Updated February 13, 2020
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
investment. However, the new constitution ensures the state
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
sector’s dominance over the economy and the predominant
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
role of the Communist Party. In October 2019, Cuba’s
isolating the government.
National Assembly appointed Díaz-Canel as president
under the new constitution. In December 2019, Díaz-Canel
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy
appointed tourism minister Manuel Marrero Cruz as prime
shift moving away from sanctions toward engagement and
minister, who reportedly will serve as the president’s
the normalization of relations. The policy change included
administrative right-hand man in implementing policy.
the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of
international terrorism (May 2015); the restoration of
The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the reimposition
diplomatic relations (July 2015); and efforts to increase
of, and increase in, U.S. sanctions that impede international
travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba by
financial transactions with Cuba and by Venezuela’s
easing restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
economic crisis, which has limited Venezuela’s support to
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
Cuba. Cuban officials reported that 4.3 million tourists
(2015 and 2016, accomplished through amendments to the
visited Cuba in 2019, down from 4.7 million in 2018; the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, administered by the
decline in tourism has hurt private sector businesses. The
Treasury Department, and the Export Administration
Economist Intelligence Unit estimates the Cuban economy
Regulations, administered by the Commerce Department).
grew 0.5% in 2019 but will contract 0.7% in 2020.
The restoration of relations led to increased government-to-
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
government engagement, with over 20 bilateral agreements
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June
negotiated and numerous bilateral dialogues.
2017 that introduced new sanctions. These included the
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
elimination of people-to-people travel for individuals and
2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back some of
restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by
the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations.
the Cuban military. The State Department issued a list of
By 2019, the Trump Administration had largely abandoned
“restricted entities” in 2017, which has been updated
engagement by increasing economic sanctions significantly
several times, most recently in November 2019. The list
to pressure the Cuban government on its human rights
includes 223 entities and subentities, including 2 ministries,
record and its support for the regime of Nicolás Maduro in
5 holding companies and 49 of their subentities, 109 hotels,
Venezuela. It took actions to allow lawsuits against those
2 tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and
trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban
41 entities serving defense and security sectors.
government and tightened restrictions on travel to Cuba,
The Administration’s strong criticism of Cuba for its
including terminating cruise ship travel from the United
support of Venezuela began in November 2018, when then-
States and U.S. flights to Cuban cities other than Havana.
National Security Adviser John Bolton asserted that Cuba
Cuban Political Developments. In April 2018, Miguel
was responsible for enabling the Venezuelan regime’s
Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice president,
repression. In rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War, Bolton
succeeded Raúl Castro as president, but Castro continues to
referred to Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua as the “Troika
head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021. The selection
of Tyranny” in the hemisphere. In 2019, the Trump
of Díaz-Canel, now 59 years old, reflects the generational
Administration has imposed a series of sanctions against
change in Cuban leadership that began several years ago
Cuba for its poor human rights record and its support for
and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban revolution
the Maduro government in Venezuela. These include
that a Castro is not in charge of the government. While in
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba.
power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to implement
Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed
significant economic policy changes, moving toward a
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels
more mixed economy with a stronger private sector, but his
government’s
that have transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba, including
slow, gradualist approach did not produce
six vessels sanctioned in early December 2019. In July
major improvements to the economy, which has
2019, it imposed sanctions on Cuba’s state-run oil
experienced minimal growth in recent years.
import and export company. Cuba and Venezuela signed
In February 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a new
a preferential oil agreement in 2000 whereby Cuba
constitution in a national referendum. The changes include
received some 90,000-100,000 barrels of oil per day
the addition of an appointed prime minister to oversee
(bpd), but Venezuela’s economic crisis reduced this to
government operations; limits on the president’s tenure
between 40,000-50,000 bpd (about one-third of Cuba’s
(two five-year terms) and age (60, beginning first term);
consumption) in early 2019.
and market-oriented economic reforms, including the right
Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective
to private property and the promotion of foreign
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
policy concern for many years. According to the Havana-
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
based Cuban Center for Human Rights, Cuba held at least
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time
107 political prisoners at the end of October 2019; Amnesty
of the confiscation. To date, some 21 lawsuits have been
International (AI) has named six of these as prisoners of
filed against U.S. and foreign companies, including
conscience, including independent journalist Roberto
cruise ship operators, airlines, travel booking
Quiñones, sentenced to one year in prison in August 2019.
