Updated January 24, 2020
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
market-oriented economic reforms, including the right to
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
private property and the promotion of foreign investment.
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
However, the new constitution ensures the state sector’s
isolating the government.
dominance over the economy and the predominant role of
the Communist Party. In October 2019, Cuba’s National
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy
Assembly appointed Díaz-Canel as president under the new
shift moving away from sanctions toward engagement and
constitution. In December 2019, Díaz-Canel appointed
the normalization of relations. The policy change included
tourism minister Manuel Marrero Cruz as prime minister,
the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of
who reportedly will serve as the president’s administrative
international terrorism in May 2015; the restoration of
right-hand man in implementing policy.
diplomatic relations in July 2015; and efforts to increase
travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba by
The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the increase in
easing restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
U.S. sanctions, which impede international financial
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
transactions with Cuba, and by Venezuela’s economic
(accomplished through amendments in 2015 and 2016 to
crisis, which has limited Venezuela’s support to Cuba. In
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations [CACR],
the fall of 2019, Cuba experienced severe fuel shortages
administered by the Treasury Department, and the Export
limiting transportation and resulting in planned blackouts.
Administration Regulations [EAR], administered by the
Cuban officials reported that 4.3 million tourists visited
Commerce Department). The restoration of relations led to
Cuba in 2019, down from 4.7 million in 2018; the decline
increased government-to-government engagement, with
in tourism has hurt private sector businesses. The
over 20 bilateral agreements negotiated and bilateral
Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that the economy
dialogues conducted in numerous areas of cooperation.
grew 0.5% in 2019 but will contract 0.7% in 2020.
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back some of
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June
the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations.
2017 that introduced new sanctions. These included
By 2019, the Trump Administration had largely abandoned
restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by
the previous Administration’s policy of engagement by
the Cuban military and the elimination of people-to-people
increasing economic sanctions significantly to pressure the
travel for individuals. To implement these changes, in
Cuban government on its human rights record and its
November 2017, the Treasury and Commerce Departments
support for the regime of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. It
amended the CACR and EAR and the State Department
took actions to allow lawsuits against those trafficking in
issued a list of “restricted entities.” Updated several times,
property confiscated by the Cuban government and
most recently in November 2019, the list currently includes
tightened restrictions on travel to Cuba, including
223 entities and subentities, including 2 ministries, 5
terminating cruise ship travel from the United States and
holding companies and 49 of their subentities, 109 hotels, 2
U.S. flights to and from Cuban cities other than Havana.
tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 41
entities serving the defense and security sectors.
Cuban Political Developments. In April 2018, Miguel
Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice president,
The Administration’s strong criticism of Cuba for its
succeeded Raúl Castro as president, but Castro continues to
support of Venezuela began in November 2018, when then-
head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021. The selection
National Security Adviser John Bolton asserted that Cuba
of Díaz-Canel, now 59 years old, reflects the generational
was responsible for enabling the Venezuelan regime’s
change in Cuban leadership that began several years ago
repression. In rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War, Bolton
and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban revolution
referred to Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua as the “Troika
that a Castro is not in charge of the government. While in
of Tyranny” in the hemisphere. In 2019, the Trump
power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to implement
Administration has imposed a series of sanctions against
significant economic policy changes, moving toward a
Cuba for its poor human rights record and its support for
more mixed economy with a stronger private sector, but his
the Maduro government in Venezuela. These include
government’s slow, gradualist approach did not produce
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba.
major improvements to the economy, which has
Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed
experienced minimal growth in recent years.
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels
In February 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a new
that have transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba, including
constitution in a national referendum. The changes include
six vessels sanctioned in early December 2019. In July
the addition of an appointed prime minister to oversee
2019, it imposed sanctions on Cuba’s state-run oil
government operations; limits on the president’s terms (two
import and export company. Cuba and Venezuela signed
five-year terms) and age (60, beginning first term); and
a preferential oil agreement in 2000 whereby Cuba
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
received some 90,000-100,000 barrels of oil per day
Interior Minister (November 2019) and on Cuba’s
(bpd), but Venezuela’s economic crisis reduced this to
defense minister (January 2020) for gross violations of
between 40,000-50,000 bpd (about one-third of Cuba’s
human rights in Venezuela.
consumption) in early 2019.
