Updated March 19, 2020
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
investment. However, the new constitution ensures the state
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
sector’s dominance over the economy and the predominant
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
role of the Communist Party. In October 2019, Cuba’s
isolating the government.
National Assembly appointed Díaz-Canel as president
under the new constitution. In December 2019, Díaz-Canel
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy
appointed tourism minister Manuel Marrero Cruz as prime
shift moving away from sanctions toward engagement and
minister, who reportedly will serve as the president’s
the normalization of relations. The policy change included
administrative right-hand man in implementing policy.
the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of
international terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of
The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the reimposition
diplomatic relations (July 2015); and efforts to increase
of, and increase in, U.S. sanctions that impede international
travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba by
financial transactions with Cuba and by Venezuela’s
easing restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
economic crisis, which has limited Venezuela’s support to
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
Cuba. Cuban officials reported that 4.3 million tourists
(2015 and 2016, accomplished through amendments to the
visited Cuba in 2019, down from 4.7 million in 2018; the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, administered by the
decline in tourism has hurt private sector businesses.
Treasury Department, and the Export Administration
Cuba’s economy will also take a significant hit from the
Regulations, administered by the Commerce Department).
coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic. As of March 19, 2020,
The restoration of relations led to increased government-to-
Cuba had 11 confirmed cases (with one death, an Italian
government engagement, with over 20 bilateral agreements
tourist) and over 350 people under surveillance. Before the
negotiated and numerous bilateral dialogues.
pandemic, the Economist Intelligence Unit estimated that
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
the economy would contract 0.7% in 2020, but the decline
2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back some of
is likely to be steeper as the tourism sector shuts down.
the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations.
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
By 2019, the Trump Administration had largely abandoned
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June
engagement by increasing economic sanctions significantly
2017 that introduced new sanctions. These included the
to pressure the Cuban government on its human rights
elimination of people-to-people travel for individuals and
record and its support for the regime of Nicolás Maduro in
restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by
Venezuela. It took actions to allow lawsuits against those
the Cuban military. The State Department issued a list of
trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban
“restricted entities” in 2017, which has been updated
government and tightened restrictions on travel to Cuba,
several times, most recently in November 2019. The list
including terminating cruise ship travel from the United
includes 223 entities and subentities, including 2 ministries,
States and U.S. flights to Cuban cities other than Havana.
5 holding companies and 49 of their subentities, 109 hotels,
Cuban Political and Economic Developments. In April
2 tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and
2018, Miguel Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice
41 entities serving defense and security sectors.
president, succeeded Raúl Castro as president, but Castro
The Administration’s strong criticism of Cuba for its
continues to head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021.
support of Venezuela began in November 2018, when then-
The selection of Díaz-Canel, now 59 years old, reflects the
National Security Adviser John Bolton asserted that Cuba
generational change in Cuban leadership that began several
was responsible for enabling the Venezuelan regime’s
years ago and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban
repression. In rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War, Bolton
revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government.
referred to Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua as the “Troika
While in power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to
of Tyranny” in the hemisphere. In 2019, the Trump
implement significant economic policy changes, moving
Administration has imposed a series of sanctions against
toward a more mixed economy with a stronger private
Cuba for its poor human rights record and its support for
sector, but his government’s slow, gradualist approach did
the Maduro government in Venezuela. These include
not produce major improvements to the economy, which
has experienced minimal growth in recent years.
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba.
Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed
In February 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a new
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels
constitution in a national referendum. The changes include
that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. In July 2019, it
the addition of an appointed prime minister to oversee
imposed sanctions on Cuba’s state-run oil import and
government operations; limits on the president’s tenure
export company. Beginning in 2000, Cuba received
(two five-year terms) and age (60, beginning first term);
some 90,000-100,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd), but
and market-oriented economic reforms, including the right
Venezuela’s economic crisis reduced this to between
to private property and the promotion of foreign
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
40,000-50,000 bpd in early 2019, about one-third of
Title IV of the LIBERTAD Act, related to the
Cuba’s consumption.
trafficking of property confiscated in Cuba.
Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property
policy concern for many years. According to the Havana-
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
based Cuban Center for Human Rights, Cuba held at least
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
107 political prisoners at the end of October 2019; Amnesty
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
International (AI) has named six of these as prisoners of
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time
conscience, including independent journalist Roberto
of the confiscation. To date, some 25 lawsuits have been
Quiñones, sentenced to one year in prison in August 2019.
filed against U.S. and foreign companies, including
AI also has called for the release of José Daniel Ferrer,
cruise ship operators, airlines, travel booking
leader of the opposition Patriotic Union of Cuba
companies, and hotels; several lawsuits have been
(UNPACU), held in detention since October 2019.
dismissed by federal courts or by plaintiffs. Previous
Administrations had suspended, at six-month intervals,
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
the right to file such lawsuits pursuant to the provisions
According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy
of the law. Secretary Pompeo cited Cuba’s repression of
community members suffered a series of unexplained
its own people and its support for the Maduro regime in
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
Venezuela as reasons for the implementation of Title III.
incidents occurred in late 2016 and 2017, but two occurred
The European Union and Canada criticized the
in May 2018). The State Department maintains that the U.S.
Administration’s action, vowing to ban enforcement or
investigation has not reached a definitive conclusion
recognition of any judgement, allow counterclaims in
regarding the cause or source of the injuries. Cuba strongly
European and Canadian courts, and potentially seek
denies responsibility for the injuries. In September 2017,
action in the World Trade Organization.
the State Department ordered the departure of
nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. In June
minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff
2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-to-
was reduced by about two-thirds. The staff reduction has
people educational travel altogether and the Commerce
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing.
Department generally prohibited cruise ships, private
and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued
going to Cuba. In September 2019, the Treasury
to fund democracy assistance for Cuba and U.S.-
Department capped family remittances, which
government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2019,
previously were not limited, to $1,000 per quarter and
Congress appropriated $20 million for democracy programs
eliminated the category of donative remittances. The
and $29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 116-6,
Transportation Department suspended commercial
H.Rept. 116-9). For FY2020, Congress appropriated $20
flights by U.S. carriers between the United States and
million for democracy programs and $20.973 million for
Cuban cities other than Havana, effective December 10,
Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 116-94, Division G); Division J of
2019; this was extended to charter fight on January 10,
the law includes benefits for U.S. government employees
2020. These actions largely affect family travel.
and dependents injured while stationed in Cuba. The
measure includes several Cuba reporting requirements in
Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September
H.Rept. 116-78 and S.Rept. 116-126. Congress has begun
2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn
consideration of the Administration’s FY2021 budget
transactions, which allowed banking institutions to
request of $10 million for Cuba democracy programs and
process certain funds transfers originating and
$12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting.
terminating outside the United States. In October 2019,
the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to
Among other bills, several would ease or lift U.S. sanctions:
leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de
H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R. 1898/S. 1447
minimis rule (from 25%) requiring a third country-based
(U.S. agricultural exports); H.R. 2404 (overall embargo);
company exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10%
and H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel). H.R. 4884 would direct the
U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and imposed
Administration to reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification
licensing requirements for the export of certain donated
Parole Program. Several resolutions would express
items to organizations controlled by the Cuban
concerns regarding Cuba’s foreign medical missions
government or Communist Party and items for
(S.Res. 14/H.Res. 136); U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba
telecommunications infrastructure.
(H.Res. 92/S.Res. 232); religious and political freedom in
Cuba (S.Res. 215); and the release of human rights activist
Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa
José Daniel Ferrer and other UNPACU members (S.Res.
restrictions on Raúl Castro in September 2019 for gross
454 and H.Res. 774). S.Res. 531 would honor Las Damas
violations of human rights in Cuba and Venezuela.
de Blanco, a Cuban human rights organization, and call for
Further visa restrictions were imposed on Cuba’s
the release of all political prisoners. Also see CRS Report
Interior Minister (November 2019) and Cuba’s defense
R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress.
minister (January 2020) for gross human rights
violations in Venezuela. In February 2020, the Spanish
hotel chain Meliá confirmed its chief executive officer is
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
prohibited from entering the United States pursuant to
IF10045
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 67 · UPDATED