Updated July 27, 2020
U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes
Introduction
with a “maximum speed value,” as well as associated parts
In March 2018, the United States submitted a proposal to
and components, a Department of State official told CRS on
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners
December 4, 2018. The official did not specify the
that would relax the regime’s export guidelines for certain
proposed speed value. The proposal also included a method
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). Advocates of altering
for determining the speed of such a UAS, a feature not
the guidelines to ease such exports argue that increasing
contained in the current MTCR annex, and a definition of
competition from foreign UAS manufacturers is
“cruise missile.” The proposed changes would not apply to
undermining the competitive advantage of their U.S.
cruise missiles or affect current MTCR treatment of either
counterparts. Other observers have emphasized the need to
complete production facilities or technology for the
maintain the MTCR’s standards, which are widely regarded
development and production of complete systems. Assistant
as effective. For more information on the MTCR, see CRS
Secretary of State Christopher Ford noted during a July 24,
Report RL33865, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A
2020, event that the United States has “repeatedly … made
Catalog of Treaties and Agreements. Congress has
technical changes and various other adjustments to our
frequently expressed interest in issues concerning UAS
reform proposal in response to issues raised and ideas that
development and use, as well as missile proliferation, and
were suggested by our MTCR partners.”
also conducts oversight of U.S. UAS exports.
The proposed changes, which have not gained the MTCR
The MTCR, according to its website, “seeks to limit the
partners’ required consensus approval, are a part of a
risks of proliferation of” nuclear, biological, and chemical
broader Donald Trump Administration UAS export policy.
weapons (NBC weapons) “by controlling exports of goods
Announced in April 2018, this policy replaced a similar
and technologies that could make a contribution to delivery
2015 Obama Administration measure and states that all
systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.”
U.S. UAS transfers “will be reviewed consistent with U.S.
Established in 1987 by the United States and six other
international nonproliferation commitments,” including
countries, the MTCR, which holds several meetings per
Washington’s MTCR commitments. An April 19, 2018,
year and currently consists of 35 partner countries, is an
National Security Presidential Memorandum from President
informal voluntary arrangement whose partners agree to
Trump similarly states that the United States will continue
apply common export policy guidelines to an annex
its “participation in and support for” the regime.
containing two categories of controlled items. Partner
On July 24, the Trump Administration announced that it
countries implement these guidelines pursuant to national
was implementing a new UAS export policy similar to the
legislation and regularly exchange information on relevant
proposal described above. The new policy will “treat a
export licensing issues, including denials of technology
carefully selected subset of MTCR Category I UAS, which
transfers. The MTCR guidelines apply to both armed and
cannot travel faster than 800 kilometers per hour, as
unarmed UAS.
Category II” and thereby “overcome the MTCR’s strong
According to the MTCR, Category I items are the most
presumption of denial” for these systems. Despite these
sensitive and include complete UAS “capable of delivering
policy changes, the United States will “keep promoting” the
a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km,
MTCR proposal described above, Ford stated on July 24.
their major complete subsystems … and related software
and technology,” as well as “specially designed” production
Category I UAS Exporters
facilities for these UAS and subsystems. Partner
The United States has exported MTCR Category I UAS to
governments should have “a strong presumption to deny”
France, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom; all of
such transfers, regardless of their purpose, but may transfer
these governments are MTCR partners. Press and
such items on “rare occasions.” The guidelines prohibit
nongovernmental expert reports also name China and the
exports of production facilities for Category I items.
United Arab Emirates (UAE) as exporters of MTCR
Regime partners have greater flexibility with respect to
Category I UAS. China is not an MTCR partner but agreed
authorizing exports of Category II items, which include less
in 1992 to adhere to the MTCR guidelines. The UAE is not
sensitive and dual-use missile related components. This
an MTCR partner; the government has no policy
category also includes complete UAS, regardless of
concerning Category I UAS exports, a UAE government
payload, capable of ranges of at least 300 km, as well as
representative told CRS on December 26, 2018, adding that
other UAS with certain characteristics.
the country needs no such policy because it does not
produce or export such systems.
Details
The proposal that the United States submitted during the
Potential Threat
March 2018 MTCR Technical Experts Meeting would
Experts have expressed concern for at least 25 years that
provide Category II treatment for a certain subset of UAS
UAS proliferation would enable the spread of NBC
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U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes
weapons; specifically, some observers have argued that
“responsibility for taking all steps necessary to ensure that
hostile actors could convert some types of UAS into cruise
the item is put only to its stated end-use.” Moreover, a
missiles or incorporate UAS technology into such missiles.
government is only to authorize transfers of items that
RAND reports from 2014 and 2018 have downplayed this
“could contribute to [an NBC] delivery system” if the
risk, however. Whether any country is acquiring or
government receives “appropriate assurances from the
attempting to acquire UAS for developing or producing
[recipient] government” that the recipient will use the items
cruise missiles is unclear. Some observers have also warned
only for their stated purpose and will refrain from
that hostile governments or nonstate actors could use UAS
modifying, replicating, or retransferring the items without
for disseminating chemical and biological agents.
the exporting government’s prior consent.