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file
policy concern for many years. According to the Havana-
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property
based Cuban Center for Human Rights, Cuba held at least
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
107 political prisoners at the end of October 2019; Amnesty
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
International (AI) has named six of these as prisoners of
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
conscience, including independent journalist Roberto
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time
Quiñones, sentenced to one year in prison in August 2019.
of the confiscation. To date, some 20 lawsuits have been
AI also has called for the release of José Daniel Ferrer,
filed against U.S. and foreign companies, including
leader of the opposition Patriotic Union of Cuba
cruise ship operators, airlines, travel booking
(UNPACU), who has been held in detention since October
companies, and hotels; a federal court dismissed two
1, 2019. In recent years, Cuba has shifted to using short-
lawsuits against cruise ship companies in early January
term detentions and harassment to repress dissent.
2020. Previous Administrations had suspended, at six-
month intervals, the right to file such lawsuits pursuant
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
to the provisions of the law. Secretary Pompeo cited
According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy
Cuba’s repression of its own people and its support for
community members suffered a series of unexplained
the Maduro regime in Venezuela as reasons for the
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
implementation of Title III. The European Union and
incidents occurred in late 2016 and 2017, but two occurred
Canada criticized the Administration’s action, vowing to
in May 2018). The State Department maintains that the U.S.
ban enforcement or recognition of any judgement, allow
investigation has not reached a definitive conclusion
counterclaims in European and Canadian courts, and
regarding the cause or source of the injuries. Cuba strongly
potentially seek action in the World Trade Organization.
denies responsibility for the injuries. In September 2017,
the State Department ordered the departure of
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. In June
nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to
2019, the Treasury Department eliminated the category
minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff
of people-to-people educational travel altogether and the
was reduced by about two-thirds. The staff reduction has
Commerce Department generally prohibited cruise
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing.
ships, private and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and
fishing boats from going to Cuba. In September 2019,
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued
the Treasury Department capped family remittances to
to fund democracy assistance for Cuba and U.S.-
$1,000 per quarter (previously, such remittances were
government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2019,
not limited) and eliminated the category of donative
Congress appropriated $20 million for democracy programs
remittances. At the request of the State Department, the
and $29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 116-6,
Transportation Department suspended commercial
H.Rept. 116-9). For FY2020, Congress appropriated $20
flights by U.S. carriers between the United States and
million for democracy programs and $20.973 million for
Cuban cities other than Havana, effective December 10,
Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 116-94, H.R. 1865, Division G). In
2019; on January 10, 2020, this suspension was
addition, Division J of the law includes benefits for U.S.
extended to charter flights between the United States
government employees and dependents who were injured
and Cuban cities other than Havana. These actions
while serving in Cuba (and China). The measure also
largely affect family travel.
includes several reporting requirements on Cuba set forth in
H.Rept. 116-78 and S.Rept. 116-126.
Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September
2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn
Among other bills introduced, several would ease or lift
transactions, which allowed banking institutions to
U.S. sanctions: H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R.
process certain funds transfers originating and
1898/S. 1447 (financing for U.S. agricultural exports); H.R.
terminating outside the United States. In October 2019,
2404 (overall embargo); and H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel).
the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to
H.R. 4884 would direct the Administration to reinstate the
leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de
Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program. Several
minimis rule (up from 25%) requiring a third country-
resolutions would express concerns regarding Cuba’s
based company exporting goods to Cuba with more than
foreign medical missions (S.Res. 14/H.Res. 136); U.S.
10% U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and
fugitives from justice in Cuba (H.Res. 92/S.Res. 232);
imposed licensing requirements for the export of certain
religious and political freedom in Cuba (S.Res. 215); and
donated items to organizations controlled by the Cuban
the release of human rights activist José Daniel Ferrer and
government or Communist Party and items for
other members of UNPACU (S.Res. 454 and H.Res. 774).
telecommunications infrastructure.
Also see CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the
Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa
116th Congress.
restrictions on Raúl Castro in September 2019 for gross
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
violations of human rights in Cuba and Venezuela.
Further visa restrictions were imposed on Cuba’s
IF10045
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 63 · UPDATED