Updated January 17, 2020
Conflict in Mali
Mali has faced severe security and governance challenges
Figure 1. Mali at a Glance
since a northern separatist rebellion, an Islamist insurgency,
and a military coup shook the country from 2011 to 2013.
Security conditions have worsened despite a 2015 peace
deal between the government and northern rebels, as an
Islamist insurgency has expanded from the north into
central Mali, leveraging and fomenting local tensions and
resentment toward state actors. Ethnic militias—some of
which appear to enjoy state backing or tacit support—have
carried out large massacres, contributing to worsening
insecurity. Bamako (Figure 1) has also been a target of
terrorist attacks, with some targeting Western nationals.
Rebel, terrorist, communal defense, and criminal networks
are fluid and shifting, complicating conflict resolution.
These challenges have undermined already daunting
development prospects in Mali. As of late 2019, over
201,000 Malians were internally displaced (roughly double
the number from a year earlier) and nearly 139,000 were
refugees in neighboring countries, per U.N. figures. Food
Source: CRS graphic. Facts from CIA World Factbook and
insecurity is widespread. Security threats and limited donor
International Monetary Fund; 2018 estimates unless noted.
funding have constrained humanitarian relief.
Background: Mali’s 2011-2013 Crisis
President Ibrahim Boubacar Kéïta won reelection to a
In 2011, members of the semi-nomadic ethnic Tuareg
second five-year term in 2018. Security threats disrupted or
minority launched a separatist rebellion in the north, with
prevented voting in some areas. Turnout was low; Kéïta’s
fighters and arms flowing from Libya. In early 2012,
margin of victory and the number of votes cast for him
soldiers angered by their leaders’ mishandling of the war
were lower than in 2013, when his election restored civilian
ousted Mali’s elected president. Amid the ensuing military
rule after a military coup. Corruption scandals, along with
collapse, the rebels declared an independent state of
the government’s inability to improve living standards,
“Azawad.” By mid-2012, however, local affiliates and
ensure security, or assert state control over the north, appear
offshoots of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, an
to have undermined public faith. Legislative elections due
Algerian-origin regional network)—some of which had
in 2018 have been repeatedly delayed.
fought alongside the rebellion—had outmaneuvered the
Foreign troops are in to Mali to help bolster stability and
separatists and asserted control over the north, a sparsely
counter terrorism. In addition to a U.N. peacekeeping
populated desert area about the size of Texas. These events
operation (discussed below), over 1,000 French troops are
displaced hundreds of thousands and exacerbated a
in Mali under Operation Barkhane, a regional
humanitarian emergency spurred by drought.
counterterrorism mission that evolved from France’s 2013
In early 2013, citing a sudden southward jihadist advance,
intervention in Mali. The European Union (EU) has a multi-
France deployed its military to oust Islamist fighters from
year program to train and restructure the Malian military. In
northern towns. The United States provided logistical
2017, the G5 Sahel—comprising Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
support, while Chadian soldiers aided ground operations.
Burkina Faso, and Chad—launched a “joint force” to
Separatist rebels then reasserted control over some areas
counter security threats in border regions. A lack of
vacated by Islamist groups. A mid-2013 ceasefire between
capacity, mutual distrust, and divergent priorities among
a transitional government and separatist groups paved the
participating countries have hampered its effectiveness.
way for elections and peace talks, while French strikes
Donors have pledged funds, but not all have materialized.
appeared to weaken Islamist insurgents. MINUSMA
The north-south peace process may have contained seeds of
deployed, succeeding and absorbing a nascent African
Mali’s further destabilization. It arguably rewarded those
Union (AU) intervention. Kéïta, a veteran politician, was
who took up arms, while forcing both Bamako and
elected in late 2013 and his coalition won a majority in
separatist leaders to make concessions that are deeply
parliament. The same year, charges were brought against
unpopular with their respective constituencies. The accord
coup leader Capt. Amadou Haya Sanogo for the killings of
also arguably alienated communities, in the north and
rival soldiers, but trial proceedings have been subject to
elsewhere, that felt victimized by both the state and ethnic
repeated delays.
or communal rivals who were granted a seat at the table.
Designated jihadist groups were not party to the talks.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Conflict in Mali
A Stalled Peace Accord
U.N. Peacekeeping Operation
The signatories to the 2015 peace accord, mediated by
The U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Algeria, are the Malian government and two rival coalitions
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is authorized at up to 15,209
of northern armed movements: the Coordination of Azawad
uniformed personnel. Renewing its mandate in June 2019,
Movements (CMA), led by former separatists, and the
the U.N. Security Council decided that MINUSMA’s
Platform, led by groups favoring national unity that have at
“second strategic priority”—after support to implementing
times aligned with the government. The two have
the 2015 north-south accord—is to “facilitate” a new
periodically fought one another, and each has struggled to
strategy to stabilize central Mali. MINUSMA faces stark
contain internal schisms. New groups have emerged since
logistical and force-protection challenges. Although several
2015, with differing views on the accord and the state.
