INSIGHTi

Iraq: Protests and the Future of U.S.
Partnership
Updated November 12, 2019
Mass protests and state violence against some protestors have shaken Iraq since October 2019, with more
than 300 Iraqis reported dead and thousands more injured in demonstrations and isolated clashes in
Baghdad and southern Iraq. Protestors and some prominent political figures have demanded the
resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abd Al Mahdi and his cabinet, channeling nationalist, nonsectarian
sentiment and a range of frustrations into potent rejections of the post-2003 political order. Current
protests reiterate past demonstrators’ concerns (with some louder critiques of Iranian interference), but the
scope and endurance of the protests are unprecedented in Iraq’s recent history. U.S. officials have not
endorsed demands for an immediate transition, but protestors’ calls for improved governance, reliable
local services, more trustworthy and capable security forces, and greater economic opportunity broadly
correspond to stated U.S. goals.
The nature, duration, and response to the protests are deepening U.S. concerns about Iraq’s stability.
Related future developments could complicate U.S. efforts to partner with Iraq’s government as Iraq
recovers from war with the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) and seeks to maintain its sovereignty.
Congress is considering President Donald Trump’s requests for additional military and civilian aid for
Iraq without certainty about the future of Iraq’s governing arrangements or how change might affect U.S.
interests.
Iraqi Perspectives and Proposed Solutions
The prime minister and some Iraqi officials acknowledge shortcomings in the current political system, but
express concern that a period of potentially violent uncertainty could accompany a sudden transition.
Other Iraqi officials, Iran’s Supreme Leader, and Iran-aligned Iraqi militia leaders contend that the protest
movement is a foreign-backed conspiracy. These critics have pledged to defend their interests, especially
in light of some protestors’ isolated attacks on various party headquarters, an Iranian diplomatic facility,
and some security forces and militia personnel. Iran reportedly is working to shape transition
arrangements to preserve its interests and those of its Iraqi partners.
Leaders of Iraq’s Shia Muslim religious establishment have expressed solidarity with the protestors,
called for reforms, urged demonstrators to reject violence, rejected foreign interference, and condemned
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killings of civilians. Iraqi Kurdish leaders have recognized protestors’ concerns and criticized repressive
violence, while convening to unify positions on reforms that some Kurds fear could undermine the
federally recognized Kurdistan region’s rights under Iraq’s constitution. Arrests and official
discouragement reportedly have limited the spread of protests to areas of western Iraq predominantly
inhabited by Sunni Arabs.
The prime minister and Iraqi legislators have approved a range of measures in response to protestors’
demands, but protestors largely have rejected the measures as insufficient, with many insisting on a
sweeping transition. President Barham Salih has proposed revisions to the electoral system followed by
elections and has acknowledged the prime minister’s willingness to resign if dominant political blocs
agree on a replacement. Amendments to Iraq’s electoral law require parliamentary approval, and
legislators may resist, having won their seats in May 2018 elections. Elections under a revamped system
could introduce new political currents and leaders, but fiscal pressures and the limited capacity of some
state institutions may present lasting hurdles to reform.
Some 2019 polling suggests that many Iraqis may share protestors’ stated concerns about the status quo,
but close observers of Iraqi politics express some skepticism that the leading political forces will find
consensus easily on transition arrangements. Iraqis continue to differ over implementation of key
provisions of the existing constitution and have formed governments since 2005 only after extended and
contentious negotiations among elites and establishment groups. Many elite stakeholders are targets of
protestors’ ire, but they remain the likely arbiters of proposed remedies to the protestors’ demands. Iran
and the United States previously have used pressure and mediation to shape negotiations among Iraqi
elites, but now face new dynamics introduced by the nationalist protest movement.
U.S. Responses and Outlook
The impasse in Iraq presents dilemmas for the Administration and Congress as they contemplate how best
to promote Iraq’s unity and stability, prevent an IS resurgence, and limit Iranian influence. As Iraqis
debate their political future, Congress may seek the Administration’s views about the prospects for
different outcomes in Iraq and their possible implications for U.S. military operations, patterns of U.S.
assistance, and regional security.
On November 1, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo said “the Government of Iraq should listen to the
legitimate demands made by the Iraqi people....” He reiterated that the U.S. government has “called on all
sides to reject violence” and called for an end to restrictions on the press and expression. On November 6,
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad said in a statement, “There is no path forward based on suppression of the
will of the Iraqi people.” On November 10, the White House Press Secretary said, “The United States
joins the U.N. Assistance Mission to Iraq in calling on the Iraqi government to halt the violence against
protesters and fulfill President Salih’s promise to pass electoral reform and hold early elections.”
Leading Iraqi officials endorse the continued presence of U.S. military forces in Iraq, despite calls from
some Iraqis, especially Iran-aligned voices, for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The United States has
sought Iraq’s cooperation in its maximum pressure campaign against Iran, but has acknowledged limits
on Iraq’s ability to reduce some ties to its neighbor. U.S. officials welcome Iraqi efforts to assert more
state control over militias, but have not encouraged Iraqi counterparts to confront pro-Iranian armed
groups forcefully.
Many Iraqis appear to view incremental change as unlikely to resolve their concerns, but they also appear
to differ in their preferences for the scope and pace of systemic change. Systemic reform might present
new opportunities for U.S.-Iraq partnership, but also might further empower Iraqis seeking to minimize
U.S. influence and/or weaken bilateral ties. Some Iraqis reject what they regard as U.S. interference in
efforts to respond to the protestors’ demands.

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Maintenance of the political status quo despite Iraqi domestic opposition also presents risks. If, for
example, the United States continues to cooperate with an increasingly unpopular Iraqi governing elite
that remains unresponsive to citizens’ demands, then options for pursuing U.S. interests could become
more limited or costly. Confrontations resulting from continued paralysis or repressive measures could
jeopardize Iraq’s hard-won security gains.


Author Information

Christopher M. Blanchard

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs




Disclaimer
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