Updated January 16, 2020
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab (aka Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidin, or
Infighting arose under Godane, who had consolidated
Mujahidin Youth Movement) is an insurgent and terrorist
power by assassinating rivals in the organization, reportedly
group that emerged in the mid-2000s amid a vacuum of
including American jihadist Omar Hammami in 2013.
state authority in Somalia. The group evolved out of a
Some prominent commanders left the group or surrendered
militant wing of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which
to local authorities in exchange for amnesty during this
took control of Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, in 2006.
time. Diriye, who was part of Godane’s inner circle, has
Neighboring Ethiopia, which backed Somalia’s nascent
maintained allegiance to Al Qaeda, amid defections by a
transitional government, intervened militarily to oust the
small number of fighters to the Islamic State (IS/ISIS).
UIC. Al Shabaab used historical anti-Ethiopian sentiment
Relationship with Al Qaeda
among Somalis to attract recruits and support, including
among the diaspora in the United States.
Some of Al Shabaab’s founding members trained with Al
Qaeda in Afghanistan, and senior AQ operatives in East
Al Shabaab held much of south-central Somalia, including
Africa, including Fazul Mohammed—the late mastermind
Mogadishu, from the late 2000s until the U.N.-authorized
of the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania—
African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
have been associated with the group. After expressions of
gained momentum against the insurgency in 2011-2012.
allegiance to Al Qaeda in Al Shabaab’s early years, the
Despite its territorial losses and the formation of a new
groups announced a formal affiliation in 2012.
federal government in Mogadishu in 2012, Al Shabaab has
While Al Shabaab’s leaders appear to broadly share Al
retained control or influence over large areas of the country.
Qaeda’s transnational agenda, the group appears to operate
See also CRS Report IF10155, Somalia.
independently. It maintains ties with other AQ affiliates,
The Threat
particularly Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
Al Shabaab has waged an asymmetric campaign against the
In 2015, some Al Shabaab members pressed for the group
Somali government, AMISOM, and foreign targets in
to shift allegiance to the Islamic State. Al Shabaab
Somalia. By conservative estimates, it has killed over 4,000
leadership rejected the proposal and launched a deadly
civilians since 2010. Its deadliest attack to date, an October
crackdown against IS supporters. A small IS faction in
2017 truck bombing in Mogadishu, killed more than 500
northern Somalia survived the purge and has persisted, but
people. While the group has focused primarily on Somalia,
Al Shabaab remains the dominant group.
it also threatens the countries participating in AMISOM and
has conducted attacks in Uganda, Djibouti, and Kenya.
Objectives
The group’s
Al Shabaab broadly ascribes to a vision of uniting ethnic
activity in Kenya, where it has killed hundreds,
Somali-inhabited areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and
has increased since Kenya’s 2011 military intervention in
Somalia under an Islamist government. Its leaders have also
Somalia (Kenya joined AMISOM in 2012). Al Shabaab’s
repeatedly expressed their commitment to global jihad.
assault on a university in northeast Kenya in 2015, which
killed at least 147 people, was the deadliest terrorist attack
The group has justified attacks outside Somalia as
in the country since the 1998 U.S. embassy bombing by Al
retaliation against countries conducting military operations
Qaeda (AQ). Attacks on international targets in Kenya have
in Somalia and as retribution for alleged abuses against
raised Al Shabaab’s profile, notably the 2013 Westgate
Muslims. Al Shabaab described its attacks on Manda Bay
Mall siege and the 2019 assault on the DusitD2 hotel
Airfield and the DusitD2 complex in Kenya as consistent
complex in Nairobi. On January 5, 2020, Al Shabaab killed
with AQ directives to target U.S. and Israeli interests, while
a U.S. soldier and two U.S. contractors during a raid on
also referring to the airfield as one of the “launch pads for
Manda Bay Airfield, a Kenyan military facility used by the
the American crusade against Islam in the region.” Al
U.S. military near the Somali border.
Shabab’s activities in Kenya more broadly appear focused
Al Shabaab’s
on sowing internal dissent and fomenting a domestic
recruitment abroad, including among U.S.
insurgency. Non-Muslims have been specifically targeted in
citizens, has concerned U.S. officials. The group’s ties with
some of the group’s attacks in Kenya.
other major terrorist organizations, most notably Al Qaeda
and its Yemen affiliate, as well as its demonstrated capacity
Area of Operations and Capabilities
to strike international targets in East Africa, elevate its
Operations by AMISOM and neighboring countries pushed
prominence among extremist groups on the continent.
Al Shabaab from Mogadishu and other urban centers and
Leadership
ports between 2011 and 2014. Al Shabaab’s area of
territorial control has remained largely unchanged since
Ahmed Diriye (aka Abu Ubaidah), a Somali national, has
2015, when AMISOM ceased major offensive operations,
led Al Shabaab since 2014, when he succeeded Ahmed
although the nascent Somali army—with AMISOM
Abdi Godane, who was killed in a U.S. airstrike. Godane’s
support—has recovered some new areas in the past year. Al
predecessor was killed in a 2008 U.S. missile strike.
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Al Shabaab
Shabaab maintains the ability to conduct frequent attacks in
with Somali and AMISOM forces since 2016. Two U.S.
the capital and other areas beyond its control. AMISOM
service members have been killed during such operations.
and Somali forces have struggled to provide security along
their supply routes and for civilians in reclaimed areas.
In late 2016, the Obama Administration publicly named Al
Shabaab an “associated force” of Al Qaeda in the context of
While Al Shabaab’s loss of Mogadishu and other strategic
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (P.L. 107-
port cities initially restricted its revenue, the group now
40). U.S. airstrikes in Somalia were limited until 2015,
levies “taxes” covering “all aspects of the Somali
when President Obama broadened the justification for U.S.
economy,” per U.N. reporting. It generates significant
military action in the country—previously “to counter Al
revenue from checkpoints in areas under its control and
Qaeda and associated elements of Al Shabaab”—to cover
taxes local charcoal production despite a U.N. embargo on
support for Somali, AMISOM, and U.S. forces operating
the Somali charcoal trade. Al Shabaab extorts businesses in
there. The tempo of U.S. air strikes has continued to rise
government areas, including the capital. Foreign donations
since then.
also contribute to its financing. The United States and
others have sanctioned several Kenyan clerics, for example,
President Trump changed the rules of engagement for U.S.
who reportedly raise funds and recruit for the group. The
military operations in Somalia in early 2017, authorizing
United States also has prosecuted several U.S. citizens for
offensive air strikes and designating parts of the country as
fundraising on Al Shabaab’s behalf.
an “area of active hostilities.” U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM) reported 63 airstrikes in Somalia in 2019.
The State Department estimates that Al Shabaab has 7,000
Three months prior to the Manda Bay attack, Al Shabaab
to 9,000 members. The group capitalizes on grievances and
launched an unsuccessful assault on an airfield used by the
distrust of the government in parts of Somalia and fills local
U.S. military in central Somalia.
governance roles, providing basic services and resolving
Figure 1. U.S. Airstrikes in Somalia
disputes. It also forcibly recruits fighters, including
children. Al Shabaab uses various propaganda tools to
spread its message in multiple languages. In Kenya, the
group plays on narratives of collective punishment by the
Kenyan government against Muslims, among other themes.
Kenyan nationals of non-Somali descent led the DusitD2
attack, highlighting Al Shabaab’s expanding Kenyan ranks.
Al Shabaab is capable of large-scale raids in Somalia and
complex vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices
(VBIEDs). In 2016, an Al Shabaab suicide bomber onboard

