Updated March 23, 2020
U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview
The United States has imposed sanctions on Russia in
13694, as amended by EO 13757 (and codified by
response to its invasion of Ukraine, election interference,
CRIEEA), targets those who engage in cyberattacks (1)
other malicious cyber activities, human rights abuses, use of
against critical infrastructure, (2) for financial or
a chemical weapon, weapons proliferation, illicit trade with
commercial gain, (3) to significantly disrupt the availability
North Korea, and support to Syria and Venezuela.
of a computer or network, or (4) to interfere with U.S.
election processes and institutions.
Sanctions against Russian persons (defined to include
individuals, entities, vessels, and aircraft) may include
Second, CRIEEA, §224, requires the President to impose
blocking of assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction; limits on
sanctions in response to a range of activities conducted on
access to the U.S. financial system, including transactions
behalf of the Russian government that undermine
involving U.S. individuals and businesses; and denial of
“cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic
entry into the United States. The United States also tightly
institution, or government.”
controls exports to Russia’s defense and energy sectors. For
more, see CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia.
Third, EO 13848 authorizes sanctions against foreign
persons that have “directly or indirectly engaged in,
Invasion of Ukraine
sponsored, concealed or otherwise been complicit in foreign
Most U.S. designations of Russian persons to be subject to
interference in a United States election.”
sanctions have been in response to Russia’s 2014 invasion
and occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and parts of
Under one or more of these authorities, the United States
eastern Ukraine. The United States has imposed Ukraine-
has designated for activities related to election interference
related sanctions on about 690 persons (totals throughout
at least 49 Russian persons, including Russia’s leading
are current as of March 23, 2020).
intelligence and military intelligence agencies. Several
designated persons also have been indicted by the
A series of executive orders issued in 2014 (EOs 13660,
Department of Justice for related crimes. About 50 Russian
13661, 13662, and 13685), based on national emergency
persons have been designated for malicious cyber activities
authorities and codified by the Countering Russian
unrelated to election interference (including six who have
Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA;
been designated for both).
P.L. 115-44, Title II; 22 U.S.C. 9501 et seq.), establish a
framework for Ukraine-related sanctions on those the
Under Section 231 of CRIEEA, the Administration also has
President determines have undermined Ukraine’s security,
imposed sanctions on foreign entities engaged in
stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, or
“significant transactions” with the Russian defense or
misappropriated state assets. The EOs also established
intelligence sectors. A Chinese defense agency and its
sanctions against designated Russian government officials
director have been designated for taking delivery of combat
and persons who operate in the Russian arms sector, key
aircraft and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems. In 2019,
sectors of the Russian economy, or occupied Crimea. They
Turkey also took possession of S-400 missile systems and
also prohibit U.S. business, trade, or investment in occupied
India reportedly made an advance payment for S-400
Crimea.
systems. As of March 2020, the Trump Administration has
not imposed Section 231 sanctions on Turkey or India or
Sectoral sanctions, in particular, apply to specific entities in
issued a national security waiver to avert sanctions.
Russia’s financial, energy, and defense sectors. U.S.
persons are restricted from engaging in specific transactions
Human Rights Abuse and Corruption
with these entities, which are identified as subject to
The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of
directives issued by the Department of the Treasury.
2012 (P.L. 112-208, Title IV; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) requires
Restrictions apply to new equity investment and financing
the President to impose sanctions on those he identifies as
for specified entities in Russia’s financial sector, and new
having been involved in a “criminal conspiracy” uncovered
financing for specified entities in Russia’s energy and
by Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky and his subsequent
defense sectors. Sectoral sanctions also prohibit U.S. trade
imprisonment and death. The act also requires the President
related to the development of Russian deepwater, Arctic
to impose sanctions on those he finds have committed
offshore, or shale oil projects and such projects worldwide
human rights abuses in Russia against individuals fighting
in which specified entities have an ownership interest of at
to expose the illegal activity of government officials or
least 33% or a majority of voting interests.
seeking to exercise or defend internationally recognized
human rights and freedoms.
Malicious Cyber Activities
Sanctions imposed on Russian persons in response to
Fifty-five persons are designated under the Sergei
malicious cyber activities are based on three authorities. EO
Magnitsky Act. Two other Russian persons have been
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U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview
designated under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
one entity (and associated persons) for serving as a front
Accountability Act (P.L. 114-328, Title XII, Subtitle F; 22
company in a “scheme to facilitate the [illicit transfer] of jet
U.S.C. 2656 note) and EO 13818, which address human
