Updated May 29, 2020
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
appointed tourism minister Manuel Marrero Cruz as prime
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
minister, who reportedly will serve as the president’s
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
administrative right-hand man in implementing policy.
isolating the government.
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by both Venezuela’s
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy
economic crisis, which has reduced Venezuela’s support for
shift moving away from sanctions toward engagement and
Cuba and increased U.S. economic sanctions, and the
the normalization of relations. The policy change included
economic shutdown in response to the Coronavirus Disease
the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Before COVID-19, the
international terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of
Economist Intelligence Unit estimated the Cuban economy
diplomatic relations (July 2015); and efforts to increase
would contract 0.7% in 2020; now, it is projecting a more
travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba by
than 8% decline. The global contraction in economic
easing restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
growth, trade, foreign investment, and tourism likely will
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
slow Cuba’s post-COVID-19 economic recovery.
(2015 and 2016, accomplished through amendments to the
As of May 28, 2020, Cuba registered over 2,000 confirmed
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, administered by the
COVID-19 cases and 82 deaths (a mortality rate of 0.72 per
Treasury Department, and the Export Administration
100,000 people, compared to 31.06 in the United States,
Regulations, administered by the Commerce Department).
according to Johns Hopkins University). Cuba has been
The restoration of relations led to increased government-to-
providing international assistance to respond to the
government engagement, with over 20 bilateral agreements
pandemic by sending some 2,300 medical professionals to
negotiated and numerous bilateral dialogues.
more than 20 countries worldwide, including in Europe,
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
Africa, and throughout the Caribbean and Central America.
2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back some
The pandemic has led to increased calls, including by
efforts to normalize relations. By 2019, the Trump
United Nations officials, for the United States to ease
Administration had largely abandoned engagement by
sanctions to make it less difficult for Cuba to acquire
increasing economic sanctions significantly to pressure the
needed equipment, supplies, and medicines to confront the
Cuban government for its human rights record and support
health crisis. U.S. officials responded by maintaining that
for the government of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.
U.S. sanctions allow for such exports providing
Cuban Political and Economic Developments. In April
humanitarian relief and assistance to the Cuban people.
2018, Miguel Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
president, succeeded Raúl Castro as president, but Castro
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June
continues to head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021.
2017 that introduced new sanctions. These included the
The selection of Díaz-Canel, now 59 years old, reflects the
elimination of people-to-people travel for individuals and
generational change in Cuban leadership that began several
restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by
years ago and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban
the Cuban military. The State Department issued a list of
revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government.
“restricted entities” in 2017, which has been updated
While in power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to
several times, most recently in November 2019. The list
implement significant economic policy changes, moving
includes 223 entities and subentities, including 2 ministries,
toward a more mixed economy with a stronger private
5 holding companies and 49 of their subentities, 109 hotels,
sector, but his government’s slow, gradualist approach did
2 tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and
not produce major improvements to the economy, which
41 entities serving defense and security sectors.
has experienced minimal growth in recent years.
Since 2019, the Administration has imposed a series of
In February 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a new
sanctions against Cuba for its poor human rights record and
constitution in a national referendum. The changes include
its support for the Maduro government. The Administration
the addition of an appointed prime minister to oversee
also has targeted Cuba’s foreign medical missions, a major
government operations; limits on the president’s tenure
foreign exchange earner for Cuba, for not addressing
(two five-year terms) and age (60, beginning first term);
allegations of coercive labor practices. (Cuba’s medical
and market-oriented economic reforms, including the right
diplomacy, however, has generated political goodwill,
to private property and the promotion of foreign
including recent support during the COVID-19 pandemic).
investment. However, the new constitution ensures the state
sector’s dominance over the economy and the predominant
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba.
role of the Communist Party. In October 2019, Cuba’s
Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed
National Assembly appointed Díaz-Canel as president
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels
under the new constitution. In December 2019, Díaz-Canel
that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. In July 2019, it
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
imposed sanctions on Cuba’s state-run oil import and
Title IV of the LIBERTAD Act, related to the
export company.
trafficking of property confiscated in Cuba.
Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property
policy concern for many years. The human rights group
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
Cuban Prisoners Defenders listed 134 political prisoners in
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
May 2020, with 75 imprisoned for reasons of conscience.
