February 14, 2020
U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers
Overview
announced such a Conclusion nor a timetable for reaching
Annex B of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 (July
it.
17, 2015), which enshrined the multilateral Iran nuclear
agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA),
U.S. and officials of other Security Council members
provides for a ban on arms transfers to or from Iran until
widely interpret the restriction as inapplicable to the sale to
October 18, 2020. Although major arms suppliers have
Iran of systems for purely defensive purposes. For example,
apparently not violated the restriction by transferring major
in 2007, Russia agreed to the sale to Iran of the S-300 air
combat systems to Iran, U.S. officials and U.S. and U.N.
defense system, with a reported estimated value of about
reports assert that Iran has not abided by the ban on arms
$800 million. The two governments reportedly disagreed
transfers to its allies. The Trump Administration and many
later over certain terms and the system’s delivery date, but
in Congress advocate a Security Council extension of the
Russia delivered the system in November 2016. A State
arms transfer ban, but two key potential arms suppliers of
Department spokesperson said in May 2016 that “[w]hile
Iran – Russia and China – are members of the Security
we’re opposed to the sale, it is not formally a violation”
Council and oppose Trump Administration policy on Iran.
because the S-300 is for defensive uses only.
Annex B also contains a ban, until October 18, 2023, on
Figure 1. Iran’s Regional Allies
supplying equipment that Iran could use to develop nuclear-
capable ballistic missiles, and a non-binding ban on Iran’s
development of ballistic missiles designed to carry a
nuclear weapon. These missile-related provisions are
addressed separately in CRS Report RS20871, Iran
Sanctions
, by Kenneth Katzman.
Provisions of the Arms Transfer Ban
Annex B of Resolution 2231 continued similar restrictions
in previous U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iran.
Resolution 1747 (March 24, 2007) contained a ban on
Iran’s transfer of arms from its territory and required all
U.N. member states to prohibit the transfer of Iranian arms
to their nationals. Resolution 1929 (June 9, 2010) contained
a ban (Resolution 1747 had a voluntary restriction) on the
supply to Iran of “any battle tanks, armoured combat

vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft,
Source: Defense Intel igence Agency. Iran Military Power: 2019
attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as
defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of
Effects of the Ban
Arms or related materiel, including spare parts…” These
The U.S. government assesses that the arms transfer ban to
restrictions are restated in Annex B of Resolution 2231,
Iran has been only partially effective. According to
which supersedes all previous Security Council resolutions
Appendix J of the congressionally-mandated Defense
on Iran, although Annex B permits the importation and
Intelligence Agency (DIA) annual report on the military
exportation of such arms by Iran if the U.N. Security
power of Iran for 2019, released in November 2019, Iran
Council provides advance approval of such transfers on a
wants to “purchase new advanced weapon systems from
“case-by-case basis.” Such approval is virtually impossible
foreign suppliers to modernize its armed forces, including
- both the Obama and Trump Administration officials have
equipment it has largely been unable to acquire for
consistently said they could not envision U.S. approval of
decades.” The report adds that once the U.N. ban on arms
such sales or transfers.
sales to Iran expires, Iran “will be permitted to purchase
conventional systems it is unable to produce domestically,
The Iran arms transfer ban in Resolution 2231 is temporary;
such as advanced fighter aircraft and main battle tanks. Iran
it applies “until the date that is five years after the JCPOA
is already evaluating and discussing military hardware for
Adoption Day” (Adoption Day was October 18, 2015 – 90
purchase primarily from Russia and, to a lesser extent,
days after the passage of Resolution 2231). The restriction
China.” According to the report, “Iran’s potential
would expire earlier than the five-year period if the
acquisitions after the lifting of UNSCR 2231 restrictions
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were to issue
a “Broader Conclusion” that all nuc
include Russian Su-30 fighters, Yak-130 trainers, and T-90
lear material in Iran
MBTs (main battle tanks). Iran has also shown interest in
remains in peaceful activities. The IAEA has neither
acquiring S-400 air defense systems and Bastian coastal
defense systems from Russia.” The report does not say that
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U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers
Iran has obtained any major combat systems from foreign
in advance of a meeting with Israel’s Prime Minister
suppliers since the ban went into effect. For information on
Binyamin Netanyahu, held one year before the U.N.
the composition of Iran’s forces, see Figure 2.
restriction is to expire, Secretary Pompeo stated that: “The
Security Council must renew the arms embargo.” For their
Figure 2. Iran Military Structure and Size Estimates
part, Iranian leaders have advocated for staying in the
JCPOA in part to ensure the lifting of the ban—perhaps
because, under the JCPOA, Iranian withdrawal could
potentially trigger a “snapback” of all sanctions that were in
place prior to the agreement. Some in Congress have argued
that the United States is able to unilaterally trigger a
snapback of all sanctions even though it has left the
JCPOA, using applicable provisions of Resolution 2231,
and that doing so would ensure the continuation of the arms
transfer ban beyond its expiration in October 2020.
The Administration has not, to date, announced formal
negotiations within the U.N. Security Council to extend the
arms transfer restrictions of Annex B. Any such
negotiations are likely to be complicated by the fact that
Source: Defense Intel igence Agency. Iran Military Power: 2019
two permanent Council members, Russia and China, might
seek to sell significant packages of new major combat
The ban on Iranian arms exports is assessed by the U.S.
systems to Iran, as referenced in the DIA report. Both
government as ineffective. According to the DIA report,
countries have remained parties to the JCPOA and opposed
which represents a consensus U.S. judgment: “Since
the U.S. exit from the deal. Russian officials have
UNSCR 2231 came into effect, no export proposals [by
reportedly stated that they will reject any attempt to extend
Iran] have been submitted to the UNSC. Since the Islamic
the arms transfer ban. The Administration and Congress,
Revolution, Iran has transferred a wide range of weapons
potentially through legislation, might seek to link other
and military equipment to state and nonstate actors,
bilateral issues with Russia and China to their support for
including designated terrorist organizations…Although
extending the embargo.
some Iranian shipments have been interdicted, Tehran is
often able to get high-priority arms transfers to its
Separate from the U.N. restriction, a number of U.S.laws
customers. See Figure 1. Over the years, Iranian transfers to
and authorities impose sanctions on countries that supply
state and nonstate actors have included: communications
arms and related technology to Iran. These laws, all of
equipment; small arms—such as assault rifles, sniper rifles,
which have been used to sanction entities supplying arms-
machine guns, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades
related technology to Iran, include the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
(RPGs)—and ammunition; …artillery systems, including
Proliferation Act, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
MRLs (multiple rocket launchers) and battlefield rockets
Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA), and Executive Order
and launchers; armored vehicles; FAC (fast attack craft);
13382. Additionally, the Countering America’s Adversaries
equipment for unmanned explosives boats;….SAMs
through Sanctions Act authorizes sanctions for the sale to
(surface-to-air missiles); UAVs (unmanned aerial
Iran of the combat systems enumerated by Annex B. Iran’s
vehicles)…ground-attack aircraft…”and other weaponry.
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism provides
For comprehensive analysis on Iran’s support to its allies
additional authorities for the President to sanction countries
and proxies, see: CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and
that supply arms to Iran. For more detail on these
Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman
provisions, see: CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by
Kenneth Katzman. It is not known from open sources
Relevant Laws, Authorities, and Options
whether the apparent restraint shown by such suppliers as
for the Administration and Congress
Russia and China in proceeding with new arms sales to
The stated policy of the Trump Administration is to apply
Tehran are a result of the Annex B restriction, or the threat
“maximum pressure” on Iran’s economy, through the
from U.S. secondary sanctions. Some options Congress
imposition and enforcement of U.S. sanctions, to compel
might consider include expanding the sanctions provisions
Iran to alter its behavior. One of the reasons the
of these laws.
Administration gave for its exit from the JCPOA is that the
nuclear restrictions in it, as well as the restrictions on arms

transfers in Resolution 2231, are temporary. At an August
20, 2019 meeting of the U.N. Security Council—more than

one year before the ban expires—Secretary of State
Michael Pompeo argued for the international community to
Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
keep the arms transfer ban in place. On October 18, 2019,
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U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers


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