Updated September 1, 2020
U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers and Sanctions Snapback
Overview
spokesperson described as “…not formally a violation [of
A 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement (Joint
2231] because the S-300 is for defensive uses only.”
Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), provides for
limits on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions
Effects of the Ban
relief. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 (July 17,
Implying that the ban on arms sales to Iran has been
2015), which endorsed the JCPOA, contains Annex B that
effective, the congressionally mandated Defense
provides for a ban on the transfer of arms to or from Iran
Intelligence Agency (DIA) annual report on the military
until October 18, 2020. The Trump Administration, with
power of Iran for 2019, released in November 2019, states
the support of many in Congress, has sought to extend the
that Iran wants to “purchase new advanced weapon systems
ban in order to try to prevent Iran from acquiring new
from foreign suppliers to modernize its armed forces,
conventional weaponry, particularly advanced combat
including equipment it has largely been unable to acquire
aircraft. On August 14, the U.N. Security Council,
for decades.”
including two key potential arms suppliers of Iran—Russia
and China—voted down a U.S. draft to extend the arms
Figure 1. Iran’s Regional Allies
transfer ban. An overwhelming majority of the Council also
questions that the United States has standing for its August
20 request to implement the provision of Resolution 2231
that snaps back all U.N. sanctions on Iran, including the
arms transfer ban. The dispute within the Council over the
U.S snapback request has no clear path to resolution.
Annex B also contains a ban, until October 18, 2023, on
supplying equipment with which Iran could develop
nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and calls on Iran not to
develop ballistic missiles designed to carry nuclear
weapons. See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by
Kenneth Katzman.
Provisions of the Arms Transfer Ban
Annex B of Resolution 2231 restated and superseded the