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
Amnesty International designated six individuals as
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time
prisoners of conscience in 2019, including independent
of the confiscation. To date, some 25 lawsuits have been
journalist Roberto Quiñones, sentenced to one year in
filed against U.S. and foreign companies, including
prison in August 2019. After six months of detention, José
cruise ship operators, airlines, travel booking
Daniel Ferrer, leader of the opposition Patriotic Union of
companies, and hotels; several lawsuits have been
Cuba (UNPACU), was released in April 2020; he remains
dismissed by federal courts or by plaintiffs. Previous
under house arrest after receiving a 4½-year sentence on
Administrations had suspended, at six-month intervals,
assault charges that critics assert were trumped up.
the right to file such lawsuits pursuant to the provisions
of the law. Secretary Pompeo cited Cuba’s repression of
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
its own people and its support for the Maduro regime in
According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy
Venezuela as reasons for the implementation of Title III.
community members suffered a series of unexplained
The European Union and Canada criticized the
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
Administration’s action, vowing to ban enforcement or
incidents occurred in late 2016 and 2017, but two occurred
recognition of any judgement, allow counterclaims in
in May 2018). The State Department maintains that the U.S.
European and Canadian courts, and potentially seek
investigation has not reached a definitive conclusion
action in the World Trade Organization.
regarding the cause or source of the injuries. Cuba strongly
denies responsibility for the injuries. In September 2017,
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. In June
the State Department ordered the departure of
2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-to-
nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to
people educational travel altogether, and the Commerce
minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff
Department generally prohibited cruise ships, private
was reduced by about two-thirds. The staff reduction has
and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing.
going to Cuba. In September 2019, the Treasury
Department capped family remittances, which
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued
previously were not limited, to $1,000 per quarter and
to fund democracy assistance for Cuba and U.S.-
eliminated the category of donative remittances. The
government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2019,
Transportation Department suspended commercial
Congress appropriated $20 million for democracy programs
flights between the United States and Cuban cities other
and $29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 116-6,
than Havana in December 2019; this was extended to
H.Rept. 116-9). For FY2020, Congress appropriated $20
charter fights in January 2020, which were later capped
million for democracy programs and $20.973 million for
to 3,600 flights annually, effective June 2020.
Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 116-94, Division G); Division J of
the law includes benefits for U.S. government employees
Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September
and dependents injured while stationed in Cuba. The
2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn
measure includes several Cuba reporting requirements in
transactions, which allowed banking institutions to
H.Rept. 116-78 and S.Rept. 116-126. Congress has begun
process certain funds transfers originating and
consideration of the Administration’s FY2021 budget
terminating outside the United States. In October 2019,
request of $10 million for Cuba democracy programs and
the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to
$12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting.
leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de
minimis rule (from 25%) requiring a third country-based
Among other bills, several would ease or lift U.S. sanctions:
company exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10%
H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R. 1898/S. 1447
U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and imposed
(U.S. agricultural exports); H.R. 2404 (overall embargo);
licensing requirements for the export of certain donated
and H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel). H.R. 4884 would direct the
items to organizations controlled by the Cuban
Administration to reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification
government or Communist Party and items for
Parole Program. Several resolutions would express
telecommunications infrastructure.
concerns regarding Cuba’s foreign medical missions
(S.Res. 14/H.Res. 136); U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba
Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa
(H.Res. 92/S.Res. 232); religious and political freedom in
restrictions on Raúl Castro in September 2019 for gross
Cuba (S.Res. 215); and the release of UNPACU members
violations of human rights in Cuba and Venezuela.
(S.Res. 454 and H.Res. 774). S.Res. 531 would honor Las
Further visa restrictions were imposed on Cuba’s
Damas de Blanco human rights organization, and H.Res.
Interior Minister (November 2019) and Cuba’s defense
971 would commemorate the 35th anniversary of
minister (January 2020) for gross human rights
broadcasting to Cuba. Also see CRS Report R45657, Cuba:
violations in Venezuela. In February 2020, the Spanish
U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress.
hotel chain Meliá confirmed its chief executive officer is
prohibited from entering the United States pursuant to
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
IF10045
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