Updated June 5, 2020
Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are
deaths are currently surging in some countries, especially
diverse and include economic, political, security, and
Brazil. Before the pandemic, the International Monetary
humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured
Fund projected a regional economic growth rate of 1.6% in
strong economic linkages between the United States and the
2020; its revised forecast is for a contraction of 5.2%. The
region, and the United States is a major trading partner and
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the
source of foreign investment for many Latin American and
Caribbean projects that almost 29 million people in the
Caribbean countries. Free-trade agreements (FTAs) have
region will move into poverty in 2020. Many countries may
augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries in the
struggle with protracted recoveries.
region. The Western Hemisphere is a large source of U.S.
immigration, both legal and illegal; geographic proximity
Trump Administration Policy
and economic and security conditions are major factors
Under the Trump Administration, U.S. relations with Latin
driving migration trends.
America and the Caribbean generally have moved toward a
more confrontational approach from one of engagement and
Curbing the flow of illicit drugs from Latin America and
partnership during past Administrations. In 2018, the State
the Caribbean has been a key component of U.S. relations
Department set forth a framework for U.S. policy toward
with the region and a major interest of Congress for
the region focused on three pillars for engagement—
decades. The flow of illicit drugs, including heroin,
economic growth and prosperity, security, and democratic
methamphetamine, and fentanyl from Mexico and cocaine
governance. The framework reflects continuity with long-
from Colombia, poses risks to U.S. public health and safety.
standing regional U.S. policy priorities, but it appears at
Since 2000, Colombia has received support through Plan
odds with the Administration’s sometimes antagonistic
Colombia and its successor programs . For over a decade,
actions and statements on immigration, trade, and foreign
the United States also has sought to forge partnerships with
aid. According to Gallup and Pew Research Center polls,
other countries to combat drug trafficking and related
negative views of U.S. leadership in the region have
violence and to advance citizen security, including through
increased markedly during the Trump Administration.
the Mérida Initiative, begun in 2007 to support Mexico; the
Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI),
Foreign Aid. The Administration’s proposed foreign aid
begun in 2008; and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
budgets for the region would have cut assistance levels by
(CBSI), begun in 2009.
more than a third in FY2018 and FY2019 and by 30% in
FY2020. Congress essentially rejected those requests by
Another long-standing component of U.S. policy is support
providing significantly more assistance in appropriations
for democratic governance and the rule of law. U.S. policy
measures. In 2019, the Trump Administration withheld
efforts have supported democracy promotion, including
some assistance to the “Northern Triangle” countries of
support for strengthening civil society and promoting
Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras)
human rights and the rule of law.
to compel governments to curb the flow of migrants to the
United States. The FY2021 request of $1.4 billion would
Increasing Chal enges in the Region
cut aid to the region by 18%, but a large proposed aid
Over the past several years, the quality of democracy has
increase to support a potential democratic transition in
eroded in numerous countries, along with public
Venezuela masks significantly larger cuts for many
satisfaction with how democracy is working. Venezuela has
countries and programs. In response to the COVID-19
descended into a dictatorship under President Nicolás
pandemic, as of late May 2020, the Administration had
Maduro, and Cuba and Nicaragua are ruled by authoritarian
announced $112 million in new and previously announced
regimes repressing the political opposition. Other countries
assistance to help the region respond to the pandemic.
have experienced social unrest fueled by political factors
such as fraudulent elections, weak democratic institutions,
Trade. In 2017, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal
politicized judicial systems, public corruption scandals,
from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA
high levels of crime and violence, and organized crime’s
negotiated in 2015 by 12 Asia-Pacific countries; the TPP
effect on state institutions. Economic factors such as
would have increased U.S. economic linkages with Chile,
declining or stagnant growth rates, high levels of income
Mexico, and Peru, which were parties to the agreement. The
inequality, and increased poverty also have increased social
President strongly criticized the North American Free Trade
pressure. Protests that racked numerous countries in 2019
Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada and
could reemerge, as underlying conditions that fueled unrest
repeatedly threatened U.S. withdrawal. The Administration
persist.
initiated renegotiations in 2017, and the three countries
agreed in 2018 to a new United States-Mexico-Canada
Most significantly in 2020, the Coronavirus Disease 2019
Agreement (USMCA) that retained many of NAFTA’s
(COVID-19) pandemic is having widespread economic,
provisions and included modernizing features and new
social, and political effects in the region. Infections and
provisions on the auto and dairy industries.
