

 
Updated March 20, 2020
Iraq and U.S. Policy 
COVID-19, Iran-U.S. Confrontation, 
relating to the COVID-19 pandemic and plummeting global 
Protests, and Iraq’s Future  
oil prices are further upending the status quo. 
Iraqi authorities have instituted curfews and travel 
Plans for Political Transition Uncertain 
restrictions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which 
Political differences among leading blocs have precluded 
poses serious public health, economic, and fiscal risks for 
the prompt replacement of Prime Minister Abd al Mahdi. 
the country. Public health measures to slow the spread of 
Protestors have demanded an independent candidate with a 
the disease have diminished participation in the protest 
demonstrated record of honest leadership, with many 
movement that has swept central and southern Iraq since 
rejecting President Salih’s nominees and alternatives 
October 2019. Security forces and militia members killed 
proposed by political blocs. Current Prime Minister-
hundreds of protestors and wounded thousands in Baghdad 
designate Adnan Al Zurfi has until April 16, 2020, to 
and several southern Iraqi cities, fueling calls for the ouster 
propose a cabinet list for approval by the Council of 
of the ruling elite. While crowds have dispersed, protestors’ 
Representatives (COR), Iraq’s unicameral legislature.  
demands for systemic change and an end to corruption and 
foreign interference remain unmet. Meanwhile, intense 
Figure 1. Iraq 
U.S.-Iranian confrontation has reinvigorated some Iraqis’ 
efforts to drive U.S. and other foreign forces out of Iraq.  
Following escalating Iran-linked threats to U.S. and Iraqi 
personnel in 2019, a January 2020 U.S. air strike in Iraq 
killed Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods 
Force Commander General Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi 
Popular Mobilization Forces leader Abu Mahdi al 
Muhandis. Iran launched missiles at Iraqi bases hosting 
U.S. personnel in response. The U.S. strike eliminated key 
figures in Iran’s efforts to shape Iraqi security and politics, 
but the Iran-U.S. violence has further complicated 
underlying disputes over government leadership and the 
future of Iraq’s security partnerships. Iran-backed militias 
since have conducted additional rocket attacks, killing U.S. 
and U.K. personnel in March. U.S. forces retaliated 
militarily, and further escalation remains possible. 
In response to the protests and violence, Prime Minister 
Adel Abd al Mahdi resigned in November 2019, but he has 
served in a caretaker role while political blocs and 
 
