Updated March 11, 2020
Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are
Trump Administration Policy
diverse and include economic, political, security, and
Under the Trump Administration, U.S. relations with Latin
humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured
America and the Caribbean have moved toward a more
strong economic linkages between the United States and the
confrontational approach from one of engagement and
region, with the United States being a major trading partner
partnership during past Administrations. In 2018, the State
and source of foreign investment for many Latin American
Department set forth a framework for U.S. policy toward
and Caribbean countries. Free trade agreements (FTAs)
the region focused on three pillars for engagement—
have augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries
economic growth and prosperity, security, and democratic
in the region. The Western Hemisphere is a large source of
governance. The framework reflects continuity with long-
U.S. immigration, both legal and illegal; geographic
standing U.S. policy priorities for the region, but it also
proximity and economic and security conditions are major
appears at odds with the Administration’s sometimes
factors driving migration trends.
antagonistic actions and statements on immigration, trade,
and foreign aid. According to Gallup and Pew Research
Curbing the flow of illicit drugs from Latin America and
Center polls, negative views of U.S. leadership in the region
the Caribbean has been a key component of U.S. relations
have increased markedly during the Trump Administration.
with the region and a major interest of Congress for more
than four decades. The flow of illicit drugs, including
Foreign Aid. The Administration’s proposed foreign aid
heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl from Mexico and
budgets for the region would have cut assistance levels by
cocaine from Colombia, poses risks to U.S. public health
more than a third in FY2018 and FY2019 and by 30% in
and safety. Since 2000, Colombia has received support
FY2020. Congress essentially rejected those requests by
through Plan Colombia and its successor programs. For
providing significantly more assistance in appropriations
over a decade, the United States also has sought to forge
measures, but in 2019, the Trump Administration withheld
close partnerships with other countries to combat drug
some assistance to the “Northern Triangle” countries of
trafficking and related violence and advance citizen
Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras)
security. These include the Mérida Initiative, begun in 2007
to compel their governments to curb the flow of migrants to
to support Mexico; the Central America Regional Security
the United States. The FY2021 request of $1.4 billion
Initiative (CARSI), begun in 2008; and the Caribbean Basin
would cut aid to the region by 18%, but a large proposed
Security Initiative (CBSI), begun in 2009.
aid increase to support a potential democratic transition in
Venezuela masks significantly larger cuts for many
Another long-standing component of U.S. policy has been
countries and programs.
support for democratic governance and the rule of law. U.S.
policy efforts have long supported democracy promotion,
Trade. In 2017, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal
including support for strengthening civil society and
from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA
promoting human rights and the rule of law.
negotiated in 2015 by 12 Asia-Pacific countries; the TPP
would have increased U.S. economic linkages with three
Increasing Challenges in the Region
Latin American countries that were parties to the
Over the past several years, the quality of democracy has
agreement—Chile, Mexico, and Peru. The President
eroded in a number of countries, along with public
strongly criticized the North American Free Trade
satisfaction with how democracy is working. Venezuela has
Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada, repeatedly
descended into a dictatorship under President Nicolás
warned that the United States might withdraw from the
Maduro, and Cuba and Nicaragua are also ruled by
agreement, and initiated renegotiations in 2017. The three
authoritarian regimes repressing the political opposition.
countries agreed in 2018 to a new United States-Mexico-
Other countries have experienced social unrest fueled by
Canada Agreement (USMCA), which retained many of
such political factors as fraudulent elections, weak
NAFTA’s provisions and included modernizing features
democratic institutions, politicized judicial systems, public
and new provisions on the auto and dairy industries.
corruption scandals, high levels of crime and violence, and
the effect of organized crime on state institutions.
Mexico, Central America, and Immigration. Relations
Economic factors such as declining or stagnant growth
with Mexico have been tested because of inflammatory
rates, high levels of income inequality, and increased
anti-immigrant rhetoric and immigration actions that have
poverty have also increased social pressure. Protests that
shifted the burden of interdicting migrants and offering
racked a number of countries in 2019 could reemerge in
asylum to Mexico. In 2017, the Administration announced
2020, given that many of the underlying conditions that
it would end the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
fueled unrest in the region persist.
program; begun in 2012, the program provides relief from
deportation for certain immigrants who arrived as children.
The program’s future remains uncertain, given challenges
in federal court. In 2018, Mexico’s president agreed to
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
allow the United States to return certain non-Mexican
U.S. foreign and domestic policy often overlap, particularly
migrants to Mexico (pursuant to Migrant Protection
in areas of immigration and trade.
Protocols) while awaiting U.S. immigration court decisions.
