Updated April 15, 2020
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
investment. However, the new constitution ensures the state
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
sector’s dominance over the economy and the predominant
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
role of the Communist Party. In October 2019, Cuba’s
isolating the government.
National Assembly appointed Díaz-Canel as president
under the new constitution. In December 2019, Díaz-Canel
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy
appointed tourism minister Manuel Marrero Cruz as prime
shift moving away from sanctions toward engagement and
minister, who reportedly will serve as the president’s
the normalization of relations. The policy change included
administrative right-hand man in implementing policy.
the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of
international terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of
The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the reimposition
diplomatic relations (July 2015); and efforts to increase
of, and increase in, U.S. sanctions that impede international
travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba by
financial transactions with Cuba and by Venezuela’s
easing restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
economic crisis, which has limited Venezuela’s support to
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
Cuba. Cuban officials reported that 4.3 million tourists
(2015 and 2016, accomplished through amendments to the
visited Cuba in 2019, down from 4.7 million in 2018; the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, administered by the
decline in tourism has hurt private sector businesses.
Treasury Department, and the Export Administration
Cuba’s economy also is being severely affected by the
Regulations, administered by the Commerce Department).
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. As of
The restoration of relations led to increased government-to-
April 15, 2020, Cuba had 21 deaths and over 700 confirmed
government engagement, with over 20 bilateral agreements
cases. Before the pandemic, the Economist Intelligence
negotiated and numerous bilateral dialogues.
Unit estimated the Cuban economy would contract 0.7% in
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
2020; now, it is projecting a 4.7% decline. Cuba is
2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back some of
providing international assistance to respond to the
the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations.
pandemic by sending more than 1,200 medical
By 2019, the Trump Administration had largely abandoned
professionals to assist 18 countries including, for the first
engagement by increasing economic sanctions significantly
time, Italy and Andorra.
to pressure the Cuban government on its human rights
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to increased worldwide
record and its support for the regime of Nicolás Maduro in
calls, including by United Nations, European, and other
Venezuela. It took actions to allow lawsuits against those
officials, for the United States to ease sanctions to make it
trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban
less difficult for Cuba to acquire needed equipment,
government and tightened restrictions on travel to Cuba,
supplies, and medicines to confront the pandemic.
including terminating cruise ship travel from the United
States and U.S. flights to Cuban cities other than Havana.
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June
Cuban Political and Economic Developments. In April
2017 that introduced new sanctions. These included the
2018, Miguel Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice
elimination of people-to-people travel for individuals and
president, succeeded Raúl Castro as president, but Castro
restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by
continues to head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021.
the Cuban military. The State Department issued a list of
The selection of Díaz-Canel, now 59 years old, reflects the
“restricted entities” in 2017, which has been updated
generational change in Cuban leadership that began several
several times, most recently in November 2019. The list
years ago and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban
includes 223 entities and subentities, including 2 ministries,
revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government.
5 holding companies and 49 of their subentities, 109 hotels,
While in power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to
2 tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and
implement significant economic policy changes, moving
41 entities serving defense and security sectors.
toward a more mixed economy with a stronger private
sector, but his government’s slow, gradualist approach did
In 2019, the Trump Administration imposed a series of
not produce major improvements to the economy, which
sanctions against Cuba for its poor human rights record and
has experienced minimal growth in recent years.
its support for the Maduro government. These include
In February 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a new
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba.
constitution in a national referendum. The changes include
Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed
the addition of an appointed prime minister to oversee
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels
government operations; limits on the president’s tenure
that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. In July 2019, it
(two five-year terms) and age (60, beginning first term);
imposed sanctions on Cuba’s state-run oil import and
and market-oriented economic reforms, including the right
export company.
