Updated August 19, 2020
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
Cuba; increased U.S. economic sanctions; and the
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
economic decline associated with the Coronavirus Disease
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The Economist Intelligence
isolating the government.
Unit is forecasting an 8.3% economic contraction in 2020.
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift
Cuba’s public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic
moving away from sanctions toward engagement and the
appears to have been effective. As of August 1, 2020, the
normalization of relations . Changes included the rescission
country registered 3,408 confirmed cases and 88 deaths,
of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international
with a mortality rate of 0.78 per 100,000 people (compared
terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of diplomatic
to 52.52 in the United States) according to Johns Hopkins
relations (July 2015); and an easing of restrictions on travel,
University. Cuba has provided international assistance to
remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and
respond to the pandemic by sending over 3,700 medical
financial services (2015 and 2016, accomplished through
professionals to almost 40 countries worldwide, including
amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations,
in Europe, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.
administered by the Treasury Department, and the Export
The pandemic led to increased calls, including by United
Administration Regulations, administered by the Commerce
Nations officials, for the United States to ease sanctions to
Department). The restoration of relations led to increased
make it less difficult for Cuba to acquire needed equipment,
government-to-government engagement, with over 20
bilateral agreements and numerous bilateral dialogues.
supplies, and medicines to confront the health crisis. U.S.
officials responded by maintaining that U.S. sanctions
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
allow for such exports providing humanitarian relief and
2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back some
assistance to the Cuban people.
efforts to normalize relations. By 2019, the Trump
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
Administration had largely abandoned engagement by
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June
increasing economic sanctions significantly to pressure the
2017 that introduced new sanctions, including restrictions
Cuban government for its human rights record and support
on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
for the government of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.
military. The State Department issued a list of “restricted
Cuban Political and Economic Developments. In April
entities” in 2017, which has been updated several times,
2018, Miguel Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice
most recently in June 2020. The list includes 229 entities
president, succeeded Raúl Castro as president, but Castro
and subentities, including 2 ministries, 5 holding companies
continues to head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021.
and 53 of their subentities, 111 hotels, 2 tourist agencies, 5
The selection of Díaz-Canel, now 60 years old, reflected the
marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 41 entities serving
generational change in Cuban leadership that began several
defense and security sectors.
years ago and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban
Since 2019, the Administration has imposed a series of
revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government.
sanctions against Cuba for its poor human rights record and
While in power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to
its support for the Maduro government. In addition to the
implement significant economic policy changes, moving
sanctions noted below, the Administration has increased
toward a more mixed economy with a stronger private
efforts (including visa restrictions) to call attention to
sector, but his government’s slow, gradualist approach did
not produce major economic improvements.
allegations of coercive labor practices in Cuba’s foreign
medical missions, a major foreign exchange earner for
In a February 2019 referendum, Cubans approved a new
Cuba. In addition, in May 2020, the State Department
constitution that introduced such changes as an appointed
(pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act)
prime minister to oversee government operations; limits on
added Cuba to its annual list of countries certified as not
the president’s tenure (two five-year terms) and age (60,
cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, the first
beginning first term); and market-oriented economic
such certification for Cuba since 2015.
reforms, including the right to private property and the
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba.
promotion of foreign investment. However, the new
Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed
constitution ensures the state sector’s dominance over the
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels
economy and the predominant role of the Communist Party.
that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. In July 2019, it
In October 2019, Cuba’s National Assembly appointed
sanctioned Cuba’s state-run oil import/export company.
Díaz-Canel as president under the new constitution. In
December 2019, Díaz-Canel appointed tourism minister
Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective
Manuel Marrero Cruz as prime minister.
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by Venezuela’s
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
economic crisis, which has reduced Venezuela’s support for
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
policy concern for many years. As of August 3, 2020, the
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
human rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders listed 132
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time
political prisoners, with 74 imprisoned for reasons of
of the confiscation. To date, 26 lawsuits have been filed
conscience; Amnesty International designated six of these
against U.S. and foreign companies, including cruise
as prisoners of conscience in 2019, including independent
ship operators, airlines, travel booking companies, and
journalist Roberto Quiñones. After six months of detention,
hotels; several lawsuits have been dismissed by federal
José Daniel Ferrer, leader of the opposition Patriotic Union
courts or by plaintiffs. Previous Administrations had
of Cuba, was released in April 2020 to house arrest after
suspended, at six-month intervals, the right to file such
receiving a 4½-year sentence on assault charges that critics
lawsuits pursuant to the provisions of the law. Secretary
assert were trumped up.
