Updated April 22, 2020
South Korea: Background and U.S. Relations
Overview
including pop-up facilities and drive-through sites that
South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea, or ROK) is
provide rapid results. The government also emphasized
one of the United States’ most important strategic and
transparency, disseminating information about the virus’
economic partners in Asia. The U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense
spread, including about possible infections at the
Treaty, signed in 1953 at the end of the Korean War,
neighborhood level. After a deadly 2015 outbreak of
commits the United States to help South Korea defend
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) exposed flaws
itself, particularly from North Korea (officially the
in the country’s response, South Korea reformed its health
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK), and the
policy by granting the government greater powers to
alliance helps the United States promote its interests in East
monitor and track individual patients and to allow private
Asia and around the globe. ROK troops, for example, have
companies to produce tests rapidly.
fought alongside U.S. troops in U.S.-led military conflicts.
Approximately 28,500 U.S. troops are based in the ROK.
The economic relationship is bolstered by the U.S.-South
Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). South Korea
is the United States’ seventh-largest trading partner, and the
United States is South Korea’s second-largest trading
partner, behind China.
Policy cooperation between the United States and South
Korea has been inconsistent under the administrations of
Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in. Moon, a progressive, was
elected President in May 2017 after a decade of
conservative rule. Although the two sides generally have
managed to navigate differences, for instance over trade
and North Korea policy, underlying tensions continue to
surface on a range of issues. Most recently, the U.S.-ROK
“Special Measures Agreement” (SMA) on how to divide
the costs of basing U.S. troops in South Korea expired at
the end of 2019, and subsequent negotiations have failed to
reach a compromise. As a result, about 4,000 South Korean
workers on U.S. bases were furloughed in April 2020. The
Trump Administration has demanded Seoul increase its
payments by 400%, and Trump publicly said it is debatable
North Korea Policy Coordination
whether the U.S. troop presence is in U.S. interests.
North Korea is the dominant strategic concern in the U.S.-
South Korea’s COVID-19 Response
South Korea relationship. Since 2016, North Korea has
made major strides in its ability to strike the continental
In February 2020, South Korea emerged as the second-
United States with a nuclear-armed ballistic missile. While
worst COVID-19 affected country, after China. By the end
their approaches differ, both Trump and Moon have
of March, however, South Koreans largely had slowed the
pursued rapprochement with Pyongyang since early 2018,
initial outbreak, and had done so without resorting to large-
when DPRK leader Kim Jong-un said he would suspend
scale lockdowns. As of April 22, South Korea was
nuclear and long-range missile testing and engage in
reporting fewer than 20 new cases a day, with a cumulative
denuclearization talks. Since then, Kim has had three
total of over 10,000 infections and over 200 deaths. The
summits with Trump and three with Moon.
significant reduction in newly reported cases allowed the
government in mid-April to begin relaxing its social
However, denuclearization talks have been frozen since
distancing measures.
February 2019, when Trump and Kim’s second summit, in
Hanoi, ended without an agreement. The two sides
South Korea managed the initial outbreak with aggressive
disagreed over the scope and sequencing of concessions,
testing, contact-tracing, and public communication. South
specifically North Korean denuclearization measures in
Korea describes its approach as the three “Ts”: tracking,
exchange for relief from international and U.S. sanctions.
testing, and treatment, including caring for mildly
U.S. officials say their North Korean counterparts have
symptomatic patients in separate facilities away from
refused to engage in additional negotiations. Since May
families and from hospitals. As of April 21, over 550,000
2019, the DPRK has conducted multiple short-range
citizens had been tested for the virus—one of the highest
ballistic missile tests, as well as a submarine-launched
rate of testing per capita in the world—at over 600 sites,
ballistic missile test, in violation of United Nations
https://crsreports.congress.gov
South Korea: Background and U.S. Relations
prohibitions. The tests appear aimed at advancing solid fuel
system in the ROK. China responded by enacting economic
and guidance systems and developing capabilities to thwart
measures that have cost ROK companies billions of dollars.
short-range missile defense systems. President Trump has
largely dismissed the significance of these tests. In late
Ties with Japan are perennially fraught because of sensitive
December 2019, Kim announced that due to the
historical issues from Japan’s colonization of the Korean
continuation of sanctions, “there is no ground” for North
Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. A series of actions and
Korea to continue its nuclear and missile testing moratoria.
retaliatory countermeasures by both governments involving
Kim criticized the United States’ continuation of sanctions,
trade, security, and history-related controversies in 2018
and its joint military exercises with and shipments of
and 2019 caused ROK-Japan relations to plummet, eroding
advanced military equipment to South Korea. He warned he
U.S.-ROK-Japan policy coordination.
would show “a new strategic weapon” if the U.S. did not
change approach.
