economic
violence, and cooption of humanitarian aid, along with state
growth and opportunity through sustainable development
official involvement in protection rackets and obstruction of
and increased American investment.” In March 2020, the
the peace process. New armed factions have emerged since
State Department appointed Dr. J. Peter Pham to serve as
2015, with varying views of the peace accord and the state.
the first U.S. Special Envoy for Sahel Stabilization.
The design and process behind the 2015 accord may also
The State Department and U.S. Agency for International
have contained the seeds of further destabilization. While
Development (USAID) allocated $130 million in bilateral
the accord is structured as a deal between Bamako and the
aid for Mali in FY2019 (excluding food aid), and $89
north, there is an armed struggle within the north over
million in additional emergency humanitarian assistance.
territory, trafficking routes, patronage, and revenge. The
Mali participates in the State Department-led Trans-Sahara
talks granted concessions to a relatively small number of
Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), but it has not been
actors who had taken up arms, alienating others who felt
a major regional recipient of U.S. military aid since the
victimized by the state and/or by signatory groups. The
2012 coup. U.S. security assistance has focused on defense
mediators ruled out discussion of federalism or altering the
sector reforms and building the counterterrorism capacity of
secular underpinning of Mali’s political system, issues with
Mali’s internal security forces. Mali’s designation under the
wide resonance in and beyond the north. Some Malians,
Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (Title IV of P.L.
including then-President Kéïta, have proposed peace talks
110-457) triggers restrictions on certain U.S. security aid; in
with Malian-led Islamist armed groups, but the idea
FY2020, President Trump waived most of these for Mali,
remains controversial, and Western donors have opposed it.
citing national interest, as permitted under the Act. Since
Islamist Insurgency
2018, DOD has sought to scale back its counterterrorism
In 2017, AQIM’s Sahel branch merged with an offshoot
footprint in West Africa, with uncertain implications for
and two local affiliates to form the Union for Supporting
Mali and U.S. support to France’s Operation Barkhane.
Islam and Muslims (aka JNIM), led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a
As of mid-September, the State Department had not
Malian ethnic Tuareg. JNIM has since claimed attacks on
determined whether the CNSP’s actions constituted a “coup
U.N., French, and state targets in Mali and Burkina Faso. In
d’état” with regard to §7008 of foreign aid appropriations
2018, JNIM attacked the G5 Sahel joint force headquarters
legislation (most recently, P.L. 116-94 Division G), which
in central Mali, forcing it to relocate to Bamako. A separate
would impose restrictions on certain aid to Mali’s
AQIM offshoot has affiliated with the Islamic State and
government (notably, military aid). On August 21, Special
claimed the 2017 deadly ambush of U.S. soldiers in Niger.
Envoy Pham stated that the Administration had suspended
These groups have proven resilient, withstanding French
support for Mali’s military pending further review.
strikes on top leaders and exploiting local grievances and
communal tensions. They have expanded their areas of
Via the U.N. Security Council, the United States has helped
operation, enlarged their recruitment base, killed dozens of
shape MINUSMA’s mandate and a U.N. sanctions regime
soldiers in attacks on local military outposts, and forced the
established in 2017. In line with Council actions, the United
retreat of state and rival actors by targeting civilian
States has designated five individuals for financial
officials, traditional leaders, and individuals accused of
sanctions under a Mali-specific Executive Order. (Other
colluding with the state and/or the French. Abuses by state
Malian individuals and groups are designated for U.S. and
security forces and ethnic militias may fuel recruitment by
U.N. global terrorism sanctions.) The State Department
offering a means of self-defense and retribution.
allocated $347 million for MINUSMA’s budget in FY2019;
U.N. Peacekeeping Operation
separate U.S. programs support African troop and police
contributors. In early 2020, U.S. diplomats at the U.N.
The U.N. Security Council has tasked MINUSMA with
called for MINUSMA to be downsized and reoriented
supporting implementation of the 2015 peace accord as a
“primary strategic priority,” most recently under Resolution
toward civilian protection in central Mali, and for sanctions
designations “on all sides of the conflict”—a possible
2531 (2020). Support for stabilization and the restoration of
reference to government actors. The Security Council
state authority in central Mali is the mission’s “second
strategic priority,” foll
renewed MINUSMA’s mandate in June without the
owed by protection of civilians and
proposed scope change, and Council members have not
other tasks. MINUSMA has struggled with logistical and
made new Mali sanctions designations to date.
force protection challenges. Many troop contingents are
reportedly underequipped; African troops (who make up
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
most of the largest contingents) have suffered the most
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Crisis in Mali
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