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
Mexico, Central America, and Immigration. Relations
Congressional Action in the 116th Congress
with Mexico have been tested because of inflammatory
Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy
anti-immigrant rhetoric and immigration actions that have
toward Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of both
shifted the burden of interdicting migrants and offering
legislation and oversight.
asylum to Mexico. In 2017, the Administration announced
it would end the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
The 116th Congress completed action on FY2019 foreign
program; begun in 2012, the program provides relief from
aid appropriations when it enacted the Consolidated
deportation for certain immigrants who arrived as children.
Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), in February 2019.
The program’s future remains uncertain, given challenges
Amounts appropriated for key U.S. initiatives and countries
in federal court. In 2018, Mexico’s president agreed to
exceeded the Administration’s request by almost $600
allow the United States to return certain non-Mexican
million. Congress completed action on the FY2020 foreign
migrants to Mexico (pursuant to Migrant Protection
aid budget in December 2019, when it enacted the Further
Protocols) while awaiting U.S. immigration court decisions.
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94);
amounts for key countries and regional programs once
Other Administration actions on immigration have caused
again significantly exceeded the Administration’s request.
concern in the region. In 2017, the Administration
In February 2020, Congress began consideration of the
announced plans to terminate Temporary Protected Status
Administration’s FY2021 foreign aid request.
(TPS) designations for Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and
Honduras, but federal court challenges have put the
In January 2020, Congress completed action on
terminations on hold.
implementing legislation for the USMCA (P.L. 116-113).
Before legislative approval, the agreement was amended to
Unauthorized migration from Central America has
address congressional concerns regarding provisions on
increased in recent years, fueled by difficult socioeconomic
labor (including enforcement), the environment, dispute
and security conditions and poor governance. The
settlement, and intellectual property rights.
Administration has used various policy tools to deter such
migration. In addition to aid cuts and threats of increased
On Venezuela, in December 2019, Congress enacted the
U.S. tariffs and taxes on remittances, these tools have
VERDAD Act of 2019 in Division J of P.L. 116-94, which,
included controversial asylum cooperation agreements—
among its provisions, codifies several sanctions and
also referred to as safe third country agreements—with
authorizes humanitarian assistance and support for
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras to permit the United
international election observation and democratic civil
States to transfer asylum applicants from third countries to
society. The measure incorporates provisions from S. 1025
the Northern Triangle countries.
and three March 2019 House-passed bills: H.R. 854; H.R.
920, and H.R. 1477. In July 2019, the House also approved
Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. As the situation in
H.R. 549, which would provide TPS to Venezuelans.
Venezuela has deteriorated, the Trump Administration has
imposed targeted and broader financial sanctions, including
The FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
sanctions against the state oil company, the country’s main
116-92), approved in December 2019, includes provisions
source of income. In January 2019, the Administration
on Venezuela and Guatemala and reporting requirements on
recognized the head of Venezuela’s National Assembly,
Brazil, Honduras, Central America, and Mexico.
Juan Guaidó, as interim president. In September 2019, the
United States joined 11 other Western Hemisphere
In other action, the House approved H.R. 133 in January
countries to invoke the Rio Treaty to facilitate a regional
2019, which would promote U.S.-Mexican economic
response to the Venezuelan crisis. The Administration also
partnership and exchanges; the Senate approved an
is providing humanitarian and development assistance for
amended version in January 2020. The House approved
Venezuelans who have fled to other countries, especially
H.R. 2615 in July 2019, which would authorize assistance
Colombia, and for Venezuelans inside Venezuela.
to Central America’s Northern Triangle countries to address
the root causes of migration. The Senate approved S.Res.
On Cuba, the Trump Administration has abandoned the
35 in April 2019, expressing support for democratic
policy of engagement advanced during the Obama
principles in Bolivia, and S.Res. 447 in January 2020,
Administration and imposed economic sanctions on Cuba
supporting new elections in Bolivia following October 2019
for its poor human rights record and support for the Maduro
elections allegedly marred by fraud. Both houses also
government in Venezuela. Sanctions have included
approved resolutions (H.Res. 441 in July 2019 and S.Res.
restrictions on travel and remittances and efforts to disrupt
277 in October 2019) commemorating the 25th anniversary
oil flows from Venezuela. In 2017, the State Department
of the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual
cut the staff of U.S. Embassy Havana by about two-thirds in
Association in Buenos Aires. In March 2020, the House
response to unexplained injuries of U.S. diplomatic staff.
approved H.Res. 754, expressing support for U.S. efforts to
promote democracy and human rights in Nicaragua and
Since political unrest in Nicaragua against the government
increase pressure on the Ortega government.
of President Daniel Ortega began to grow in 2018, the
Trump Administration has employed targeted sanctions
For more, see CRS Report R46258, Latin America and the
against several individuals due to their alleged ties to
Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress.
human rights abuses or significant corruption.
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
IF10460
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10460 · VERSION 13 · UPDATED

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