Updated January 10, 2020
Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
The U.S. President has sole authority to authorize the use of
radars, satellites, and processing systems that provide
U.S. nuclear weapons. This authority is inherent in his
“unambiguous, reliable, accurate, timely, survivable, and
constitutional role as Commander in Chief. The President
enduring” warning about attacks on the United States, its
can seek counsel from his military advisors; those advisors
allies, and its forces overseas.
are then required to transmit and implement the orders
authorizing nuclear use. But, as General John Hyten, then
In a scenario where the system identifies an attack or an
the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
anomalous event, the President would participate in an
(STRATCOM), noted during his September 2016
emergency communications conference with the Secretary
confirmation hearing, his job is to give advice, while the
of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
authority to order a launch lies with the president.
other military advisors. They would offer the President
details and an assessment of the possible incoming attack,
The President does not need the concurrence of either his
while the STRATCOM Commander would explain the
military advisors or the U.S. Congress to order the launch
President’s options for a retaliatory attack.
of nuclear weapons. In addition, neither the military nor
Congress can overrule these orders. As former
The President would then evaluate and respond to the
STRATCOM Commander General Robert Kehler has
information provided in the conference, then decide
noted, members of the military are bound by the Uniform
whether to authorize the use of U.S. nuclear weapons. He
Code of Military Justice “to follow orders provided they are
would communicate his choices and provide this
legal and have come from competent authority.” But
authorization through a communications device known as
questions about the legality of the order—whether it is
the nuclear “football”—a suitcase carried by a military aid
consistent with the requirements, under the laws of armed
who is always near the President. The suitcase is equipped
conflict (LOAC), for necessity, proportionality, and
with communication tools and a book with prepared war
distinction—are more likely to lead to consultations and
plans for certain targets. The President could choose from
changes in the President’s order than to a refusal by the
these prepared plans or, time permitting, ask STRATCOM
military to execute the order. In this sense, addressing legal
to prepare an alternative.
questions about an order to use nuclear weapons would
seem similar to the process used for evaluating any
If the President did choose to respond with a nuclear attack,
employment order from the President. The President could
he would identify himself to military officials at the
delegate the authority to authorize the use of nuclear
Pentagon with codes unique to him. These codes are
weapons to others in the chain-of-command (an option
recorded on an ID card, known as the “biscuit,” that the
considered necessary during the Cold War), but they also
President carries at all times. He would then transmit the
could not overrule the President.
launch order to the Pentagon and STRATCOM. The
Secretary of Defense would possibly contribute the process
The Nuclear Command and Control
by confirming that the order came from the President, but
System (NCCS)
this role could also be filled by an officer in the National
According to the Nuclear Matters Handbook, published by
Military Command Center at the Pentagon. STRATCOM
the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
would implement the order by preparing to launch the
Nuclear Matters, the elements of the nuclear command and
weapons needed for the selected option. According to
control system (NCCS) “support the President, through his
Bruce Blair, an expert on U.S. command and control, once
military commanders, in exercising presidential authority
the order is “transmitted to the war room, they would
over U.S. nuclear weapons operations.” The system relies
execute it in a minute or so.” If an immediate response was
on “a collection of activities, processes, and procedures
selected, “the (land-based) Minuteman missiles will fire in
performed by appropriate military commanders and support
two minutes. The submarines will fire in 15 minutes.” Blair
personnel that, through the chain of command, allow for
also notes that there is no way to reverse the order.
senior-level decisions on nuclear weapons employment.”
Specifically, the NCCS provides the President “with the
Options for Nuclear Use
means to authorize the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis
As General Michael Hayden, the former director of the CIA
and to prevent unauthorized or accidental use.”
noted, the system “is designed for speed and decisiveness.
It’s not designed to debate the decision.” Long-range
The NCCS collects information on threats to the United
missiles attacking the United States from Russian territory
States, communicates that information through the chain of
could reach U.S. territory in around 30 minutes; sea-based
command to the President, advises the President on options
systems deployed closer to U.S shores might arrive in half
for a response, communicates the President’s chosen
that time. If the United States wanted to retaliate before
response to the forces in the field, and controls the targeting
U.S. weapons, or, more importantly, the U.S. command and
and application of those forces. The process begins with the
control system, were degraded by an attack, then the entire
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
process of identifying, assessing, communicating, deciding,
approval from other officials if the United States were
and launching would have to take place in less than that
under attack with nuclear weapons. But, in an environment
amount of time. Given that some time would be needed for
where the threat of a massive nuclear attack seems more
mechanical or administrative steps, analysts estimate that
remote than during the Cold War, they argue that the
the President would have less than 10 minutes to absorb the
President could take the time to consult with Congress
information, review his options, and make his decision.
before launching nuclear weapons in less extreme
circumstances.