protestors have deadlocked over selecting a replacement 
Sources: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data. 
prime minister-designate. President Barham Salih’s first 
nominee, former Communications Minister Mohammed 
Leaders of Iraq’s Shia Muslim religious establishment have 
Tawfiq Allawi, was unable to garner sufficient political 
expressed solidarity with peaceful protestors, rejected 
support. In March 2020, Salih nominated the former 
foreign interference, and condemned killings of civilians. 
governor of Najaf, Adnan Al Zurfi, as prime minister-
On January 31, Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani 
designate. Government formation talks have resumed.  
condemned violence against protestors and called on 
authorities to hold elections swiftly and independently. 
Alongside issues raised by the COVID-19 pandemic, 
Sistani also issued a religious decree in March, calling for 
principal questions for Iraqi and U.S. leaders include 
collective action to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. 
whether or how to redefine the nature of and framework for 
bilateral security cooperation. While some Iraqis demand 
In the current COR, the Sa’irun (On the March) coalition 
the expulsion of foreign forces, U.S. personnel are assisting 
led by populist Shia cleric and frequent U.S. antagonist 
Iraqi forces against Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) threats 
Muqtada al Sadr and the predominantly Shia Fatah 
and build Iraqi capabilities. U.S. forces remain in Iraq and 
(Conquest) coalition led by Hadi al Ameri of the Badr 
are consolidating basing locations. U.S. training has been 
Organization hold the largest number of seats. Their 
suspended due to COVID-19 risks, and U.S. officials say 
respective coalitions have formed the cores of larger rival 
future training will use “fewer bases with fewer people.”  
COR blocs, with Sa’irun anchoring the Islah (Reform) bloc 
and Fatah anchoring the predominantly Shia Arab Bin’a 
With plans and timing for political transition uncertain, 
(Reconstruction) bloc—the largest in the COR. 
significant public health, economic, and fiscal pressures 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
Iraq and U.S. Policy 
Sadr’s supporters staged a mass protest demanding the 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC 
withdrawal of foreign forces in January 2020. They have 
countries (OPEC+), including Russia, did not agree on a 
alternately extended and withdrawn support from other 
recommendation to reduce oil production. Iraq’s draft 2020 
protestors. Fatah includes individuals formerly associated 
budget assumed an oil export price of $56 per barrel. 
with Shia Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units and 
Economic projections vary, but it appears likely that Iraq 
other militias with ties to Iran. A July 2019 prime 
will need to draw on reserves, cut salaries, limit benefits, 
ministerial decree ordered the PMF to comply with a 2016 
and/or borrow to meet salary and budget needs. Already-
law calling for PMF consolidation under state command 
low levels of investment spending will likely decline, 
structures. Implementation remains incomplete. 
including in sectors where failures have fueled protests.  
Iraq last held national elections in May 2018 for the 328-
Partnership with the United States 
seat COR. In October 2018, a pan-ethnic and pan-sectarian 
Since 2017, the Trump Administration has sought to 
coalition of interest groups agreed to support the Abd al 
promote Iraqi unity and stability, prevent an IS resurgence, 
Mahdi government, though differences over policy and 
and limit Iranian influence in Iraq. Iraqi protestors’ calls for 
leadership extended cabinet approval into 2019 and delayed 
improved governance, reliable local services, more 
progress on several key issues relevant to protestors. As 
trustworthy and capable security forces, and greater 
protests intensified in late 2019, the COR adopted a new 
economic opportunity broadly correspond to stated U.S. 
election law that would replace Iraq’s list-based system 
goals. U.S. officials have advocated for Iraqi protestors’ 
with an individual candidate- and district-based system; 
rights to demonstrate and express themselves freely, while 
implementation could require authorities to administer a 
signaling U.S. willingness to work with any Iraqi leaders 
controversial census amid continuing unrest, security 
who will move forward on shared reform priorities. In a 
disruptions, and unprecedented public health challenges. 
series of statements since October 2019, U.S. officials have 
urged Iraqi leaders to respond seriously to protestors’ 
Early elections under a revamped system could introduce 
demands and to avoid attacks against unarmed protestors, 
new political leadership, but fiscal pressures, political 
while expressing broad U.S. goals for continued partnership 
rivalries, and the limited capacity of some state institutions 
with “a free and independent and sovereign Iraq.”  
may present lasting hurdles to reform. Whether or not 
leaders implement reforms in response to protestors’ 
“Iraqis want a government that upholds Iraq’s 
demands, the Islamic State threat, security force 
sovereignty, provides basic needs, is free of 
management, reconstruction needs, demographic pressures, 
corruption, and protects their human rights. If Iraq's 
COVID-19, and lower oil prices will present continuing 
newly selected Prime Minister-designate, Adnan Zurfi 
challenges. Security has improved since 2017, but 
puts these interests first, he will have U.S. and 
thousands of IS fighters in Iraq and Syria are still active. 
international support.” 
Nearly 1.4 million Iraqis remain internally displaced and 
many more are in need of various forms of assistance. 
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo - March 2020 
Views from the Kurdistan Region 
Leaders of Iraq’s federal Kurdistan Regional Government 
The United States provides foreign aid and security 
(KRG) have recognized protestors’ concerns and criticized 
assistance to Iraq in support of Iraqi counter-IS operations, 
security force development, de-mining, public financial 
repressive violence, while convening to unify positions on 
proposed reforms that some Kurds fear could undermine the 
management reform, U.N.-coordinated stabilization, and 
Kurdistan region’s rights under Iraq’s constitution. The two 
other objectives. More than $365 million in U.S. 
stabilization aid has flowed to liberated areas of Iraq since 
largest Kurdish parties, the Erbil-based Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Suleimaniyah-based 
2016, including funds to aid religious and ethnic minority 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), hold significant 
communities. The United States is the top humanitarian 
funding donor for Iraq and has provided more than $2.7 
numbers of COR seats and won the most seats in the 
KRG’s September 2018 election. KDP leader Masrour 
billion in humanitarian aid for Iraq programs since 2014.  
Barzani serves as KRG Prime Minister. His cousin 
U.S. military personnel are present in Iraq pursuant to a 
Nechirvan Barzani is KRG President. The KRG has 
2014 exchange of diplomatic notes under the 2008 U.S.-
instituted curfews and closures to mitigate COVID-19 risks. 
Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. Congress has 
KRG leaders have discussed several oil export and budget 
authorized U.S. train and equip programs for Iraq through 
issues with Baghdad but differences remain to be resolved. 
December 2020, including aid to KRG forces, and has 
appropriated defense funds for these purposes through 
COVID-19 and Fiscal Pressure  
September 2021. Since 2014, Congress has appropriated 
With neighboring Iran hard-hit by COVID-19 and links 
more than $6.5 billion for U.S. military train and equip 
between the two countries diverse and deep, Iraq has faced 
programs for Iraqis. The FY2020 National Defense 
a multifaceted challenge in containing the spread of the 
Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) limits the availability of 
virus. Iraq’s public and private health systems have 
50% of FY2020 train and equip funding until the 
significant shortcomings and limited capacity, amplifying 
Administration submits assessments and plans, including 
risks. Iraq has approximately .8 physicians and 1.3 hospital 
for “a plan for normalizing assistance ... beginning in fiscal 
beds per 1,000 people (below the global average of 1.5 and 
year 2020.” The act states training programs may “only be 
2.7, respectively), according to World Bank statistics. 
exercised in consultation with” Iraq’s government. 
In parallel, oil prices have dropped precipitously as global 
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern 
economic demand has contracted and as the Organization of 
Affairs  
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Iraq and U.S. Policy 
 
IF10404
 
 
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