Updated July 16, 2020
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
will serve as the president’s administrative right-hand man
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
in implementing policy.
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
isolating the government.
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by both Venezuela’s
economic crisis, which has reduced Venezuela’s support for
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift
Cuba, increased U.S. economic sanctions, and the economic
moving away from sanctions toward engagement and the
shutdown in response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019
normalization of relations . Changes included the rescission
(COVID-19) pandemic. Before COVID-19, the Economist
of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international
Intelligence Unit estimated the Cuban economy would
terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of diplomatic
contract 0.7% in 2020; it is now projecting an 8.3% decline.
relations (July 2015); and an easing of restrictions on travel,
The global contraction in economic growth, trade, foreign
remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and
investment, and tourism likely will slow Cuba’s post-
financial services (2015 and 2016, accomplished through
COVID-19 economic recovery.
amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations,
Cuba’s public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic
administered by the Treasury Department, and the Export
appears to have been effective to date. As of July 16, 2020,
Administration Regulations, administered by the Commerce
the country registered over 2,400 confirmed cases and 87
Department). The restoration of relations led to increased
deaths, with a mortality rate of 0.77 per 100,000 people
government-to-government engagement, with over 20
bilateral agreements and numerous bilateral dialogues.
(compared to 41.76 in the United States, according to Johns
Hopkins University). Cuba has provided international
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
assistance to respond to the pandemic by sending over
2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back some
3,400 medical professionals to more than 30 countries
efforts to normalize relations. By 2019, the Trump
worldwide, including in Europe, Africa, and throughout the
Administration had largely abandoned engagement by
Caribbean and Central America.
increasing economic sanctions significantly to pressure the
The pandemic led to increased calls, including by United
Cuban government for its human rights record and support
Nations officials, for the United States to ease sanctions to
for the government of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.
make it less difficult for Cuba to acquire needed equipment,
Cuban Political and Economic Developments. In April
supplies, and medicines to confront the health crisis. U.S.
2018, Miguel Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice
officials responded by maintaining that U.S. sanctions
president, succeeded Raúl Castro as president, but Castro
allow for such exports providing humanitarian relief and
continues to head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021.
assistance to the Cuban people.
The selection of Díaz-Canel, now 60 years old, reflects the
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
generational change in Cuban leadership that began several
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June
years ago and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban
2017 that introduced new sanctions, including restrictions
revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government.
on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
While in power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to
military. The State Department issued a list of “restricted
implement significant economic policy changes, moving
entities” in 2017, which has been updated several times,
toward a more mixed economy with a stronger private
most recently in June 2020. The list includes 229 entities
sector, but his government’s slow, gradualist approach did
and subentities, including 2 ministries, 5 holding companies
not produce major improvements to the economy, which
and 53 of their subentities, 111 hotels, 2 tourist agencies, 5
has experienced minimal growth in recent years.
marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 41 entities serving
In a February 2019 referendum, Cubans approved a new
defense and security sectors.
constitution that introduced such changes as an appointed
Since 2019, the Administration has imposed a series of
prime minister to oversee government operations; limits on
sanctions against Cuba for its poor human rights record and
the president’s tenure (two five-year terms) and age (60,
its support for the Maduro government. The Administration
beginning first term); and market-oriented economic
also has targeted Cuba’s foreign medical missions, a major
reforms, including the right to private property and the
foreign exchange earner, for not addressing allegations of
promotion of foreign investment. However, the new
coercive labor practices. Nevertheless, Cuba’s medical
constitution ensures the state sector’s dominance over the
diplomacy, has generated political goodwill, including
economy and the predominant role of the Communist Party.
recent support during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In October 2019, Cuba’s National Assembly appointed
Díaz-Canel as president under the new constitution. In
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba.
December 2019, Díaz-Canel appointed tourism minister
Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed
Manuel Marrero Cruz as prime minister, who reportedly
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. In July 2019, it
Title IV of the LIBERTAD Act, related to the
sanctioned Cuba’s state-run oil import/export company.
trafficking of property confiscated in Cuba.
Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property
policy concern for many years. The human rights group
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
Cuban Prisoners Defenders listed 134 political prisoners in
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
May 2020, with 75 imprisoned for reasons of conscience.