The United States planned for such a scenario during the
Cold War, when the Soviet Union deployed thousands of
Some analysts outside the U.S. government have also
nuclear warheads that could reach the United States. U.S.
questioned whether the United States should retain the
doctrine argued that, to deter a Soviet attack, the United
option to launch nuclear weapons promptly because, they
States would need to be able to retaliate even if the Soviet
argue, the time pressures could lead to the accidental or
Union launched a massive attack with little warning. This
inadvertent start of a nuclear war. They note that the United
scenario, and the short time lines, would have provided the
States received false warning of nuclear attack several times
President with the option of launching U.S. weapons before
during the Cold War, and if the President had responded to
most of the attacking warheads detonated on U.S. soil.
that warning within the 30-minute time line of a nuclear
attack, it would have triggered global nuclear war. If the
But, even during the Cold War, an attack or anomalous
President could not launch the weapons in such haste, he
event was not the only possible scenario for the start of a
would necessarily have the time to wait for more accurate
nuclear war, and a massive U.S. response launched in under
or less ambiguous information.
30 minutes was not the only option available to the
President. If the nuclear war escalated out of a conflict in
Others, however, argue that there is nothing inherently
Europe, or if the Soviet Union launched a more measured
destabilizing or dangerous in the prompt launch options.
attack, the President might have more time to assess the
The President already has options to delay a response and
threat and determine his response. Moreover, because U.S.
await additional information. In addition, in the current
bombers could fly away from their bases earlier in a crisis
security environment, a President and his advisors would be
or conflict and U.S. submarine-based missiles might
unlikely to interpret ambiguous warning information as
survive an attack on U.S. territory, the President could
evidence of an all-out attack from Russia or another nation.
decide to delay the U.S. response. Nevertheless, some
Instead, they note that the presence of both prompt and
analysts have speculated that a launch under attack was the
delayed options bolsters deterrence by providing the
dominant option during the Cold War, and that the
President with the flexibility to choose the appropriate
command and control system was designed to permit such a
response to an attack on the United States or its allies.
prompt launch of U.S. nuclear weapons.
Legislation
The United States has reviewed and revised its nuclear
employment plans several times since the end of the Cold
H.R. 921, No First Use Act
War. According to unclassified reports, these reviews have
H.R. 669, Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of
added options to the plans available to the President. While
2017
some options probably still provide responses to an attack
from a nation, like Russia, with a large nuclear force, others
might provide for more measured and discriminate attacks.
In addition, even though the plans likely include options for
CRS Products
a prompt response in the face of an unexpected attack, they
also likely have options for delayed responses. As a result,
CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background,
although the prompt launch options that may have
Developments, and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf
dominated U.S. planning during the Cold War may no
longer dominate U.S. nuclear war plans.
Another scenario could see the United States choose to use
Other Resources
nuclear weapons prior to a nuclear attack against the United
States or its allies, on a time line that did not reflect an
DOD. Nuclear Matters Handbook. April 2016.
imminent nuclear attack against the United States. The
Steve Liewer, “A Nuclear Decision: As global tension builds,
United States has never declared a “no first use” policy, and
voters must choose which candidate they trust with the
the President could order the first use of nuclear weapons.
codes," Omaha World Herald, November 1, 2016.
As noted above, his military advisors may seek to adjust his
Jeffrey Lewis, “U.S. presidents are currently given a four-
orders to meet the laws of armed conflict, but there is,
minute window to decide whether or not to initiate an
otherwise, no legal barrier to first use.
irreversible apocalypse,” Foreign Policy, August 5, 2016.
Peter Huessy, “The Prompt Launch Scare,” Real Clear Defense,
Recently, some Members of Congress and analysts outside
November 9, 2016.
government have questioned whether the Commander-in-
Chief should have the sole authority to launch a nuclear
attack in all circumstances. They agree that the President
would not have the time to consult with Congress or seek
Amy F. Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
IF10521
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10521 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED