Updated July 28, 2020
Algeria
The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic
Figure 1. Algeria at a Glance
largely halted a yearlong mass protest movement in early
2020, but questions remain about the future of Algeria’s
political system. Defining features have included a strong
presidency and security apparatus, a state-centric economy
with an oligarchic business class, and social welfare
programs fueled by oil and natural gas revenues. In early
2019, then-President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was forced to
abandon his reelection bid, and then to resign, amid
swelling protests and a public withdrawal of support from
then-chief of defense staff General Ahmed Gaïd Salah.
Senate leader Abdelkader Bensalah became interim head of
state pending elections for a new president, consistent with
the constitution, although the vote was delayed past
Source: CRS graphic; data from CIA World Factbook + IMF (2019).
constitutional timelines. Gaïd Salah then appeared to
consolidate influence at the expense of the powerful and
After the country was wracked by internal conflict in the
sometimes rival military intelligence service (which
1990s, Bouteflika’s two decade-long presidency
Bouteflika had brought under the presidency’s control) and
emphasized national reconciliation and improved living
of top business and ruling party figures, many of whom
standards, but official decision-making was often opaque,
were prosecuted on corruption or national security grounds.
with politicians, security officials, and business leaders
The election was ultimately held in December 2019, in the
reportedly wielding influence. Despite being largely
face of protester demands for deeper political changes.
silenced by illness, Bouteflika was reelected in 2014 and
Activists’ calls for a boycott appeared to depress turnout,
again sought reelection in 2019. Observers interpreted this
officially 40%. Abdelmadjid Tebboune (74), a former
as resulting from an elite impasse over who might succeed
prime minister who ran as an independent, was declared the
him, as members of the “revolutionary generation” who had
winner with 58%, besting four other political insiders.
long dominated politics aged and passed away.
Viewed as favored in the race by Gaïd Salah, Tebboune
Two parties dominate the institutionally weak parliament:
arguably hails from the economic nationalist wing of the
the National Liberation Front (FLN), which led the fight for
political elite: during his brief tenure as prime minister in
independence and was the sole legal party for decades, and
2017, he imposed sweeping import restrictions and sought
the National Rally for Democracy (RND), considered close
to curtail the influence of the business class. Gaïd Salah
to the military. Both backed former Minister of Culture
died of a heart attack shortly after the election and was
Azzedine Mihoubi for president in December 2019; he lost.
replaced by Gen. Saïd Chengriha (75), former army chief of
The opposition is diverse and divided, comprising leftist,
staff and a veteran of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars.
Islamist, Berber-led, and regionally focused parties. Many
Whether and how the events of 2019 might lead to more
exhibit internal divisions. Some analysts argue that political
accountable and transparent governance are uncertain, as is
Islam has been discredited in Algeria due to armed
the extent of President Tebboune’s power and commitment
Islamists’ role in the 1990s civil conflict, or—conversely—
to such goals. Tebboune has offered dialogue with
due to some Islamists’ accommodation with the state. The
protesters, pardoned some activists, and floated changes to
Islamic Salvation Front, whose rapid electoral gains in 1991
the constitution. At the same time, a growing number of
sparked a military coup and the subsequent conflict,
protest leaders and local journalists have faced criminal
remains banned. Religiously conservative Salafist social
charges and/or prison terms in 2020, and the constitutional
movements have grown in prominence since the conflict.
proposals appear unlikely to alter the fundamental balance
COVID-19. Algeria has been a COVID-19 hotspot in
of power. After the country locked down due to COVID-19
Africa, possibly due in part to travel and family connections
in March-April 2020, authorities blocked several critical
with Europe, along with ample domestic transportation
internet news sites, while parliament enacted a new law
infrastructure (which facilitates internal travel and thus,
criminalizing “fake news” deemed harmful to state security.
contagion). As of July 24, Algeria had recorded nearly
Hundreds of people were reportedly detained when small
25,500 cases (about 5.8 per 10,000 people, slightly higher
protests resurged in some cities in May-June 2020.
than Morocco and significantly higher than Tunisia), and
Economic challenges, which have worsened with the
the rate of new infections was rising. The pandemic’s
pandemic, may fuel further unrest.
economic impact, including continued downward pressure
Context. Algeria remained comparatively stable between
on global energy prices, is also a key concern; as of April,
2011 and 2018 amid turmoil elsewhere in North Africa, but
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted Algeria’s
the prospect of an uncertain leadership transition loomed.
