Updated December 20, 2019
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
five-year terms) and age (60, beginning first term); and
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
market-oriented economic reforms, including the right to
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
private property and the promotion of foreign investment.
isolating the government.
However, the new constitution ensures the state sector’s
dominance over the economy and the predominant role of
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy
the Communist Party. In October 2019, Cuba’s National
shift moving away from sanctions toward engagement and
Assembly appointed Díaz-Canel as president under the new
the normalization of relations. The policy change included
constitution, and two remaining old-guard revolutionary
the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of
leaders were removed from the downsized Council of State.
international terrorism in May 2015; the restoration of
diplomatic relations in July 2015; and efforts to increase
The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the increase in
travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba by
U.S. sanctions, which impede international financial
easing restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
transactions with Cuba, and by Venezuela’s economic
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
crisis, which has limited Venezuela’s support to Cuba. In
(accomplished through amendments in 2015 and 2016 to
the fall of 2019, Cuba experienced severe fuel shortages
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations [CACR],
limiting transportation and resulting in planned blackouts.
administered by the Treasury Department, and the Export
In December, Cuban officials reported that 2019 tourism
Administration Regulations [EAR], administered by the
arrivals would slightly surpass 4 million, down from 4.7
Commerce Department). The restoration of relations led to
million in 2018, hurting private sector businesses. The
increased government-to-government engagement, with
Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts the economy will
over 20 bilateral agreements negotiated and bilateral
grow 0.5% in 2019 but contract 0.7% in 2020.
dialogues conducted in numerous areas of cooperation.
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June
2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back some of
2017 that introduced new sanctions. These included
the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations.
restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by
By 2019, the Trump Administration had largely abandoned
the Cuban military and the elimination of people-to-people
the previous Administration’s policy of engagement by
travel for individuals. To implement these changes, in
increasing economic sanctions significantly to pressure the
November 2017, the Treasury and Commerce Departments
Cuban government on its human rights record and its
amended the CACR and EAR and the State Department
support for the regime of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. It
issued a list of “restricted entities.” Updated several times,
also took actions to allow lawsuits against those trafficking
most recently in November 2019, the list currently includes
in property confiscated by the Cuban government and
223 entities and subentities, including 2 ministries, 5
tightened restrictions on travel to Cuba, including the
holding companies and 49 of their subentities, 109 hotels, 2
termination of cruise ship travel from the United States.
tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 41
With these actions, U.S. policy toward Cuba has again
entities serving the defense and security sectors.
shifted to a policy of strong economic pressure.
The Administration’s strong criticism of Cuba for its
Cuban Political Developments. In April 2018, Miguel
support of Venezuela began in November 2018, when then-
Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice president,
National Security Adviser John Bolton asserted that Cuba
succeeded Raúl Castro as president, but Castro continues to
was responsible for enabling the Venezuelan regime’s
head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021. The selection
repression. In rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War, Bolton
of Díaz-Canel, now 59 years old, reflects the generational
referred to Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua as the “Troika
change in Cuban leadership that began several years ago
of Tyranny” in the hemisphere. In 2019, the Trump
and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban revolution
Administration has imposed a series of sanctions against
that a Castro is not in charge of the government. While in
Cuba for its poor human rights record and its support for
power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to implement
the Maduro government in Venezuela. Among the sanctions
significant economic policy changes, moving toward a
imposed are the following:
more mixed economy with a stronger private sector, but his
government’s
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba.
slow, gradualist approach did not produce
Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed
major improvements to the economy, which has
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels
experienced minimal growth in recent years.
that have transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba, including
In February 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a new
six vessels sanctioned in early December 2019. In July
constitution in a national referendum. The changes include
2019, it imposed sanctions on Cuba’s state-run oil
the addition of an appointed prime minister to oversee
import and export company. Cuba and Venezuela signed
government operations; limits on the president’s terms (two
a preferential oil agreement in 2000 whereby Cuba
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
received some 90,000-100,000 barrels of oil per day
policy concern for many years. According to the Havana-
(bpd), but Venezuela’s economic crisis reduced this to
based Cuban Center for Human Rights, Cuba held at least
between 40,000-50,000 bpd (about one-third of Cuba’s
107 political prisoners at the end of October 2019; Amnesty
consumption) in early 2019.
