
 
 
September 16, 2020
Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Over the last decade, Russian private military companies 
personnel are highly experienced and trained ex-members 
(PMCs) have appeared globally in various conflicts. 
of Russia’s elite forces or intelligence services. Others 
Observers believe the Russian government is increasingly 
appear to be less qualified or trained and reportedly are paid 
using PMCs to project power cheaply and deniably. 
significantly less. Analysts have reported instances of 
Russian PMCs often operate alongside local militias, 
qualified, experienced Russian PMC personnel being used 
volunteers, criminal groups, and other non-state actors. In 
for specific operations and then gradually replaced by less 
many cases, such PMCs appear closely connected to and 
competent personnel.   
controlled by the Russian government; in other cases, the 
extent of government control is uncertain. Members of 
Multiple Russian PMCs are registered both domestically 
Congress may be interested in examining the scope of 
and internationally, including in Cyprus and Hong Kong. 
Russian PMC operations to understand the full range of 
Often companies are dissolved and reconstituted under new 
Russian tactics and operations when evaluating Russia’s 
management and names, often to obscure their true 
efforts to advance its foreign policy. 
ownership. The most well-known PMC is the Wagner 
Group (and entities related to it), allegedly financed and 
History and Legal Status 
operated by wealthy state-connected businessman Yevgeny 
During the 1990s, Russia experienced an increase in 
Prighozin (through his holding company, Concord 
internal demand for security services, which resulted in the 
Management and Consulting). The U.S. government has 
growth of a large domestic private protection industry. The 
imposed sanctions on Prigozhin, the Wagner Group, and/or 
fall of the USSR left many former soldiers , members of 
related individuals and entities for actions tied to Russia’s 
elite special forces, and intelligence professionals  jobless; 
invasion of Ukraine, U.S. election interference, and support 
many of these former soldiers formed associations with 
to the former government of Sudan.  
veterans of their old units and created new private security 
companies. Gradually, these firms and associations began 
Media reporting suggests the Wagner Group and its related 
to look internationally for business but were met with stiff 
entities maintain close connections to Russia’s military 
competition from Western private security companies. 
intelligence agency (GU). Reporting also has identified 
Additionally, a 1996 law forbade Russian citizens from 
Wagner training camps close to the bases of Russian 
participating in armed conflict abroad for financial gain. 
spetsnaz (special forces) brigades. Other firms appear to 
PMCs ostensibly remain illegal under Russian law, despite 
have close connections to Russia’s Ministry of Defense and 
several attempts to pass legislation that would give them 
other state security services. In some cases, tensions 
legal status. Observers suggest this may be due to 
between PMC outfits and their security service or military 
opposition from the official security services and sections 
patrons reportedly have resulted in infighting and arrests. 
of the military, which seek to ensure Russian security 
agencies retain control over these private actors and manage 
A defining feature of Russian PMCs is the blending of 
competition from them.  
private and Russian state interests. For example, the U.S. 
Treasury Department identifies the Wagner Group as “a 
Growth and Evolution 
designated Russian Ministry of Defence proxy force” 
By 2010, several internationally focused, operational 
despite it allegedly being operated by a private citizen. 
Russian private security companies, primarily run by 
former military and security service officers, appeared to 
The Russian government initially used PMCs extensively 
have close connections with the Ministry of Defense. 
during its invasion of Ukraine and its intervention in Syria. 
Initially, these companies offered traditional training and 
As the role of PMCs increased, the political and economic 
protection services for private firms, including anti-piracy 
power of their owners also increased. Over time, and as the 
services. Often these groups worked for, or had connections 
Russian government’s needs changed, Russian PMCs 
to, Russian state-run oil and gas companies. Gradually, new 
apparently began to pursue more commercially beneficial 
companies were formed that emphasized combat services, 
opportunities less directly connected to Russian foreign 
which included not only training and coordinating local 
policy objectives. Some analysts argue that, in some cases, 
forces but also participating in direct combat. This combat-
PMC owner/operators are pursuing financial opportunities 
oriented focus constitutes a main difference between 
in exchange for carrying out Russian state directives.  
Russian PMCs and Western security contractors, which 
tend to focus on logistics and support. 
Russian PMC Doctrine and Strategy 
The rise of Russian PMCs coincided with developments in 
The type, extent, and competency of Russian PMCs appear 
Russian military doctrine and strategy concerning the use 
to vary widely both across and within conflicts. Information 
and role of non-state actors in conflict. According to the 
on these groups and their activities is often imprecise. Some 
U.S. Treasury Department, “Russia relies on a highly 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
Russian  Private  Military  Companies  (PMCs) 
sophisticated apparatus consisting of state and non-state 
Country 
Deployment Actions 
agents and proxies, decades of experience carrying out 
influence operations around the globe, and the strategic 
Libya 
Combat, training, asset protection 
direction of Russian president Vladimir Putin.” The Russian 
