February 28, 2020
New U.S. Antipersonnel Landmine Use Policy
On January 31, 2020, the Department of Defense (DOD)
(also known as the Ottawa Convention), which entered into
announced a new policy regarding the use of antipersonnel
force for those signatory countries in 1999. The Clinton
landmines (APL). According to a January 31, 2020, DOD
Administration declined to sign the Ottawa Convention
memorandum, President Trump “decided to cancel
because it would preclude U.S. use of APLs in the DMZ. In
Presidential Policy Directive-37 (PPD-37),” which was
February 2004, the Bush Administration announced the
issued by the Obama Administration in January 2016. The
United States would use persistent APLs only in the DMZ
Administration adopted the new policy following an
until 2010, after which the United States would not use
internal DOD review ordered by former Secretary of
such APLs anywhere. The Bush Administration also
Defense James Mattis that was completed in 2018.
indicated that the United States would develop alternatives
to persistent landmines. The Obama Administration
The January 2020 memorandum permits Combatant
conducted a review of U.S. policy regarding landmines. A
Commanders to authorize the use of nonpersistent APLs
National Security Council spokesperson stated in June 2014
regardless of geographic location “when necessary for
that the United States would not “produce or otherwise
mission success in major contingencies or other exceptional
acquire any anti-personnel landmines in the future,”
circumstances.” Nonpersistent landmines, according to the
including for the purpose of replacing expiring stockpiles.
memorandum, “must possess self-destruction mechanisms
In 2014, the Obama Administration announced the APL
and self-deactivation features.” Persistent landmines, which
policy described in PPD-37 (discussed earlier). The
the new policy forbids, lack these features. PPD-37 forbade
Department of State noted in December 2014 that the
the use of APLs “outside the Korean Peninsula,” as well as
United States was “pursuing solutions that would be
assisting, encouraging, or inducing “anyone outside the
compliant with the [Ottawa Convention] and that would
Korean Peninsula to engage in activity prohibited by the
ultimately allow us to accede to the convention while
Ottawa Convention.” The Ottawa Convention, to which the
ensuring that we are still able to meet our alliance
United States is not a party, requires states parties to stop
commitments” to South Korea.
the production, use, and transfer of APLs, as well as to
destroy all stockpiled APLs, except for the “minimum
Details
number absolutely necessary” for training purposes. The
As noted, the new policy “will not have any expressed
Obama Administration’s policy stated the United States
geographic limitations.” DOD’s January 3, 2020,
would “undertake to destroy APL stockpiles not required
memorandum adds
for the defense” of South Korea.
[A]ppropriate geographic limitations will be
Background
formulated based on specific operational contexts
With the end of the Cold War in 1991, during the mid- to
and will be reflected in relevant rules of
late 1990s, the international community began to question
engagement, consistent with existing DOD policy
the utility of APLs in light of the growing number of
and practice.
civilian and U.N. peacekeeper casualties resulting from
abandoned unmarked or unregistered minefields. In 1996,
The policy described in the memorandum permits the use of
President Clinton announced a policy that immediately
nonpersistent APLs “in major contingencies or other
discontinued U.S. use of persistent APLs except in the
exceptional circumstances.” Responding to a question
demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating North and South
during a January 31, 2020, press briefing, the acting
Korea and supported negotiation of a worldwide ban on
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and
APLs in the U.N. In November 1996, the United States
Capabilities did not provide any specific scenarios that
introduced a resolution to the U.N. General Assembly to
might constitute “exceptional circumstances.” With respect
pursue an international agreement that would ban the use,
to the U.S. stockpile of persistent APLs, the “Military
stockpiling, production, and transfer of APLs. While many
Departments will continue to demilitarize” any such
nations supported such a ban, others were concerned that
landmines “remaining in existing inactive stockpiles,”
verifying such a ban would be difficult and that APLs still
according to the January 31, 2020, memo which mandates
played a useful role in military operations. The UN General
that DOD
Assembly, however, could not agree on a way forward.
may acquire, retain, and transfer a limited number
In 1997 the government of Canada and a number of
of persistent landmines for the purposes of training
nongovernmental organizations sponsored The Convention
personnel engaged in demining and countermining
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
operations and improving countermine capabilities.
Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,
The stocks of such persistent landmines will not
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New U.S. Antipersonnel Landmine Use Policy
exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary
was attacked by Al Shabab militants, resulting in the deaths
for such purposes.
of three Americans and the destruction of six aircraft. While
specific force protection measures for these and other
DOD’s January 31, 2020, briefing also noted that the
installations are unknown, in many instances, the presence
United States may need to develop new APLs for use in
of APL barriers can help augment base defenses where
accordance with the new policy and that
there are too few troops to provide perimeter security or the
base itself is too large to defend physically from infiltration
all activated landmines … will be designed and
and attack. Aside from base protection, DOD’s reference to
constructed to self-destruct in 30 days or less after
“obstructing, channeling, and delaying/stopping
emplacement and will possess a back-up self-
numerically superior adversaries and preventing them from
deactivation feature. Some landmines, will be
outflanking friendly forces” suggests an operational need in
designed and constructed to self-destruct in shorter
conventional ground combat scenarios outside the Korean
periods of time, such as two hours or forty eight
peninsula. One such scenario could well be in Eastern
hours.
Europe where U.S. and NATO forces are aligned to deter
Russian aggression. A 2016 RAND study, “Reinforcing
The memorandum also stipulated that “Military
Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the
Departments should explore acquiring landmines and
Defense of the Baltics,” suggested that “as currently
landmine alternatives that could further reduce the risk of
postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of
unintended harm to noncombatants.” The memorandum
its most exposed members.” Results of RAND’s wargames
also states DOD “will continue to adhere to all applicable
suggested that “the longest it has taken Russian forces to
international legal obligations concerning landmines” and
reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals
specifically cites the Protocol on Prohibitions or
of Tallinn and Riga, respectively, is 60 hours and that such
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other
a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of
Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 annexed to the
options, all of them bad.” These findings were viewed by
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
many NATO members as deeply troubling and, while
Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be
additional forces would be needed to rectify this situation,
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects
(hereafter “Protocol”). The United States is a party to the
arguably, the use of APLs could also play a role in
obstructing, channeling, and delaying/stopping numerically
Protocol, which entered into force in 1998. In addition to
superior Russian forces.
prohibiting the use of nondetectable APLs and imposing
detailed restrictions on the use of persistent APLs, the
Potential Issues for Congress
Protocol requires that its parties take “[a]ll feasible
precautions … to protect civilians from the effects” of
Potential issues for Congress might include the following:
APLs. The written 2020 DOD policy apparently conforms
What are some of the “exceptional circumstances” DOD
to these requirements.
believes could require the use of APLs?
Why the Change in Policy?
Does DOD have sufficient quantities and types of
According to DOD’s January 31, 2020, Landmine Policy
nonpersistent APLs to meet potential Combatant
statement, the change in policy was required because
Commander’s requirements as envisioned under DOD’s
new policy?
the strategic environment has changed since 2016
and the U.S. faces an era of strategic competition
Aside from self-destruct and deactivation features on
that requires our military to become more lethal,
nonpersistent APLs, what measures will military
resilient, and ready for future contingencies.
commanders employ to help prevent civilian/friendly
Regarding the utility of landmines in modern warfare, it
force casualties?
was further stated that
Under this new policy, are APLs to be used in a strictly
such area denial systems are a force multiplier in
defensive role or as a barrier to advancing enemy forces
key operational contexts: they can obstruct,
or can they be used in an offensive role such as during
channel, and delay/stop numerically superior
ambushes and raids?
adversaries and prevent them from outflanking
Will the new policy on U.S. APL usage be acceptable to
friendly forces.
our regional allies, some of whom no longer use APLs?
While DOD did not provide any specifics, incidents outside
of the Korean peninsula might have compelled the
With the possibility of more widespread use of APLs
Administration and DOD reexamine the need for
resulting from the new U.S. policy, how could this
nonpersistent APLs. There have been a number of attempts
affect civilian casualties?
in Afghanistan to penetrate U.S. bases, such as on March 1,
2019, when Taliban fighters attempted to storm a major
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Afghan military base in Helmand housing both Afghan
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
forces and U.S. Marine advisors. More recently, on January
5, 2020, a U.S./Kenyan facility at Manda Bay, which was
IF11440
primarily guarded by a small contingent of Kenyan forces,
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New U.S. Antipersonnel Landmine Use Policy
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11440 · VERSION 1 · NEW