International (AI) has named six of these as prisoners of
conscience, including independent journalist Roberto
Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective
Quiñones, sentenced to one year in prison in August 2019.
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file
AI also has called for the release of José Daniel Ferrer,
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property
leader of the opposition Patriotic Union of Cuba
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
(UNPACU), who has been held in detention since October
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
1, 2019. In recent years, Cuba has shifted to using short-
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
term detentions and harassment to repress dissent.
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time
of the confiscation. To date, some 20 lawsuits have been
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
filed against U.S. and foreign companies, including
According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy
cruise ship operators, airlines, travel booking
community members suffered a series of unexplained
companies, and hotels. Previous Administrations had
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
suspended, at six-month intervals, the right to file such
incidents occurred in late 2016 and 2017, but two occurred
lawsuits pursuant to the provisions of the law. Secretary
in May 2018). The State Department maintains that the U.S.
Pompeo cited Cuba’s repression of its own people and
investigation has not reached a definitive conclusion
its support for the Maduro regime in Venezuela as
regarding the cause or source of the injuries. Cuba strongly
reasons for the implementation of Title III. The
denies responsibility for the injuries. In September 2017,
European Union and Canada criticized the
the State Department ordered the departure of
Administration’s action, vowing to ban enforcement or
nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to
recognition of any judgement, allow counterclaims in
minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff
European and Canadian courts, and potentially seek
was reduced by about two-thirds. The staff reduction has
action in the World Trade Organization.
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing.
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. In June
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued
2019, the Treasury Department eliminated the category
to fund democracy assistance and U.S.-government
of people-to-people educational travel altogether and the
sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2019, Congress
Commerce Department generally prohibited cruise
appropriated $20 million for democracy programs and
ships, private and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and
$29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 116-6, H.Rept.
fishing boats from going to Cuba. In September 2019,
116-9) approved in February 2019.
the Treasury Department capped family remittances to
For FY2020, the Administration requested $6 million for
$1,000 per quarter (previously, such remittances were
Cuba democracy programs, a 70% cut from FY2019, and
not limited) and eliminated the category of donative
$12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting, a 55% cut from
remittances. In October 2019, the Transportation
FY2019. The FY2020 minibus appropriations measure
Department announced that, effective December 10,
(H.R. 1865, Division G), approved in December 2019,
2019, it was ending flights by U.S. carriers between the
provides $20 million for democracy programs and $20.973
United States and Cuba, with the exception of Havana;
million for Cuba broadcasting. Division J includes benefits
this largely affects family travel.
for U.S. government employees and dependents who were
Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September
injured while serving in Cuba (and China). The measure
2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn
includes several reporting requirements on Cuba set forth in
transactions, which allowed banking institutions to
H.Rept. 116-78 and S.Rept. 116-126.
process certain funds transfers originating and
On December 19, 2019, the House approved H.Res. 774,
terminating outside the United States. In October 2019,
calling for the release of human rights activist José Daniel
the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to
Ferrer and other members of UNPACU; a similar
leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de
resolution, S.Res. 454, was introduced in the Senate.
minimis rule (up from 25%) requiring a third country-
based company exporting goods to Cuba with more than
Among other bills introduced, several would ease or lift
10% U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and
U.S. sanctions: H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R.
imposed licensing requirements for the export of certain
1898/S. 1447 (financing for U.S. agricultural exports); H.R.
donated items to organizations controlled by the Cuban
2404 (overall embargo); and H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel).
government or Communist Party and items for
H.R. 4884 would direct the Administration to reinstate the
telecommunications infrastructure.
Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program. Several
Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa
resolutions would express concerns regarding Cuba’s
restrictions on Raúl Castro in September 2019 for gross
foreign medical missions (S.Res. 14/H.Res. 136); U.S.
violations of human rights in Cuba and Venezuela and
fugitives from justice in Cuba (H.Res. 92/S.Res. 232); and
on Cuba’s Interior Minister in November 2019 for gross
religious and political freedom in Cuba (S.Res. 215).
violations of human rights in Venezuela.
Also see CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
116th Congress.
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
IF10045
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