Updated May 7, 2020
U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes
Introduction
provide Category II treatment for a certain subset of UAS
In March 2018, the United States submitted a proposal to
with a “maximum speed value,” as well as associated parts
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners
and components, a Department of State official told CRS on
that would relax the regime’s export guidelines for certain
December 4. The official did not specify the proposed
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). Advocates of altering
speed value. The proposal also included a method for
the guidelines to ease such exports argue that increasing
determining the speed of such a UAS, a feature not
competition from foreign UAS manufacturers is
contained in the current MTCR annex, and a definition of
undermining the competitive advantage of their U.S.
“cruise missile.” The proposed changes would not apply to
counterparts. Other observers have emphasized the need to
cruise missiles or affect current MTCR treatment of either
maintain the MTCR’s standards, which are widely regarded
complete production facilities or technology for the
as effective. For more information on the MTCR, see CRS
development and production of complete systems.
Report RL33865, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A
Catalog of Treaties and Agreements. Congress has
The proposed changes, which have not gained the MTCR
frequently expressed interest in issues concerning UAS
partners’ required consensus approval, are a part of a
development and use, as well as missile proliferation, and
broader Trump Administration UAS export policy.
also conducts oversight of U.S. UAS exports.
Announced in April 2018, this policy replaced a similar
2015 Obama Administration measure and states that all
The MTCR, according to its website, “seeks to limit the
U.S. UAS transfers “will be reviewed consistent with U.S.
risks of proliferation of” nuclear, biological, and chemical
international nonproliferation commitments,” including
weapons (NBC weapons) “by controlling exports of goods
Washington’s MTCR commitments. An April 19, 2018,
and technologies that could make a contribution to delivery
National Security Presidential Memorandum from President
systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.”
Trump similarly states that the United States will continue
Established in 1987 by the United States and six other
its “participation in and support for” the regime.
countries, the MTCR, which holds several meetings per
year and currently consists of 35 partner countries, is an
Category I UAS Exporters
informal voluntary arrangement whose partners agree to
The United States has exported MTCR Category I UAS to
apply common export policy guidelines to an annex
France, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom; all of
containing two categories of controlled items. Partner
these governments are MTCR partners. Press and
countries implement these guidelines pursuant to national
nongovernmental expert reports also name China and the
legislation and regularly exchange information on relevant
United Arab Emirates (UAE) as exporters of MTCR
export licensing issues, including denials of technology
Category I UAS. China is not an MTCR partner but agreed
transfers. The MTCR guidelines apply to both armed and
in 1992 to adhere to the MTCR guidelines. The UAE is not
unarmed UAS.
an MTCR partner; the government has no policy
concerning Category I UAS exports, a UAE government
According to the MTCR, Category I items are the most
representative told CRS on December 26, adding that the
sensitive and include complete UAS “capable of delivering
country needs no such policy because it does not produce or
a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km,
export such systems.
their major complete subsystems … and related software
and technology,” as well as “specially designed” production
Potential Threat
facilities for these UAS and subsystems. Partner
Experts have expressed concern for at least 25 years that
governments should have “a strong presumption to deny”
UAS proliferation would enable the spread of NBC
such transfers, regardless of their purpose, but may transfer
weapons; specifically, some observers have argued that
such items on “rare occasions.” The guidelines prohibit
hostile actors could convert some types of UAS into cruise
exports of production facilities for Category I items.
missiles or incorporate UAS technology into such missiles.
Regime partners have greater flexibility with respect to
RAND reports from 2014 and 2018 have downplayed this
authorizing exports of Category II items, which include less
risk, however. Whether any country is acquiring or
sensitive and dual-use missile related components. This
attempting to acquire UAS for developing or producing
category also includes complete UAS, regardless of
cruise missiles is unclear. Some observers have also warned
payload, capable of ranges of at least 300 km, as well as
that hostile governments or nonstate actors could use UAS
other UAS with certain characteristics.
for disseminating chemical and biological agents.
Details
The proliferation implications of the March 2018 U.S.