The proliferation implications of the March 2018 U.S.
Other multilateral regimes restrict the export of
proposal are uncertain. The relevant UAS “have essentially
technologies that could enable the development of NBC
nothing to do with WMD,” Assistant Secretary of State
payloads for UAS. For example, the Nuclear Suppliers
Ford stated on February 12, 2019. Faster delivery vehicles
Group (NSG) governs nuclear-related exports, and the
are widely regarded as more effective, but the potential
Wassenaar Arrangement performs a similar function with
effects of the proposal’s speed component on NBC
respect to conventional arms and certain dual-use goods and
weapons proliferation is unclear. Furthermore, relaxing
technologies. The Australia Group is the analogous
MTCR UAS controls could set a negative precedent,
organization for technologies relevant to chemical and
according to at least one expert. Former State Department
biological weapons.
official Vann Van Diepen warned in a February 2018
speech that “changes made to MTCR Category I controls
U.S. Controls
on non-cruise-missile UAVs” could legitimize a future
In addition to the controls implemented as part of U.S.
MTCR decision to relax controls on conventionally armed
membership in the multilateral groups described above, the
Category I ballistic and cruise missiles, given these
United States imposes a number of other restrictions on
missiles’ “increasing role in conventional military
UAS exports. The State Department administers export
operations.”
controls on military UAS and other defense articles; the
statutory basis for this system is the Arms Export Control
Other MTCR Constraints on
Act (AECA; P.L. 94-329). Section 71(a) of that law
Proliferation
requires the Secretary of State to maintain a list of all items
The MTCR guidelines state that governments should
on the MTCR annex that are not controlled pursuant to U.S.
consider six factors when considering requests for the
dual-use controls. The AECA also restricts the uses to
export of MTCR annex items: (1) concerns about NBC
which U.S.-origin defense articles may be put and prohibits
proliferation; (2) the “capabilities and objectives of the
transfers of such items to third parties without U.S.
missile and space programs of the recipient state”; (3) the
government permission. For example, Section 38(a)(2)
“significance of the transfer in terms of the potential
requires that the executive branch “take into account”
development” of NBC delivery systems; (4) the
whether such an export would “contribute to an arms race
“assessment of the end use of the transfers,” including the
or regional instability” or “aid in” NBC weapons
government assurances described below; (5) the
development. The Export Controls Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-
“applicability of relevant multilateral agreements”; and (6)
232, Subtitle B, Part I) provides broad, detailed legislative
the “risk of controlled items falling into the hands of
authority for the President to implement controls on the
terrorist groups and individuals.”
export of dual-use items, including dual-use UAS and
related components. U.S. regulations on dual-use exports
The MTCR guidelines provide other mechanisms for
contain catch-all controls with respect to UAS.
preventing UAS exports from contributing to NBC
weapons proliferation. For example, the guidelines stipulate
The U.S. government also implements regulations to ensure
that a strong presumption of denial applies to transfers of
that recipients of U.S.-origin UAS use the items for their
any item on the MTCR annex or any unlisted missile if the
declared purpose. According to an April 2018 State
partner government “judges, on the basis of all available,
Department fact sheet, the United States will transfer
persuasive information” that the items “are intended to be
military UAS “only with appropriate technology security
used for” NBC delivery. Moreover, partner governments’
measures.” Both the State and Commerce Departments
export controls must require authorization for the transfer of
conduct end-monitoring to determine whether recipient
unlisted items in cases where the government has informed
countries are using exported items appropriately. Some
an exporter that such items “may be intended, in their
military UAS “may be subject to enhanced end-use
entirety or part, for use in connection with [NBC] delivery
monitoring,” as well as “additional security conditions,” the
systems … other than manned aircraft.” These restrictions
State Department fact sheet says. According to the Defense
are known as “catch-all” controls.
Security Cooperation Agency, articles subject to such
monitoring “are accompanied by specialized physical
In addition, the MTCR guidelines state that, in cases where
security and accountability notes.” U.S. transfers of MTCR
the exporting government does not judge the proposed
Category I UAS also “shall require periodic consultations
Category I UAS transfer as intended for NBC delivery, the
with” the U.S. government with respect to the systems’ use,
government is to obtain “binding government-to-
government undertakings” from the recipient state that
according to the State Department fact sheet.
“[n]either the items nor replicas nor derivatives thereof will
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
be retransferred without” the exporting government’s
consent. The exporting government must also assume
IF11069
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U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11069 · VERSION 7 · UPDATED

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