U.S.-South Korea Economic Relations
In 2019, U.S. goods and services exports to the ROK
Moon generally has favored offering more and earlier
totaled $81.0 billion, while imports totaled $90.9 billion.
concessions to North Korea than Trump. International and
Since the 2012 KORUS FTA’s entry into force, bilateral
U.S. sanctions however, prevent Moon from doing more
trade flows have increased, with U.S. services exports
without U.S. approval, which has contributed to periodic
(+$6.5 billion to $23.1 billion in 2019) and auto imports
tensions.
(+$9.7 billion to $25.2 billion in 2019) seeing the largest
gains. FDI also increased markedly since 2012, with the
U.S.-South Korea Security Issues
stock of South Korean FDI in the United States nearly
In addition to the presence of U.S. troops, South Korea is
tripling to $58.3 billion in 2018 (latest available) and U.S.
included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” (also known as
FDI to South Korea increasing by 47% to $41.5 billion. The
extended deterrence), and traditionally has paid for about
ROK economy is expected to contract significantly in 2020
50% (over $800 million annually) of the total non-
due to COVID-19’s domestic and global impact.
personnel costs of the U.S. military presence, according to
congressional testimony by U.S. military officials. U.S. and
In 2018, at Washington’s request, the two countries
ROK negotiators are currently in talks to renew the expired
negotiated limited modifications to the KORUS FTA. South
SMA agreement. South Korean negotiators reportedly
Korea agreed to a number of concessions, most prominently
offered a 13% increase in contributions, but this fell far
a delay until 2041 in reductions to U.S. light truck tariffs.
short of the Trump Administration’s proposal for a fivefold
Conclusion of these negotiations and the Trump
increase in ROK payments. The SMA needs to be approved
Administration’s decision not to target South Korean
by the ROK National Assembly, and the ROK public is
imports in its potential Section 232 auto import restrictions
strongly opposed to meeting the U.S. demand.
have somewhat eased bilateral trade tensions. A number of
U.S. import restrictions on South Korean products,
President Trump’s calls for a steep increase in ROK
including steel, aluminum, washing machines and solar
contributions, paired with his criticism of the value of other
products, however, continue to add friction to the trading
U.S. alliances, has raised concerns in Seoul about U.S.
relationship. USTR lists South Korean restrictions on geo-
security commitments. To facilitate talks with the DPRK,
location data exports and on cross-border use of cloud
Trump canceled major U.S.-ROK military exercises,
computing as key barriers to U.S. digital trade in 2020.
leading to questions about the alliance’s readiness. The
COVID-19 pandemic has further raised concern about U.S.
South Korean Politics
readiness in the broader region, particularly because of
Moon belongs to the Minjoo (Democratic) Party, which in
acute outbreaks on U.S. naval vessels.
April 2020 won a landslide victory in National Assembly
elections (conducted under social distancing conditions) to
The U.S. military is relocating its forces farther south from
gain control of the unicameral chamber, with the largest
the border with North Korea, with South Korea paying $9.7
majority in nearly 30 years. The victory was propelled by
billion—about 94% of total costs—to construct new
Moon’s success containing the initial COVID-19 outbreak.
military facilities. The U.S. departure from these bases,
The next presidential election is scheduled for May 2022.
particularly one in Seoul, will allow for the return of
ROK presidents are limited to one five-year term.
valuable real estate to South Korea. The recently opened
Camp Humphreys is the world’s largest overseas U.S. base.
Figure 1. South Korea’s National Assembly
South Korea’s Regional Relations
Because of North Korea’s economic dependence on China,
South Korea calibrates its North Korea policy with an eye
on Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang. China also is South
Korea’s largest trading partner and destination for foreign
direct investment (FDI), and Beijing has punished South
Korean companies when it disagrees with Seoul’s policy
Source: Yonhap News Agency, April 16, 2020.
decisions. For these and other reasons, South Korea
generally tries to avoid antagonizing China. An exception
Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
was Seoul’s 2016 decision to deploy a U.S. missile defense
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov
South Korea: Background and U.S. Relations
IF10165
Brock R. Williams, Specialist in International Trade and
Finance
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10165 · VERSION 24 · UPDATED