Updated February 27, 2020
Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are
Trump Administration Policy
diverse and include economic, political, security, and
Under the Trump Administration, U.S. relations with Latin
humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured
America and the Caribbean have moved toward a more
strong economic linkages between the United States and the
confrontational approach from one of engagement and
region, with the United States being a major trading partner
partnership during past Administrations. In 2018, the State
and source of foreign investment for many Latin American
Department set forth a framework for U.S. policy toward
and Caribbean countries. Free trade agreements (FTAs)
the region focused on three pillars for engagement—
have augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries
economic growth and prosperity, security, and democratic
in the region. The Western Hemisphere is a large source of
governance. The framework reflects continuity with long-
U.S. immigration, both legal and illegal; geographic
standing U.S. policy priorities for the region, but it also
proximity and economic and security conditions are major
appears at odds with the Administration’s sometimes
factors driving migration trends.
antagonistic actions and statements on immigration, trade,
and foreign aid. Meanwhile, according to Gallup and Pew
Curbing the flow of illicit drugs from Latin America and
Research Center polls, negative views of U.S. leadership in
the Caribbean has been a key component of U.S. relations
the region have increased markedly during the Trump
with the region and a major interest of Congress for more
Administration.
than four decades. The flow of illicit drugs, including
heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl from Mexico and
Foreign Aid. The Administration’s proposed foreign aid
cocaine from Colombia, poses risks to U.S. public health
budgets for the region would have cut assistance levels by
and safety. Since 2000, Colombia has received support
more than a third in FY2018 and FY2019 and by 30% in
through Plan Colombia and its successor programs. For
FY2020. Congress essentially rejected those requests by
over a decade, the United States also has sought to forge
providing significantly more assistance in appropriations
close partnerships with other countries to combat drug
measures, but in 2019, the Trump Administration withheld
trafficking and related violence and advance citizen
some assistance to the “Northern Triangle” countries of
security. These include the Mérida Initiative, begun in 2007
Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras)
to support Mexico; the Central America Regional Security
to compel their governments to curb the flow of migrants to
Initiative (CARSI), begun in 2008; and the Caribbean Basin
the United States. The FY2021 request of $1.4 billion
Security Initiative (CBSI), begun in 2009.
would cut aid to the region by 18%, but a large proposed
aid increase to support a potential democratic transition in
Another long-standing component of U.S. policy has been
Venezuela masks significantly larger cuts for many
support for democratic governance and the rule of law. U.S.
countries and programs.
policy efforts have long supported democracy promotion,
including support for strengthening civil society and
Trade. In 2017, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal
promoting human rights and the rule of law.
from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA
negotiated in 2015 by 12 Asia-Pacific countries; the TPP
Increasing Challenges in the Region
would have increased U.S. economic linkages with three
Over the past several years, the quality of democracy has
Latin American countries that were parties to the
eroded in a number of countries, along with public
agreement—Chile, Mexico, and Peru. The President
satisfaction with how democracy is working. Venezuela has
strongly criticized the North American Free Trade
descended into a dictatorship under President Nicolás
Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada, repeatedly
Maduro, and Cuba and Nicaragua are also ruled by
warned that the United States might withdraw from the
authoritarian regimes repressing the political opposition.
agreement, and initiated renegotiations in 2017. The three
Other countries have experienced social unrest fueled by
countries agreed in 2018 to a new United States-Mexico-
such political factors as fraudulent elections, weak
Canada Agreement (USMCA), which retained many of
democratic institutions, politicized judicial systems, public
NAFTA’s provisions and included modernizing features
corruption scandals, high levels of crime and violence, and
and new provisions on the auto and dairy industries.
the effect of organized crime on state institutions.
Economic factors such as declining or stagnant growth
Mexico, Central America, and Immigration. Relations
rates, high levels of income inequality, and increased
with Mexico have been tested because of inflammatory
poverty have also increased social pressure. Protests that
anti-immigrant rhetoric and immigration actions that have
racked a number of countries in 2019 could reemerge in
shifted the burden of interdicting migrants and offering
2020, given that many of the underlying conditions that
asylum to Mexico. In 2017, the Administration announced
fueled unrest in the region persists.
it would end the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
program; begun in 2012, the program provides relief from
deportation for certain immigrants who arrived as children.
The program’s future remains uncertain, given challenges
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
in federal court. In 2018, Mexico’s president agreed to
U.S. foreign and domestic policy often overlap, particularly
allow the United States to return certain non-Mexican
in areas of immigration and trade.
migrants to Mexico (pursuant to Migrant Protection
The 116th Congress completed action on FY2019 foreign
Protocols) while awaiting U.S. immigration court decisions.
aid appropriations when it enacted the Consolidated
Other Administration actions on immigration have caused
Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6). in February 2019.
concern in the region. In 2017, the Administration
Amounts appropriated for key U.S. initiatives and countries
announced plans to terminate Temporary Protected Status
exceeded the Administration’s request by almost $600
(TPS) designations for Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and
million. Congress completed action on the FY2020 foreign
Honduras, but federal court challenges have put the
aid budget in December 2019 when it enacted the Further
terminations on hold.