GDP would shrink by 5.2% in 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Algeria
Terrorism and Counterterrorism
Foreign Policy and Regional Issues
Cells linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) are
Algeria’s foreign policy emphasizes sovereignty and
apparently active in some areas, but the pace of terrorist
noninterference. Leaders’ skepticism of Western powers
attacks has decreased continuously since the early 2000s.
and NATO are a legacy of the country’s history of French
State security forces have conducted frequent counter-
settler colonialism (1830-1962) and the long armed struggle
terrorism operations and bolstered their presence in border
for independence. Algeria’s defense budget (about $10
regions since wars broke out in Libya and Mali in 2011.
billion/year) is the largest in Africa. Longstanding policy
The government administers de-radicalization programs
prohibits military deployments abroad, although recently
and seeks to control the content of religious sermons.
proposed constitutional amendments could change this.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a U.S.-
Algiers mediated Mali’s 2015 peace accord and backed
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, originated as a
U.N.-led political talks in Libya. Complex and often
faction in Algeria’s 1990s conflict, but the group’s center of
distrustful relations with neighboring states (along with
gravity has moved south and east over the past decade. The
Algerian elites’ current focus on internal political
most recent large attack linked to the group within Algeria
questions) have hindered past efforts to coordinate a
occurred in 2013, when an AQIM splinter faction mounted
regional response to security threats in West Africa’s Sahel
an assault on a natural gas plant in which 39 foreigners
region. Relations with Morocco remain tense due to a
(including three Americans) were killed. In 2017, the same
regional rivalry and disaccord over Western Sahara.
splinter faction joined with AQIM’s southern wing and two
Morocco claims (and administers most of) the disputed
Malian allies to form the Malian-led Group for Supporting
territory, while Algeria hosts and backs the independence-
Islam and Muslims (aka JNIM). AQIM’s leader, an
seeking Polisario Front.
Algerian reportedly based in northeast Algeria, was killed
Algeria’s foreign policy has often conflicted with that of the
in a U.S.-assisted French military strike in northern Mali in
United States. For example, Algeria has close ties to Russia
June 2020. There have been few IS-linked attacks since the
and China, is highly critical of Israel, opposed the 2011
beheading of a French tourist in 2014, but in 2019, IS
NATO-led intervention in Libya, and maintains relations
claimed an attack on soldiers in Tamanrasset, in the south.
with the Asad government in Syria. The United States has
The Economy and Energy Sector
recognized neither Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over
Algeria has the world’s 10th- and 16th-largest proven
Western Sahara, nor the Polisario’s Sahrawi Arab
reserves of natural gas and oil, respectively, and was the
Democratic Republic, which Algeria recognizes as a state.
10th-largest natural gas producer in 2019. It is also thought
U.S. Relations
to have the 3rd-largest recoverable shale gas reserves. State-
During a visit to Algiers in 2018, then-Deputy Secretary of
owned enterprises reportedly comprise over half of the
State John Sullivan stated a “commitment to strengthening
formal economy, led by the national oil and gas company,
and broadening U.S.-Algerian relations.” In early 2019, the
Sonatrach. Most of Algeria’s natural gas exports go to
Administration hosted a U.S.-Algeria Strategic Dialogue,
Europe, by pipeline or ship; Italy is Algeria’s top export
which had last convened in 2015. Like its predecessors, the
destination. China is the top source of imports, and a key
Trump Administration has praised U.S.-Algeria cooperation
player in the infrastructure and construction sector.
on regional crises and counterterrorism (notably via
High global energy prices prior to 2014 allowed Algeria to
information sharing and coordination in multilateral
accrue sizable foreign reserves, which financed its large
forums), while criticizing Algeria’s challenging business
military and social programs that arguably assuaged dissent.
environment. Algeria’s reliance on Russia for defense
Since then, the price drop has caused fiscal deficits and
acquisitions has also sparked friction, though Algerian
spurred concerns about the sustainability of Algeria’s
purchases of U.S. equipment have grown in recent years.
economic (and political) model. Foreign reserves declined
U.S. bilateral aid allocations in FY2019 comprised $1.1
by more than half between 2014 and 2018, according to the
million for International Military Education and Training
IMF (latest available), and unemployment has risen. The
(IMET) and $0.4 million for Nonproliferation,
IMF has criticized Algeria’s reliance on monetary
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR).
expansion to finance deficit spending. (Algeria has little
The Administration has proposed to increase bilateral aid in
external debt and does not borrow from the IMF.)
FY2021 to $2 million in economic aid and $1.3 million in
Algerian leaders have long called for greater diversification
IMET. Additional funds are often allocated for Algeria via
and foreign investment, but reforms that could encourage
regional or global programs, e.g., to promote economic
such outcomes have largely stalled, notwithstanding some
growth, strengthen civil society, and counter violent
legal changes in 2019 and 2020 portrayed locally as pro-
extremism. Algeria participates in, but is not a top focus of,
business. Most investments are required by law to be at
the State Department-led Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism
least 51% locally owned. Limits on capital flows and
Partnership. Congress has not authorized the Defense
currency exchange further inhibit foreign investment and
Department to aid Algeria in securing its border with Libya
private sector growth, as do bureaucratic red tape, the
on a reimbursement basis, as it has for Tunisia and Egypt.
absence of a modern financial market, and an under-
CRS Research Assistant Sarah Collins contributed to this
developed stock exchange and banking system. Weak
update.
infrastructure links to neighboring countries and the
dispute-driven closure of the border with Morocco since
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
1994 constrain trade. Algeria has applied to join the World
Trade Organization (WTO) but has yet to qualify.
IF11116
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Algeria
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