January 16, 2020
Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)
As an operational concept, Multi-Domain Operations
forces. By creating instability within countries and
(MDO) influence what types of weapon systems and
alliances, China and Russia create political
equipment the Army procures, what types and numbers of
separation that results in strategic ambiguity
soldiers are needed, and what type of training is required—
reducing the speed of friendly recognition, decision,
significant legislative concerns for Congress. In this regard,
and reaction. Through these competitive actions,
an understanding of MDO could prove beneficial for
China and Russia believe they can achieve
congressional oversight activities.
objectives below the threshold of armed conflict.
What Are Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)?
Army leadership believes that if the Army—in conjunction
According to the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine
with the other Services—prevails in these “competitions” in
Command (TRADOC):
all “domains,” that U.S. national security objectives should
be achieved.
Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) describes how
the U.S. Army, as part of the joint force [Army,
How MDO Is Intended to Work
Navy, Air Force, and Marines] can counter and
The Army’s central idea is to prevail by competing
defeat a near-peer adversary capable of contesting
successfully in all domains short of conflict, deterring a
the U.S. in all domains [air, land, maritime, space,
potential enemy. If deterrence fails, Army forces—along
and cyberspace] in both competition and armed
with the joint force—are to do the following:
conflict. The concept describes how U.S. ground
Penetrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems
forces, as part of the joint and multinational team,
(layered and integrated long-range precision-strike systems,
deter adversaries and defeat highly capable near-
littoral anti-ship capabilities, air defenses, and long-range
peer enemies in the 2025-2050 timeframe.
artillery and rocket systems) to enable strategic and
MDO provides commanders numerous options for
operational maneuver of U.S. forces.
executing simultaneous and sequential operations
using surprise and the rapid and continuous
Dis-integrate—disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy anti-
integration of capabilities across all domains to
access and area denial systems to enable operational and
present multiple dilemmas to an adversary in order
tactical maneuver of U.S. forces.
to gain physical and psychological advantages and
Exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to achieve
influence and control over the operational
operational and strategic objectives by defeating enemy
environment.
forces in all domains.
Why Did the Army Adopt MDO?
Re-compete—consolidate gains across domains and force a
MDO is described in detail in a December 2018 Army
return to competition on favorable terms to the United
publication titled The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
States and allies.
Operations 2028. MDO was developed in response to the
2018 National Defense Strategy, which shifted the previous
How Will MDO Change the Organization of the
focus of U.S. national security from countering violent
Army?
extremists worldwide to confronting revisionist powers—
As part of the release of The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
primarily Russia and China—that are said to “want to shape
Operations 2028, an Army official described to the media
a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining
veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic,
that specific Army echelons will be given different
“problems” to address under MDO. Existing Divisions and
and security decisions.” According to The U.S. Army in
Corps will be tasked with fighting and defeating specific
Multi-Domain Operations 2028:
components of the enemy’s system. As such, the Army will
no longer organize or center itself on Brigade Combat
China and Russia exploit the conditions of the
Teams (BCTs) as it did under previous National Defense
operational environment to achieve their objectives
Strategies. Under the previous BCT-centered organizational
without resorting to armed conflict by fracturing the
construct, Divisions and Corps had a limited warfighting
U.S.’s alliances, partnerships, and resolve. They
role, but under MDO, Divisions and Corps headquarters are
attempt to create stand-off through the integration
to return to their historic warfighting roles, in which they
of
diplomatic
and
economic
actions,
employed subordinate units and allocated Corps- and
unconventional and information warfare (social
Division-level assets to support subordinate units.
media, false narratives, cyber-attacks), and the
actual or threatened employment of conventional
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)
According to the online magazine Breaking Defense, MDO
but this update does not fully take into account the current
calls for the creation of Field Armies, an intermediate
National Security or National Defense Strategies’ emphasis
command level between already established Theater
on great power competition.
Armies—such as U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) or U.S.
Army Europe (USAREUR)—and Corps. While one Field
How the Joint Force Intends to Compete
Army currently exists—the U.S. 8th Army in Korea—it is
The notion of the Army “competing” as part of the Joint
not known how many more Field Armies are envisioned
Force is a novel concept. West Point’s Modern War
under MDO, where they would come from within Army
Institute suggests that central to competition is the notion of
force structure, and where they might be stationed. These
the “dilemma.”
Field Armies would supposedly be capable of commanding
multiple Corps against near-peer threats.
Multi-domain operations as a concept proposes that
the joint force can achieve competitive advantage
The Army’s Way Ahead
over a near-peer adversary by presenting multiple
Army leaders reportedly note that MDO will not only have
complementary threats that each require a response,
an impact on Army organizations and operations; it will
thereby exposing adversary vulnerabilities to other
drive Army modernization efforts as well, in terms of
threats. It is the artful combination of these multiple
development and acquisition of supporting capabilities and
dilemmas, rather than a clear overmatch in terms of
systems. Army leadership seeks to have MDO become a
any particular capability, that produces the desired
joint, multiservice operational concept instead of an Army-
advantage.
focused one.
These dilemmas are described as “a situation in which a
The Need for a Joint MDO Doctrine?
difficult choice has to be made between two or more
Some suggest a shared vision among the Services on multi-
alternatives, especially equally undesirable ones. To present
domain operations is insufficient and a joint doctrine for
the enemy with multiple dilemmas across multiple domains
MDO is needed. Such a joint MDO doctrine could compel
and in multiple locations,” the Army seeks to keep a
the Services to adopt a coordinated approach to MDO and
situation from escalating to an open conflict.
ensure corresponding investments are made in systems
needed to successfully prosecute MDO. The last joint
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
doctrine, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
States (JP-1), was published in 2013 and updated in 2017,
IF11409
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)
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