companies, and hotels; a federal court dismissed two
AI also has called for the release of José Daniel Ferrer,
lawsuits against cruise ship companies in early January
leader of the opposition Patriotic Union of Cuba
2020. Previous Administrations had suspended, at six-
(UNPACU), who has been held in detention since October
month intervals, the right to file such lawsuits pursuant
1, 2019. In recent years, Cuba has shifted to using short-
to the provisions of the law. Secretary Pompeo cited
term detentions and harassment to repress dissent.
Cuba’s repression of its own people and its support for
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
the Maduro regime in Venezuela as reasons for the
According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy
implementation of Title III. The European Union and
community members suffered a series of unexplained
Canada criticized the Administration’s action, vowing to
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
ban enforcement or recognition of any judgement, allow
incidents occurred in late 2016 and 2017, but two occurred
counterclaims in European and Canadian courts, and
in May 2018). The State Department maintains that the U.S.
potentially seek action in the World Trade Organization.
investigation has not reached a definitive conclusion
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. In June
regarding the cause or source of the injuries. Cuba strongly
2019, the Treasury Department eliminated the category
denies responsibility for the injuries. In September 2017,
of people-to-people educational travel altogether and the
the State Department ordered the departure of
Commerce Department generally prohibited cruise
nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to
ships, private and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and
minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff
fishing boats from going to Cuba. In September 2019,
was reduced by about two-thirds. The staff reduction has
the Treasury Department capped family remittances to
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing.
$1,000 per quarter (previously, such remittances were
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued
not limited) and eliminated the category of donative
to fund democracy assistance for Cuba and U.S.-
remittances. The Transportation Department suspended
government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2019,
commercial flights by U.S. carriers between the United
Congress appropriated $20 million for democracy programs
States and Cuban cities other than Havana, effective
and $29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 116-6,
December 10, 2019; this was extended to charter fight
H.Rept. 116-9). For FY2020, Congress appropriated $20
on January 10, 2020. These actions largely affect family
million for democracy programs and $20.973 million for
travel.
Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 116-94, H.R. 1865, Division G). In
Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September
addition, Division J of the law includes benefits for U.S.
2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn
government employees and dependents who were injured
transactions, which allowed banking institutions to
while serving in Cuba. The measure also includes several
process certain funds transfers originating and
reporting requirements on Cuba set forth in H.Rept. 116-78
terminating outside the United States. In October 2019,
and S.Rept. 116-126. Congress will soon begin
the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to
consideration of the Administration’s FY2021 budget
leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de
request of $10 million for Cuba democracy programs and
minimis rule (from 25%) requiring a third country-based
$12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting.
company exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10%
Among other bills introduced, several would ease or lift
U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and imposed
U.S. sanctions: H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R.
licensing requirements for the export of certain donated
1898/S. 1447 (financing for U.S. agricultural exports); H.R.
items to organizations controlled by the Cuban
2404 (overall embargo); and H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel).
government or Communist Party and items for
H.R. 4884 would direct the Administration to reinstate the
telecommunications infrastructure.
Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program. Several
Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa
resolutions would express concerns regarding Cuba’s
restrictions on Raúl Castro in September 2019 for gross
foreign medical missions (S.Res. 14/H.Res. 136); U.S.
violations of human rights in Cuba and Venezuela.
fugitives from justice in Cuba (H.Res. 92/S.Res. 232);
Further visa restrictions were imposed on Cuba’s
religious and political freedom in Cuba (S.Res. 215); and
Interior Minister (November 2019) and Cuba’s defense
the release of human rights activist José Daniel Ferrer and
minister (January 2020) for gross violations of human
other members of UNPACU (S.Res. 454 and H.Res. 774).
rights in Venezuela. In early February 2020, the Spanish
Also see CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the
hotel chain Meliá confirmed that the State Department
116th Congress.
notified its chief executive officer in October 2019 that
he would be prohibited from entering the United States
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
within 45 days, pursuant to Title IV of the LIBERTAD
IF10045
Act, related to the trafficking of property confiscated in
Cuba from a U.S. national.
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 66 · UPDATED