a Somali airliner detonated a bomb concealed in a laptop
Source: CRS. Data compiled from DOD and AFRICOM statements.
computer. (It detonated before the plane reached cruising
Outlook
altitude and did not destroy the aircraft.) U.N. experts report
Al Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat in Somalia
that Al Shabaab now manufactures its own explosives; the
and neighboring countries, despite the presence of roughly
U.N. Security Council imposed a ban on the transfer of
20,000 AU troops in Somalia and increased U.S. air strikes.
explosive precursors to Somalia in late 2019.
The U.N. Panel of Experts on Somalia reports that airstrikes
Threats Against U.S. Targets
have contributed to “keeping the group off-balance and
Al Shabaab has threatened U.S. and Western targets in East
preventing the massing of large numbers of fighters,” but
Africa and called for attacks against the United States. The
assesses that they have little impact on the group’s ability to
Obama Administration described the U.S. strike on Godane
launch asymmetric attacks across Somalia. AFRICOM
as responding to an “imminent threat,” citing his oversight
argues that strikes create “organizational confusion” and
of “plots targeting Westerners, including U.S. persons in
keep the group from being “a threat to the U.S. homeland.”
East Africa.” The group has killed at least 10 U.S. citizens
The Somali federal government, weakened by infighting
in the region. Six U.S. citizens were injured in the 2013
and corruption, still struggles to extend its authority in the
Westgate Mall attack; over 50 were reportedly on site at the
country. Its security forces remain under development and
time. A 2015 Al Shabaab video encouraged terrorist attacks
unable to hold territory without the support of AMISOM,
in Kenya and abroad, naming several shopping malls in
whose notional exit in 2021 remains subject to debate.
Europe and the United States as potential targets, but the
Donor fatigue may lead some to press for its withdrawal.
group has yet to claim an attack on U.S. territory.
Meanwhile, as U.S. policymakers weigh global priorities
The U.S. Response
for U.S. military deployments, it is unclear how long the
The United States named Al Shabaab a Foreign Terrorist
increased operational tempo in Somalia will continue.
Organization in 2008 and has designated over two dozen
Concerns about civilian casualties in U.S. operations
related persons for sanctions, either as Specially Designated
remain a factor in U.S. debates over whether and how the
Global Terrorists or under Executive Order 13536, related
United States can help Somalia pursue a sustainable
to Somalia. The United States has provided assistance to
response to the threat.
AMISOM and the Somali security forces for over a decade,
and has supported counter-radicalization programs in the
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs
region. U.S. forces in Somalia—estimated at 500 in 2019—
IF10170
have engaged in “advise, assist, and accompany” missions
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Al Shabaab


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10170 · VERSION 7 · UPDATED

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