Pompeo cited Cuba’s repression of its own people and
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
its support for the Maduro regime in Venezuela as
According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy
reasons for the implementation of Title III. The
community members suffered a series of unexplained
European Union and Canada criticized the
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
Administration’s action, vowing to ban enforcement or
incidents occurred in late 2016 and 2017, but two occurred
recognition of any judgement, allow counterclaims, and
in May 2018). The State Department maintains that the U.S.
potentially seek action in the World Trade Organization.
investigation has not reached a definitive conclusion
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. In June
regarding the cause or source of the injuries. Cuba strongly
2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-to-
denies responsibility for the injuries. In September 2017,
people educational travel and the Commerce
the State Department ordered the departure of
Department generally prohibited cruise ships, private
nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to
and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from
minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff
going to Cuba. In September 2019, the Treasury
was reduced by about two-thirds. The staff reduction has
Department capped family remittances (not previously
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing.
limited) to $1,000 per quarter and eliminated the
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued
category of donative remittances. The Transportation
to fund Cuba democracy assistance and U.S.-government
Department suspended commercial flights between the
sponsored broadcasting to Cuba: $20 million for democracy
United States and Cuban cities other than Havana in
programs and $29.1 million for broadcasting in FY2019
December 2019; this was extended to charter fights
(P.L. 116-6) and $20 million for democracy programs and
(other than Havana) in January 2020, which were
$20.973 million for broadcasting in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94,
capped to 3,600 flights annually in June 2020. In August
Division G). P.L. 116-94 (Division J) included benefits for
2020, the Transportation Department suspended private
U.S. government employees and dependents injured while
charter flights to Cuba, effective October 13, but public
charter flights to and from Havana remain permitted.
stationed in Cuba. For FY2021, the Administration
requested $10 million for democracy programs and $12.973
Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September
million for broadcasting. The House-passed version of the
2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn
FY2021 foreign aid appropriations bill, Division A of H.R.
transactions, which allowed banking institutions to
7608 (H.Rept. 116-444), approved July 24, 2020, would
process certain funds transfers originating and
provide $20 million for democracy programs and fully fund
terminating outside the United States. In October 2019,
the broadcasting request. In other legislative action, the
the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to
Senate approved S.Res. 454 in June 2020, calling for the
leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de
release of democracy activist José Daniel Ferrer.
minimis rule (from 25%) requiring a third country-based
company exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10%
Among other introduced bills, several would ease or lift
U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and imposed
U.S. sanctions: H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R.
licensing requirements for the export of certain donated
1898/S. 1447 (U.S. agricultural exports); H.R. 2404 (overal
items to organizations controlled by the Cuban
embargo); and H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel). H.R. 4884 would
government or Communist Party and items for
direct the Administration to reinstate the Cuban Family
telecommunications infrastructure.
Reunification Program. S. 3977 would require the State
Department to report on countries contracting with Cuba for
Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa
medical missions. Several introduced resolutions would
restrictions on Raúl Castro in September 2019 for gross
address Cuba’s medical missions (S.Res. 14/H.Res. 136);
violations of human rights in Cuba and Venezuela.
U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba (H.Res. 92/S.Res. 232);
Further visa restrictions were imposed on Cuba’s
religious/political freedom in Cuba (S.Res. 215); the release
Interior Minister (November 2019) and Cuba’s defense
of José Daniel Ferrer (H.Res. 774); Las Damas de Blanco
minister (January 2020) for gross human rights
human rights organization, (S.Res. 531); and the 35th
violations. In February 2020, the Spanish hotel chain
anniversary of broadcasting to Cuba (H.Res. 971/S.Res.
Meliá confirmed its chief executive officer is prohibited
637). Also see CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in
from entering the United States pursuant to Title IV of
the 116th Congress.
the LIBERTAD Act, related to the trafficking of
property confiscated in Cuba.
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
IF10045
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 71 · UPDATED