to private property and the promotion of foreign
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property
policy concern for many years. The human rights group
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
Cuban Prisoners Defenders (based in Spain) listed 128
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
political prisoners in April 2020, with 73 imprisoned for
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
reasons of conscience. Amnesty International designated
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time
six individuals as prisoners of conscience in 2019,
of the confiscation. To date, some 25 lawsuits have been
including independent journalist Roberto Quiñones,
filed against U.S. and foreign companies, including
sentenced to one year in prison in August 2019. After six
cruise ship operators, airlines, travel booking
months of detention, José Daniel Ferrer, leader of the
companies, and hotels; several lawsuits have been
opposition Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU), was
dismissed by federal courts or by plaintiffs. Previous
released in early April 2020, but he remains under house
Administrations had suspended, at six-month intervals,
arrest after receiving a 4½-year sentence on assault charges
the right to file such lawsuits pursuant to the provisions
that critics assert were trumped up.
of the law. Secretary Pompeo cited Cuba’s repression of
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
its own people and its support for the Maduro regime in
According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy
Venezuela as reasons for the implementation of Title III.
community members suffered a series of unexplained
The European Union and Canada criticized the
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
Administration’s action, vowing to ban enforcement or
incidents occurred in late 2016 and 2017, but two occurred
recognition of any judgement, allow counterclaims in
in May 2018). The State Department maintains that the U.S.
European and Canadian courts, and potentially seek
investigation has not reached a definitive conclusion
action in the World Trade Organization.
regarding the cause or source of the injuries. Cuba strongly
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. In June
denies responsibility for the injuries. In September 2017,
2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-to-
the State Department ordered the departure of
people educational travel altogether and the Commerce
nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to
Department generally prohibited cruise ships, private
minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff
and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from
was reduced by about two-thirds. The staff reduction has
going to Cuba. In September 2019, the Treasury
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing.
Department capped family remittances, which
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued
previously were not limited, to $1,000 per quarter and
to fund democracy assistance for Cuba and U.S.-
eliminated the category of donative remittances. The
government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2019,
Transportation Department suspended commercial
Congress appropriated $20 million for democracy programs
flights by U.S. carriers between the United States and
and $29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 116-6,
Cuban cities other than Havana, effective December 10,
H.Rept. 116-9). For FY2020, Congress appropriated $20
2019; this was extended to charter fight on January 10,
million for democracy programs and $20.973 million for
2020. These actions largely affected family travel.
Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 116-94, Division G); Division J of
Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September
the law includes benefits for U.S. government employees
2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn
and dependents injured while stationed in Cuba. The
transactions, which allowed banking institutions to
measure includes several Cuba reporting requirements in
process certain funds transfers originating and
H.Rept. 116-78 and S.Rept. 116-126. Congress has begun
terminating outside the United States. In October 2019,
consideration of the Administration’s FY2021 budget
the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to
request of $10 million for Cuba democracy programs and
leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de
$12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting.
minimis rule (from 25%) requiring a third country-based
Among other bills, several would ease or lift U.S. sanctions:
company exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10%
H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R. 1898/S. 1447
U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and imposed
(U.S. agricultural exports); H.R. 2404 (overall embargo);
licensing requirements for the export of certain donated
and H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel). H.R. 4884 would direct the
items to organizations controlled by the Cuban
Administration to reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification
government or Communist Party and items for
Parole Program. Several resolutions would express
telecommunications infrastructure.
concerns regarding Cuba’s foreign medical missions
Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa
(S.Res. 14/H.Res. 136); U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba
restrictions on Raúl Castro in September 2019 for gross
(H.Res. 92/S.Res. 232); religious and political freedom in
violations of human rights in Cuba and Venezuela.
Cuba (S.Res. 215); and the release of human rights activist
Further visa restrictions were imposed on Cuba’s
José Daniel Ferrer and other UNPACU members (S.Res.
Interior Minister (November 2019) and Cuba’s defense
454 and H.Res. 774). S.Res. 531 would honor Las Damas
minister (January 2020) for gross human rights
de Blanco, a Cuban human rights organization, and call for
violations in Venezuela. In February 2020, the Spanish
the release of all political prisoners. Also see CRS Report
hotel chain Meliá confirmed its chief executive officer is
R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress.
prohibited from entering the United States pursuant to
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Title IV of the LIBERTAD Act, related to the
trafficking of property confiscated in Cuba.
IF10045
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 68 · UPDATED