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), with
Unauthorized migration from Central America’s Northern
amounts for key countries and regional programs once
again significantly exceeding the Administration’s request.
Triangle countries has increased in recent years, fueled by
In February 2020, Congress began consideration of the
difficult socioeconomic and security conditions and poor
Administration’s FY2021 foreign aid request.
governance. To deter such migration, the Trump
Administration implemented a “zero tolerance” policy
In January 2020, Congress completed action on
toward illegal border crossings in 2018 and restrictions on
implementing legislation for the USMCA (P.L. 116-113).
access to asylum at the U.S. border. The Administration has
Before legislative approval, the agreement was amended to
used aid cuts of appropriated assistance and threats of
address congressional concerns regarding provisions on
increased U.S. tariffs and taxes on remittances to compel
labor (including enforcement), the environment, dispute
Central American countries and Mexico to curb
settlement, and intellectual property rights.
unauthorized migration to the United States. In 2019, the
On Venezuela, Congress has supported the
Administration negotiated “safe third country” agreements
Administration’s efforts to sanction the Maduro regime for
with each of the Northern Triangle countries to permit the
its antidemocratic actions and to provide humanitarian
United States to transfer asylum applicants from third
assistance to Venezuelan migrants. In December 2019,
countries to the Northern Triangle countries.
Congress enacted the VERDAD Act of 2019 in Division J
Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. As the situation in
of P.L. 116-94, which, among its provisions, codifies
Venezuela has deteriorated under the government of
several types of sanctions imposed on Venezuela and
President Maduro, the Trump Administration has imposed
authorizes humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans and
targeted and broader financial sanctions, including
support for international election observation and
sanctions against the state oil company, the country’s main
democratic civil society. The measure incorporates
source of income. In January 2019, the Administration
provisions from S. 1025 and three bills passed by the House
recognized the head of Venezuela’s National Assembly,
in March 2019: H.R. 854; H.R. 920, and H.R. 1477. In July
Juan Guaidó, as interim president. In September 2019, the
2019, the House also approved H.R. 549, which would
United States joined 11 other Western Hemisphere
provide TPS to Venezuelans in the United States.
countries to invoke the Rio Treaty to facilitate a regional
The FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
response to the Venezuelan crisis. The Administration also
116-92), approved in December 2019, includes provisions
is providing humanitarian and development assistance for
on Venezuela and Guatemala and reporting requirements on
Venezuelans who have fled to other countries, especially
Brazil, Honduras, Central America and Mexico.
Colombia, and for Venezuelans inside Venezuela.
In other action, the House approved H.R. 133 in January
On Cuba, the Trump Administration has abandoned the
2019, which would promote U.S.-Mexican economic
policy of engagement advanced during the Obama
partnership and exchanges; the Senate approved an
Administration and imposed a series of economic sanctions
amended version in January 2020. The House approved
on Cuba for its poor human rights record and support for
H.R. 2615 in July 2019, which would authorize assistance
the Maduro government in Venezuela. Economic sanctions
to Central America’s Northern Triangle countries to address
have included restrictions on travel and remittances, efforts
the root causes of migration. In April 2019, the Senate
to disrupt oil flows from Venezuela, and authorization
approved S.Res. 35, expressing support for democratic
(pursuant to Title III of the LIBERTAD Act, P.L. 104-114),
principles in Bolivia; in January 2020, the Senate approved
of the right to file lawsuits against those trafficking in
S.Res. 447, supporting new elections in Bolivia following
confiscated property in Cuba. In 2017, the State Department
October 2019 elections that were marred by irregularities.
cut the staff of U.S. Embassy Havana by about two-thirds in
Both houses also approved resolutions (H.Res. 441 in July
response to unexplained injuries of U.S. diplomatic staff.
2019 and S.Res. 277 in October 2019), commemorating the
Since political unrest began to grow in Nicaragua in 2018,
25th anniversary of the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-
the Trump Administration has employed targeted sanctions
Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires.
against several individuals with close ties to President
For background on legislative action in the 115th Congress
Daniel Ortega due to their alleged ties to human rights
(2017-2018), see CRS Report R45120, Latin America and
abuses or significant corruption.
the Caribbean: Issues in the 115th Congress.
Congressional Action in the 116th Congress
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy
toward Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of both
IF10460
legislation and oversight. Given the region’s proximity,
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
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