Western countries have contributed troops, African troops
Under the 2015 accord, the government committed to
comprise many of the largest contingents, which are often
increasing political decentralization and development for
reportedly under-equipped and have suffered the most
the north, while armed groups agreed to recognize Malian
fatalities in violent attacks. MINUSMA does not have an
territorial unity and, ultimately, to disarm. Some
explicit mandate to pursue counterterrorism operations. The
combatants are to be integrated into the military, which then
Security Council has authorized MINUSMA to provide
is to redeploy to rebel-held areas. The accord also aims to
logistical support to the G5 force on a reimbursable basis.
foster northern representation in the central government,
U.S. Policy and Aid
advance justice reforms, and ensure accountability for past
Since 2013, U.S. policy has focused on encouraging the
abuses. The mediators and Bamako ruled out discussions of
north-south peace process, supporting Mali’s development,
federalism or altering the secular nature of the state.
and addressing humanitarian needs. Congress appropriated
Hopes that the accord would deliver a peace dividend, unify
$140 million in bilateral aid in FY2018 (latest available),
the country, and isolate Islamist extremists have not
and U.S. emergency humanitarian assistance for Mali
materialized. Malian state actors are absent from much of
totaled $89 million in FY2019. The Department of Defense
the north and, increasingly, the center. Groups that signed
(DOD) provides logistical support to France’s Operation
the accord have not disarmed and maintain parallel
Barkhane (which Congress has explicitly authorized on a
governance structures. Decentralization, institutional
non-reimbursable basis), and DOD and the State
reforms, and development initiatives have been slow to
Department have provided substantial security assistance to
advance, at best. Spoilers, including jihadists, continue to
neighboring countries. The Trump Administration has
undermine peace. U.N. sanctions monitors have reported
pledged $111 million in military aid specifically for G5
collusion between signatory armed groups and designated
Sahel forces since 2017. The implications, for Mali and the
terrorists, as well as involvement of signatory group
Sahel, of ongoing DOD discussions about drawing down
members in drug trafficking, ethnic conflict, and
troops and missions in Africa remain to be seen.
obstruction of humanitarian aid. More broadly, U.N.
As a veto-capable permanent member of the U.N. Security
monitors describe a complex war within the north among
Council, the United States shapes MINUSMA’s mandate
armed factions and the communities they represent, seeking
and the scope of a U.N. sanctions regime established in
control over territory, trafficking routes, and patronage.
2017. In January 2020, U.S. diplomats called for
Islamist Insurgency
MINUSMA to be downsized and reoriented toward civilian
Despite territorial losses in 2013, Islamist armed groups
protection in central Mali (versus support to implementing
have proven resilient, withstanding French strikes against
the 2015 north-south accord), and for new sanctions
top leaders and exploiting the evolving conflict to their
designations “on all sides of the conflict.” U.S. funding for
advantage. In late 2015, AQIM and an offshoot, Al
MINUSMA’s budget was estimated at $327 million in
Murabitoun (“the sentinels”), jointly claimed a siege at a
FY2019; separately, U.S. military and police aid supports
Bamako hotel that killed 19 civilians, including an
African troop and police contributors. The United States
American. In 2017, AQIM’s Sahel branch merged with Al
has designated five individuals for financial and travel
Murabitoun and two Malian-led groups to form the Union
sanctions under a Mali-specific Executive Order issued in
for Supporting Islam and Muslims (aka JNIM). Iyad Ag
July 2019, in line with Security Council actions. The
Ghaly, a Malian Tuareg, heads JNIM, which has claimed
Security Council has designated another three individuals
attacks on U.N., French, and Malian targets, along with
for travel restrictions alone. Other Mali-based individuals
large attacks in Burkina Faso. A 2018 JNIM attack on the
and groups have been designated for U.S. and U.N.
G5 Sahel force headquarters in central Mali forced it to
sanctions related to global terrorism.
relocate to Bamako. A separate AQIM offshoot has
Mali participates in the State Department-led Trans-Sahara
affiliated with the Islamic State and claimed the October
Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), but has not been a
2017 deadly attack on U.S. soldiers in Niger.
major regional recipient of U.S. military aid since the 2012
Islamist attacks have continued to escalate in the sub-
coup. Instead, U.S. security assistance has focused on
region, increasingly targeting military outposts in border
defense sector reforms and building the capacity of Mali’s
regions. Alleged abuses by Malian state security forces and
civilian security forces and gendarmes. Mali’s designation
ethnic militias may fuel Islamist armed group recruitment
under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (Title IV
by offering a means of self-defense and retribution. Some
of P.L. 110-457) triggers certain U.S. security assistance
Malians have proposed peace talks with jihadists, but the
restrictions; in FY2020, President Trump waived most of
idea remains controversial.
these for Mali under the Act, citing national interest.
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
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Conflict in Mali
IF10116
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10116 · VERSION 9 · UPDATED