The proposal that the United States submitted during the
proposal are uncertain. The relevant UAS “have essentially
March 2018 MTCR Technical Experts Meeting would
nothing to do with WMD,” Assistant Secretary of State
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U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes
Christopher Ford stated on February 12, 2019. Faster
modifying, replicating, or retransferring the items without
delivery vehicles are widely regarded as more effective, but
the exporting government’s prior consent.
the potential effects of the proposal’s speed component on
NBC weapons proliferation is unclear. Furthermore,
Other multilateral regimes restrict the export of
relaxing MTCR UAS controls could set a negative
technologies that could enable the development of NBC
precedent, according to at least one expert. Former State
payloads for UAS. For example, the Nuclear Suppliers
Department official Vann Van Diepen warned in a February
Group (NSG) governs nuclear-related exports, and the
2018 speech that “changes made to MTCR Category I
Wassenaar Arrangement performs a similar function with
controls on non-cruise-missile UAVs” could legitimize a
respect to conventional arms and certain dual-use goods and
future MTCR decision to relax controls on conventionally
technologies. The Australia Group is the analogous
armed Category I ballistic and cruise missiles, given these
organization for technologies relevant to chemical and
missiles’ “increasing role in conventional military
biological weapons.
operations.”
U.S. Controls
Other MTCR Constraints on
In addition to the controls implemented as part of U.S.
Proliferation
membership in the multilateral groups described above, the
The MTCR guidelines state that governments should
United States imposes a number of other restrictions on
consider six factors when considering requests for the
UAS exports. The State Department administers export
export of MTCR annex items: (1) concerns about NBC
controls on military UAS and other defense articles; the
proliferation; (2) the “capabilities and objectives of the
statutory basis for this system is the Arms Export Control
missile and space programs of the recipient state”; (3) the
Act (AECA) of 1976 (P.L. 94-329). Section 71(a) of that
“significance of the transfer in terms of the potential
law requires the Secretary of State to maintain a list of all
development” of NBC delivery systems; (4) the
items on the MTCR annex that are not controlled pursuant
“assessment of the end use of the transfers,” including the
to U.S. dual-use controls. The AECA also restricts the uses
government assurances described below; (5) the
to which U.S.-origin defense articles may be put and
“applicability of relevant multilateral agreements”; and (6)
prohibits transfers of such items to third parties without
the “risk of controlled items falling into the hands of
U.S. government permission. For example, Section 38(a)(2)
terrorist groups and individuals.”
requires that the executive branch “take into account”
whether such an export would “contribute to an arms race
The MTCR guidelines provide other mechanisms for
or regional instability” or “aid in” NBC weapons
preventing UAS exports from contributing to NBC
development. The Export Controls Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-
weapons proliferation. For example, the guidelines stipulate
232, Subtitle B, Part I) provides broad, detailed legislative
that a strong presumption of denial applies to transfers of
authority for the President to implement controls on the
any item on the MTCR annex or any unlisted missile if the
export of dual-use items, including dual-use UAS and
partner government “judges, on the basis of all available,
related components. U.S. regulations on dual-use exports
persuasive information” that the items “are intended to be
contain catch-all controls with respect to UAS.
used for” NBC delivery. Moreover, partner governments’
export controls must require authorization for the transfer of
The U.S. government also implements regulations to ensure
unlisted items in cases where the government has informed
that recipients of U.S.-origin UAS use the items for their
an exporter that such items “may be intended, in their
declared purpose. According to an April 2018 State
entirety or part, for use in connection with [NBC] delivery
Department fact sheet, the United States will transfer
systems … other than manned aircraft.” These restrictions
military UAS “only with appropriate technology security
are known as “catch-all” controls.
measures.” Both the State and Commerce Departments
conduct end-monitoring to determine whether recipient
In addition, the MTCR guidelines state that, in cases where
countries are using exported items appropriately. Some
the exporting government does not judge the proposed
military UAS “may be subject to enhanced end-use
Category I UAS transfer as intended for NBC delivery, the
monitoring,” as well as “additional security conditions,” the
government is to obtain “binding government-to-
State Department fact sheet says. According to the Defense
government undertakings” from the recipient state that
Security Cooperation Agency, articles subject to such
“[n]either the items nor replicas nor derivatives thereof will
monitoring “are accompanied by specialized physical
be retransferred without” the exporting government’s
security and accountability notes.” U.S. transfers of MTCR
consent. The exporting government must also assume
Category I UAS also “shall require periodic consultations
“responsibility for taking all steps necessary to ensure that
with” the U.S. government with respect to the systems’ use,
the item is put only to its stated end-use.” Moreover, a
according to the State Department fact sheet.
government is only to authorize transfers of items that
“could contribute to [an NBC] delivery system” if the

government receives “appropriate assurances from the
[recipient] government” that the recipient will use the items
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
only for their stated purpose and will refrain from
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U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes


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