The 116th Congress completed action on FY2019 foreign
Other Administration actions on immigration have caused
aid appropriations when it enacted the Consolidated
concern in the region. In 2017, the Administration
Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6). in February 2019.
announced plans to terminate Temporary Protected Status
Amounts appropriated for key U.S. initiatives and countries
(TPS) designations for Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and
exceeded the Administration’s request by almost $600
Honduras, but federal court challenges have put the
million. Congress completed action on the FY2020 foreign
terminations on hold.
aid budget in December 2019 when it enacted the Further
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), with
Unauthorized migration from Central America has
amounts for key countries and regional programs once
increased in recent years, fueled by difficult socioeconomic
again significantly exceeding the Administration’s request.
and security conditions and poor governance. To deter such
In February 2020, Congress began consideration of the
migration, the Trump Administration implemented a “zero
Administration’s FY2021 foreign aid request.
tolerance” policy
toward illegal border crossings in 2018
and restrictions on access to asylum at the U.S. border. The
In January 2020, Congress completed action on
Administration has used aid cuts of appropriated assistance
implementing legislation for the USMCA (P.L. 116-113).
and threats of increased U.S. tariffs and taxes on
Before legislative approval, the agreement was amended to
remittances to compel Central American countries and
address congressional concerns regarding provisions on
Mexico to curb unauthorized migration to the United States.
labor (including enforcement), the environment, dispute
In 2019, the Administration negotiated “safe third country”
settlement, and intellectual property rights.
agreements with each of the Northern Triangle countries to
On Venezuela, in December 2019, Congress enacted the
permit the United States to transfer asylum applicants from
VERDAD Act of 2019 in Division J of P.L. 116-94, which,
third countries to the Northern Triangle countries.
among its provisions, codifies several sanctions and
Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. As the situation in
authorizes humanitarian assistance and support for
Venezuela has deteriorated under the government of
international election observation and democratic civil
President Maduro, the Trump Administration has imposed
society. The measure incorporates provisions from S. 1025
targeted and broader financial sanctions, including
and three March 2019 House-passed bills: H.R. 854; H.R.
sanctions against the state oil company, the country’s main
920, and H.R. 1477. In July 2019, the House also approved
source of income. In January 2019, the Administration
H.R. 549, which would provide TPS to Venezuelans.
recognized the head of Venezuela’s National Assembly,
The FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
Juan Guaidó, as interim president. In September 2019, the
116-92), approved in December 2019, includes provisions
United States joined 11 other Western Hemisphere
on Venezuela and Guatemala and reporting requirements on
countries to invoke the Rio Treaty to facilitate a regional
Brazil, Honduras, Central America and Mexico.
response to the Venezuelan crisis. The Administration also
is providing humanitarian and development assistance for
In other action, the House approved H.R. 133 in January
Venezuelans who have fled to other countries, especially
2019, which would promote U.S.-Mexican economic
Colombia, and for Venezuelans inside Venezuela.
partnership and exchanges; the Senate approved an
amended version in January 2020. The House approved
On Cuba, the Trump Administration has abandoned the
H.R. 2615 in July 2019, which would authorize assistance
policy of engagement advanced during the Obama
to Central America’s Northern Triangle countries to address
Administration and imposed a series of economic sanctions
the root causes of migration. The Senate approved S.Res.
on Cuba for its poor human rights record and support for
35 in April 2019, expressing support for democratic
the Maduro government in Venezuela. Economic sanctions
principles in Bolivia, and S.Res. 447 in January 2020,
have included restrictions on travel and remittances, efforts
supporting new elections in Bolivia following October 2019
to disrupt oil flows from Venezuela, and authorization
elections allegedly marred by fraud. Both houses also
(pursuant to Title III of the LIBERTAD Act, P.L. 104-114),
approved resolutions (H.Res. 441 in July 2019 and S.Res.
of the right to file lawsuits against those trafficking in
277 in October 2019) commemorating the 25th anniversary
confiscated property in Cuba. In 2017, the State Department
of the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual
cut the staff of U.S. Embassy Havana by about two-thirds in
Association in Buenos Aires. In March 2020, the House
response to unexplained injuries of U.S. diplomatic staff.
approved H.Res. 754, expressing support for U.S. efforts to
Since political unrest began to grow in Nicaragua in 2018
promote democracy and human rights in Nicaragua and
against the government of President Daniel Ortega, the
increase pressure on the Ortega government.
Trump Administration has employed targeted sanctions
against several individuals due to their alleged ties to
For more, see CRS Report R46258, Latin America and the
human rights abuses or significant corruption.
Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress.
Congressional Action in the 116th Congress
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy
toward Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of both
IF10460
legislation and oversight. Given the region’s proximity,
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
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