fuel to Russian forces operating in Syria.”
rights abuses and corruption more broadly. Four other
Russian nationals have been denied entry to the United
Venezuela-Related Sanctions
States under authority related to human rights abuses stated
In 2019, the Administration designated a bank jointly
in annual foreign operations appropriations (popularly cited
owned by Russian and Venezuelan state-owned companies
as Section 7031(c) authorities).
for providing support to Venezuela’s state-owned oil
company, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. In early 2020, the
The Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and
Administration designated two subsidiaries of state-owned
Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, as amended by
oil company Rosneft and a related person for operating in
§228 of CRIEEA (SSIDES; P.L. 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et
the oil sector of the Venezuelan economy.
seq.), requires sanctions on those responsible for serious
human rights abuses in “any territory forcibly occupied or
Energy Export Pipelines
otherwise controlled” by Russia. The Administration has
The Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019 (P.L.
designated three persons for human rights abuses in
116-92, Title LXXV; 22 U.S.C. 9526 note) requires
Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine.
sanctions on foreign persons who the President determines
have sold, leased, or provided subsea pipe-laying vessels
Use of a Chemical Weapon
for the construction of Russian natural gas pipelines Nord
The United States has determined that Russia used a
Stream 2 and TurkStream, or any successor pipeline, since
chemical weapon in contravention of international law in
December 20, 2019. The company laying the pipeline
relation to the March 2018 nerve agent attack on UK citizen
suspended its activities, but Russian officials have said that
and former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei
Russia should be able to finish construction of Nord Stream
Skripal and his daughter. This August 2018 finding
2 on its own. TurkStream was inaugurated in January 2020.
triggered sanctions under the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991
Other Sanctions and Restrictions
(CBW Act, P.L. 102-182, Title III; 22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.).
The Department of Commerce imposes export-licensing
restrictions on Russian persons in response to Russia’s
The CBW Act sanctions on Russia include prohibitions on
invasion of Ukraine, as well as to other Russian persons
exporting many controlled goods and services, lending non-
that engage in activities considered contrary to U.S.
ruble-denominated funds to the Russian government, and
national security and/or foreign policy interests.
participating in the primary market for non-ruble-
denominated sovereign bonds. The Trump Administration
As in past years, FY2020 appropriations for defense,
has designated two military intelligence officers for the
energy, and foreign operations programs restrict assistance
nerve agent attack. For more, see CRS In Focus IF10962,
to the Russian government. The State Department identifies
Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions.
Russia as a nation that fails to meet minimum standards for
the elimination of human trafficking (Tier 3); this
Weapons Proliferation
designation requires limits on aid and U.S. support for
Under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation
multilateral development loans.
Act (P.L. 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), state-owned arms
exporter Rosoboronexport and several other Russian
About three dozen Russian persons are designated under
defense entities are denied most U.S. government
global sanctions regimes related to terrorism and
procurement contracts, export licenses, and trade in U.S.
transnational crime.
Munitions List-controlled items. Rosoboronexport also is
subject to Ukraine-related sectoral sanctions and other
Other Available Sanctions
restrictions.
As of March 2020, the Administration has not made
designations under other CRIEEA authorities related to
North Korea Sanctions Violations
pipeline development, privatization deals, or support to
The Trump Administration has designated at least 22
Syria (§§232-234). The Administration also has not made
Russia-related persons for evading sanctions restricting
other designations under SSIDES or the Ukraine Freedom
trade and financial transactions with North Korea.
Support Act of 2014 (UFSA; P.L. 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921
Designations have applied to persons trading in oil and oil
et seq.; as amended by CRIEEA, §§225-228) related to
products, metals, and information technology.
weapons transfers abroad, certain oil projects, corruption,
and secondary sanctions against foreign persons that
Syria-Related Sanctions
facilitate significant transactions or sanctions evasion for
In 2018, the Administration designated Rosoboronexport
Russia-related designees. Some Members of Congress have
and an associated bank for their support to the Syrian
called on the President to make more designations based on
government, adding to prior designations of two other
CRIEEA’s mandatory sanctions provisions.
Russian banks and related persons for the same reason. In
2018, the Administration designated four Russian persons
Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy
as part of “a complex scheme Iran and Russia have used to
Legislation
bolster the Assad regime and generate funds for Iranian
Cory Welt, Specialist in European Affairs
malign activity.” In 2019, the Administration designated
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U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview

IF10779


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10779 · VERSION 8 · UPDATED

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