restrictions of: (1) Resolution 1747 (March 24, 2007),
Source: Defense Intel igence Agency. Iran Military Power: 2019.
which banned Iran’s transfer of arms from its territory and
required all U.N. member states to prohibit the transfer of
By contrast, regarding the ban on Iranian arms exports, the
Iranian arms from its territory, and (2) Resolution 1929
DIA report (which represents a consensus U.S. judgment)
(June 9, 2010), which banned the supply to Iran of “any
stated: “Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has transferred a
battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre
wide range of weapons and military equipment to state and
artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters,
non-state actors, including designated terrorist
warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the
organizations.… Although some Iranian shipments have
purpose of the United Nations Register of Arms [ballistic or
been interdicted, Tehran is often able to get high-priority
cruise missiles capable of delivering a warhead or weapon
arms transfers to its customers. [See Figure 1.] Over the
of destruction to a range of at least 16 miles] or related
years, Iranian transfers to state and non-state actors have
materiel, including spare parts….” The Security Council
included communications equipment; small arms—such as
can waive the restrictions on a “case-by-case basis,” but no
assault rifles, sniper rifles, machine guns, mortars, and
Iran arms transfers have been approved to date. The ban
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs)—and ammunition; …
expires on the earlier of (1) five years after the JCPOA
artillery systems, including MRLs (multiple rocket
“Adoption Day” (ie: October 18, 2020), or (2) upon the
launchers) and battlefield rockets and launchers; armored
issuing by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
vehicles; FAC (fast attack craft); equipment for unmanned
of a “Broader Conclusion” that all nuclear material in Iran
explosives boats; … SAMs (surface-to-air missiles); UAVs
remains in peaceful activities.
(unmanned aerial vehicles) … ground-attack aircraft …”
and other weaponry. A June 2020 report by the U.N.
U.S. and other Security Council member officials interpret
Secretary General on implementation of Resolution 2231
the restriction as inapplicable to the sale to Iran of purely
assessed that Iran attempted to export weaponry and missile
defensive systems. In 2016, Russia delivered to Iran the S-
parts to Houthi forces in Yemen, and U.S. and allied forces
300 air defense system, which a State Department
intercepted some of that weaponry in November 2019 and
February 2020. See CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign
and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman.
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U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers and Sanctions Snapback
Figure 2. Iran Military Structure and Size Estimates
After the defeat of the effort to extend the arms transfer
ban, President Trump stated that the United States would
invoke a snapback of all U.N. sanctions that were lifted
upon implementation of the JCPOA, saying: We'll be doing
a snapback. You'll be watching it next week.” The U.S.
position that it can trigger a sanctions snapback is based on
a State Department legal interpretation of Resolution 2231
that a JCPOA “participant” could, after notifying the
Security Council of an issue that the government “believes
constitutes significant non-performance of [JCPOA]
commitments,” trigger (within 30 days) an automatic draft
resolution keeping sanctions relief in effect. A U.S. veto of
this resolution would reimpose the suspended sanctions. On
April 30, 2020, the then-State Department Special
Representative for Iran, Ambassador Brian Hook, asserted
Source: Defense Intel igence Agency. Iran Military Power: 2019.
that the U.S. status as a participant in the nuclear accord
under Resolution 2231 exists independently of the JCPOA.
Relevant Laws, Authorities, and Options
for the Administration and Congress
Governments of European countries, Russia, and China
The Trump Administration’s stated policy is to apply
opposed the U.S. assertion that remains a “participant” in
“maximum pressure” on Iran to compel it to alter its
the accord under Resolution 2231 and can trigger a
behavior. The Administration cited the expiration of the
sanctions snapback. On August 16, EU foreign policy chief
arms transfer ban as among the flaws in the JCPOA that
Josep Borrell said “Given that the US unilaterally withdrew
justified the U.S. exit from it in May 2018, and the
from the JCPOA in May 2018 and has not participated in
Administration has insisted that the arms transfer ban not
any JCPOA structures or activities subsequently, the US
expire. At a U.N. Security Council meeting on June 30,
cannot be considered as a JCPOA participant. We therefore
2020, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo said: “Don’t just
consider that the US is not in a position to resort to
take it from the United States, listen to countries in the
mechanisms reserved for JCPOA participants [such as the
region. From Israel to the Gulf, countries in the Middle
so-called snapback].”
East—who are most exposed to Iran’s predations—are
speaking with one voice: Extend the arms embargo.” A
Despite the opposition, Secretary of State Pompeo met on
May 4, 2020 letter, signed by 387 House Members, “urge[s]
August 20 with the U.N. Security Council presidency, held
increased diplomatic action by the United States to renew
in August by Indonesia, to deliver the formal U.S.
the expiring United Nations arms embargo against Iran….”
complaint that Iran is in material breach of the JCPOA and
that all U.N. sanctions should snap back. The next day, 13
The DIA report, cited above, states “Iran’s potential
of the 15 Security Council members wrote letters to the
acquisitions after the lifting of UNSCR 2231 restrictions
Indonesian rotating Council presidency asserting that the
include Russian Su-30 fighters, Yak-130 trainers, and T-90
United States does not have standing to implement the
MBTs (main battle tanks). Iran has also shown interest in
snapback. On that basis, Indonesia refused to circulate the
acquiring S-400 air defense systems and Bastian coastal
draft resolution maintaining sanctions relief, but U.S.
defense systems from Russia.” On June 23, 2020, Secretary
officials maintain that, on September 19, all U.N. sanctions
Pompeo posted this Twitter message: “If the U.N. Arms
will go back into effect. Indicating that a U.S. assertion of
Embargo on Iran expires in October, Iran will be able to
snapback will not be widely recognized, a joint letter of the
buy new fighter aircraft like Russia’s SU-30 and China’s J-
United Kingdom, France, and Germany stated that: “Any
10. With these highly lethal aircraft, Europe and Asia could
decisions and actions which would be taken based on this
be in Iran’s crosshairs.” The composition of Iran’s forces is
procedure or on its possible outcome would also be devoid
of any legal effect.”
depicted in Figure 2.
It is not clear what entity or person
might adjudicate the dispute.
In early August 2020, the United States circulated a draft
If a sanctions snapback is not widely recognized or
U.N. Security Council resolution that would extend the
implemented, the Administration might use its sanctions
arms transfer ban “until the Security Council decides
otherwise.”
authorities to deter any arms sales to Iran. These include the
On August 14, the Security Council completed
Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, the Iran, North
the voting process on the U.S. extension draft. The United
Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA),
States and the Dominican Republic voted in favor, Russia
Executive Order 13382, the Countering America’s
and China voted against, and the remaining eleven Council
Adversaries through Sanctions Act, and Iran’s designation
members abstained. The European countries on the Council
as a state sponsor of terrorism provides authorities for the
argued that extending the arms transfer ban would likely
President to sanction arms suppliers to Iran. Alternatively,
cause Iran to leave the JCPOA outright. Secretary of State
the United States might try to work with potential arms
Pompeo denounced the adverse U.N. vote, saying “The
Security Council’s failure to act decisively in defense of
sellers to Iran to dissuade them from completing any sales.
international peace and security is inexcusable.”
Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
IF11429
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U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers and Sanctions Snapback


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11429 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED

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