military believes the importance of information and 
Central 
Training, asset protection, supplying 
political influence has increased in modern conflicts, 
African 
weaponry 
making nontraditional forms of coercion particularly 
Republic 
important. The Russian state may use PMCs prior to 
Sudan 
Training, asset protection, supplying 
conflict to prepare the battlefield, and it may deploy PMCs 
weaponry 
during conflict to increase Russia’s low-cost power-
projection capabilities  PMCs also generally increase speed 
Mozambique 
Combat, training 
and flexibility in conducting operations. Overall, PMCs 
Source: Compiled by CRS based on public U.S. government 
offer four potential benefits to the Russian state:  
documents, media reports, and U.N. sanctions monitoring reports. 
Deniability. PMCs may allow the Russian government to 
Ukraine: PMCs played a key role in Russia’s  2014 
deny and deflect accusations of direct involvement in 
invasion of Ukraine, both in direct combat and in the 
conflicts. Although the level of deniability is often tenuous, 
training and oversight of various rebel forces. Most PMC 
the Russian government appears to use PMCs to confuse 
personnel appear to have been highly qualified and well 
and complicate attribution rather than to fully hide its 
trained. The GU appears to have controlled their 
responsibility. This strategy often reduces the political costs 
deployment, and there are allegations PMCs assassinated 
of interventions and undermines international responses. 
rebel leaders who Russia found problematic. Analysts cite 
Ukraine as the first appearance of the Wagner Group.  
Casualty Avoidance.  By using PMCs, the Russian 
government can avoid official casualties, which may 
Syria: PMCs have seen extensive service in Syria, ranging 
increase domestic opposition and attention to foreign 
from oil field protection to direct combat, including 
operations. PMC losses are not subject to the same scrutiny 
engagements with U.S. forces . Analysts and media reports 
as Russian military losses, and Russian officials may 
have noted a range of goals and quality in personnel. Some 
consider PMC personnel more expendable than regular 
operations appear to be commercial—such as protecting oil 
troops. 
fields—and often are conducted by less skilled personnel. 
Other actions, such as combat and training of local allied 
Rapid  Deployment and  Withdrawal. PMCs provide the 
forces, appear to be conducted by highly skilled personnel 
Russian government with an easily scalable fighting force. 
and closely coordinated with the Russian military. 
They also provide increased flexibility, with the ability to 
inject, or withdraw, fighting forces on short notice. 
Libya:  Russian PMCs, specifically the Wagner Group, 
have played a relatively large role in supporting Libyan 
Low  Cost. Using PMCs is cheaper than using conventional 
National Army leader Khalifa Haftar since 2018. Support 
Russian forces. PMCs require less logistical support, and 
has included direct combat, training and advising, and 
the combination of public and private motives means PMCs 
overseeing the deployment of air defense systems  and 
often can sustain their presence through private financial 
aircraft.  
ventures (e.g., asset protection of valuable natural resource 
deposits) when not directly in service of the Russian state. 
Central African Republic (CAR): Since 2018, when 
Russia transferred a shipment of weapons to the 
PMCs also come with potential disadvantages. As noted, 
government of CAR—having obtained a U.N. Security 
some analysts have identified a wide range in quality 
Council exemption from an arms embargo imposed on the 
among PMC operations and outfits. PMCs also offer less 
country—Russian PMCs reportedly have provided security 
capability and capacity than Russian forces to decisively 
services, military training, and personal protection for top 
defeat committed opponents. Armed primarily with small 
CAR officials (including the president). Russian firms  
arms, PMCs generally are limited to acting as force 
connected to PMCs also have concluded mining contracts 
multipliers and are exposed without the support of 
with the state and established a presence at rebel-held 
conventional forces. 
diamond mines that are subject to international sanctions. 
Opaque ownership and varying levels of direct government 
Sudan: Since 2018, the Wagner Group and related entities 
control complicate attribution and assessment of Russian 
have been documented in Sudan training local s ecurity 
intent. Nevertheless, the growth of Rus sian PMCs and 
personnel (including troops from CAR) and protecting gold 
extensive operational experience mean their use may 
sector investments. 
increase in the future. 
Selected Russian PMC Deployments
Mozambique:  In 2019,  Wagner Group personnel 
 
reportedly deployed to Mozambique’s far north to train and 
Country 
Deployment Actions 
support government forces against a local Islamist 
insurgency with ties to the Islamic State. The PMC 
Ukraine 
Combat, training, assassinations 
appeared to suffer serious losses, however, and reportedly is 
no longer involved in such activity.
Syria 
Combat, training, asset protection 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
Russian  Private  Military  Companies  (PMCs) 
 
IF11650
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European 
Affairs   
 
 
Disclaimer 
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to 
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. 
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has 
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the 
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be 
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include 
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permissio n of the copyright holder if you 
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
 
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11650  · VERSION  1 · NEW