INSIGHTi
New U.S. Marine Corps Force
Design Initiatives
Updated June 5, 2020
Background
On March 23, 2020, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) announced a major force design initiative planned to
occur over the next 10 years. The Marine Corps aims to redesign the force for naval expeditionary
warfare and to better align itself with the National Defense Strategy, in particular, its focus on
strategically competing with China and Russia. The Marines intend to eliminate or reduce certain types of
units and eliminate some military occupational specialties (MOS). The Marines also plan to reorganize
higher echelon Marine formations and get smaller—reducing forces by 12,000 personnel by 2030.
Congress in its regulatory, oversight, and authorization and appropriations roles could take interest in this
major proposed force design initiative.
Major Ground Force Eliminations/Reductions/Realignments
Marine ground force eliminations/reductions/realignments include the following:
eliminate all Marine Corps Tank Battalions and associated MOSs;
eliminate all Law Enforcement Battalions and associated MOSs;
eliminate all Bridging Companies and associated MOSs;
reduce the number of Infantry Battalions from 24 to 21;
reduce the number of Cannon Artillery Batteries from 21 to 5; and
reduce the number of Amphibious Vehicle Companies from 6 to 4.
Major Aviation Force Deactivations
Marine aviation force deactivations include the following:
Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264;
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462;
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Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 469;
Marine Wing Support Groups 27 and 37; and
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367.
Of particular note, the Marines plan to reduce the number of F-35 B and C aircraft (see CRS Report
RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler) in each squadron from 16 to 10.
Reorganization at Higher Echelons
Per the Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG), the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
headquartered at Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan, is to be the focal point of higher echelon
modernization described as follows:
The Marine Corps is to establish three Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) organized,
trained, and equipped to accomplish sea denial and control within contested maritime
spaces as part of the modernized III MEF.
The III MEF’s Pacific posture is to be augmented by three globally deployable Marine
Expeditionary Units (MEUs) possessing both traditional and Expeditionary Advanced
Base capabilities that can deploy with nonstandard Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs).
I MEF (Camp Pendleton, CA) and II MEF (Camp Lejeune, NC) are to generate forces to
support MLRs and MEUs.
First Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) Being Formed
The first MLR is reportedly being formed in Hawaii, largely from units already stationed there. The 3rd
Marine Regiment in Hawaii is to be the first to transform to a MLR, and it is planned to conduct
experimentation before converting the other two regiments, the 4th and 12th Marine Regiments, which are
stationed in Japan. The MLR is to include about 1,800 to 2,000 Marines and sailors, and it would include
three main elements: a Littoral Combat Team (LCT), a Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, and a Littoral Logistics
Battalion. The LCT is to be organized around an infantry battalion along with a long-range anti-ship
missile battery. The LCT is intended to provide the basis for employing multiple platoon-reinforced-size
expeditionary advance base (EAB) sites that can conduct missions such as long-range anti-ship fires,
forward arming and refueling of aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) of key
maritime terrain, and air-defense and early warning. The Littoral Anti-Air Battalion is intended to employ
air defense, air surveillance and early warning, air control, and forward rearming and refueling
capabilities. The Littoral Logistics Battalion is to provide tactical logistics support to the MLR by
resupplying expeditionary advance base sites, managing cache sites, and connecting to higher-level
logistics providers and provide r medical and maintenance capabilities. A regimental headquarters would
supplement these organizations with enhanced signals and human intelligence, reconnaissance,
communications, logistics planning, civil affairs, cyber, and information operations capabilities.
Proposed Future Capabilities of the Redesigned Force
As part of the redesigned Marine Corps for 2030, the Marines intend to pursue the following capabilities:
Expansion of Long-Range Fires: Achieve a 300% increase in rocket artillery capacity,
which, in conjunction with anti-ship missiles, is intended to significantly expand the
Marine Corps’ ability to support the fleet commander in sea control and denial
operations.
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Lighter, More Mobile and Versatile Infantry: Reduce the size of infantry battalions in
order to support naval expeditionary warfare and to facilitate distributed and
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations.
Investments in Unmanned Systems: Double the number of unmanned aerial systems
(UAS) squadrons and austere lethal unmanned air and ground systems to enhance the
ability to sense and strike targets.
Maritime Mobility and Resilience: Seek new capabilities to increase littoral maritime
mobility and resilience, including a new light amphibious warship, as well as more
affordable stern-landing and operational support vessels.
Mobile Air Defense and Counter-Precision Guided Missile Systems: Pursue a variety
of efforts to include directed energy systems, loitering munitions, signature management,
electronic warfare, and expeditionary airfield capabilities and structure to support
manned and unmanned aircraft and other systems from austere, minimally developed
locations.
Potential Issues for Congress
Potential issues for Congress include, but are not limited to the following:
The elimination of Marine Tank Battalions represents a significant reduction in the ability
to confront enemy armor threats. How will the Marines compensate for the loss of this
capability?
The estimated elimination of 76% of the Marine Cannon Artillery Batteries represents a
significant reduction in organic on-shore artillery fire support. How will the Marines
compensate for this loss?
The reduction of F-35s per squadron and the possible reduction in Joint Light Tactical
Vehicles (JLTVs) (see CRS Report RS22942, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV):
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert) resulting from unit
eliminations/deactivations have implications beyond the Marines, as both are major Joint-
Service programs. How might this planned reduction in Marine requirements for F-35s
and JLTVs affect the other military service’s procurement plans for these systems?
Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces–Crisis Response units (SPMAGTF-CR)
have been used by Combatant Commanders to respond to limited crises in their regions.
Will the Marines continue to support SPMAGTF-CRs in its redesigned force structure?
How do proposed Marine force design changes and intended future capabilities efforts
(e.g., long-range fires, smaller infantry battalions) fit into the larger context of changes in
Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts and Navy fleet architecture, including the
amphibious fleet? (See CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA
Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke,
and CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.)
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Author Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Disclaimer
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to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
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