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
Amnesty International designated six individuals as
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time
prisoners of conscience in 2019, including independent
of the confiscation. To date, 26 lawsuits have been filed
journalist Roberto Quiñones, sentenced to one year in
against U.S. and foreign companies, including cruise
prison in August 2019. After six months of detention, José
ship operators, airlines, travel booking companies, and
Daniel Ferrer, leader of the opposition Patriotic Union of
hotels; several lawsuits have been dismissed by federal
Cuba was released in April 2020; he remains under house
courts or by plaintiffs. Previous Administrations had
arrest after receiving a 4½-year sentence on assault charges
suspended, at six-month intervals, the right to file such
that critics assert were trumped up.
lawsuits pursuant to the provisions of the law. Secretary
Pompeo cited Cuba’s repression of its own people and
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
its support for the Maduro regime in Venezuela as
According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy
reasons for the implementation of Title III. The
community members suffered a series of unexplained
European Union and Canada criticized the
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
Administration’s action, vowing to ban enforcement or
incidents occurred in late 2016 and 2017, but two occurred
recognition of any judgement, allow counterclaims, and
in May 2018). The State Department maintains that the U.S.
potentially seek action in the World Trade Organization.
investigation has not reached a definitive conclusion
regarding the cause or source of the injuries. Cuba strongly
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. In June
denies responsibility for the injuries. In September 2017,
2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-to-
the State Department ordered the departure of
people educational travel altogether, and the Commerce
nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to
Department generally prohibited cruise ships, private
minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff
and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from
was reduced by about two-thirds. The staff reduction has
going to Cuba. In September 2019, the Treasury
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing.
Department capped family remittances, which
previously were not limited, to $1,000 per quarter and
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued
eliminated the category of donative remittances. The
to fund Cuba democracy assistance and U.S.-government
Transportation Department suspended commercial
sponsored broadcasting to Cuba: $20 million for democracy
flights between the United States and Cuban cities other
programs and $29.1 million for broadcasting in FY2019
than Havana in December 2019; this was extended to
(P.L. 116-6) and $20 million for democracy programs and
charter fights in January 2020, which were later capped
$20.973 million for broadcasting (P.L. 116-94, Division G)
to 3,600 flights annually, effective June 2020.
in FY2020. P.L. 116-94 (Division J) included benefits for
U.S. government employees and dependents injured while
Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September
stationed in Cuba. For FY2021, the Administration
2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn
requested $10 million for democracy programs and $12.973
transactions, which allowed banking institutions to
million for broadcasting. The House Appropriations
process certain funds transfers originating and
Committee-reported bill, H.R. 7608 (H.Rept. 116-444),
terminating outside the United States. In October 2019,
would provide $20 million for democracy programs and
the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to
would fully fund the broadcasting request. In other action,
leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de
on June 11, 2020, the Senate approved S.Res. 454 calling
minimis rule (from 25%) requiring a third country-based
for the release of democracy activist José Daniel Ferrer.
company exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10%
U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and imposed
Among other introduced bills, several would ease or lift
licensing requirements for the export of certain donated
U.S. sanctions: H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R.
items to organizations controlled by the Cuban
1898/S. 1447 (U.S. agricultural exports); H.R. 2404 (overal
government or Communist Party and items for
embargo); and H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel). H.R. 4884 would
telecommunications infrastructure.
direct the Administration to reinstate the Cuban Family
Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa
Reunification Program. S. 3977 would require the State
restrictions on Raúl Castro in September 2019 for gross
Department to report on countries contracting with Cuba for
violations of human rights in Cuba and Venezuela.
medical missions. Several introduced resolutions would
Further visa restrictions were imposed on Cuba’s
address Cuba’s medical missions (S.Res. 14/H.Res. 136);
Interior Minister (November 2019) and Cuba’s defense
U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba (H.Res. 92/S.Res. 232);
minister (January 2020) for gross human rights
religious/political freedom in Cuba (S.Res. 215); the release
violations in Venezuela. In February 2020, the Spanish
of José Daniel Ferrer (H.Res. 774); Las Damas de Blanco
hotel chain Meliá confirmed its chief executive officer is
human rights organization, (S.Res. 531); and the 35th
prohibited from entering the United States pursuant to
anniversary of broadcasting to Cuba (H.Res. 971/
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
S.Res. 637). Also see CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S.
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Policy in the 116th Congress.
IF10045
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