Updated December 19, 2019
Algeria
Large peaceful protests forced Algeria’s longstanding
Figure 1. Algeria at a Glance
president to resign in early 2019 and continue to prompt
questions about the country’s political stability and future.
Abdelmadjid Tebboune was declared the winner of
presidential elections held on December 12, with
historically low turnout of 40%. A previous cabinet
minister and prime minister (for a short time in 2017),
Tebboune ran as an independent and is seen by some
observers as close to military leaders; Algeria’s two largest
political parties endorsed a rival candidate. Protesters have
continued to take to the streets, decrying the election
process as illegitimate, Tebboune as representing political
continuity, and military leaders for steering the transition
process in recent months. Dozens of protesters have been
Source: CRS graphic; data from CIA World Factbook + IMF (2018).
arrested since mid-2019 on various, often vague charges.
Police and protesters clashed violently on election day.
The bicameral parliament is institutionally weak and
dominated by two parties: the National Liberation Front
The protests began in February 2019, sparked by then-
(FLN), which led the fight for independence and was the
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s decision to seek a fifth
sole legal party for decades, and the National Rally for
term despite his evident ill health and advanced age (81), in
Democracy (RND), considered close to the military. Both
a vote then due in April. Bouteflika withdrew from the race
parties formally backed former Minister of Culture
in March, then resigned on April 2 after military chief of
Azzedine Mihoubi in the December 2019 presidential race,
staff General Ahmed Gaïd Salah (a onetime ally) called for
who lost. The political opposition is diverse and divided,
his impeachment. Law enforcement has since arrested
comprising leftist, Islamist, Berber-led, and regionally
prominent business, military intelligence, and political party
focused groups. Many parties exhibit internal divisions.
figures on corruption and state security charges.
Some analysts argue that political Islam has been
A presidential vote was initially scheduled for July 2019,
discredited in Algeria due to Islamists’ role in the 1990s
then canceled when the Constitutional Council disqualified
civil conflict, or—alternatively—due to some Islamist
the two candidates who had registered. General Gaïd Salah,
politicians’ accommodation with the state. The Islamic
who has positioned himself as a power broker without
Salvation Front (FIS), whose rapid electoral gains in 1991
explicitly seizing control, strongly backed the December 12
sparked a military coup and the subsequent conflict,
election date and process, and characterizing protests as the
remains banned. Religiously conservative Salafist social
dangerous product of outside interference.
movements have grown in prominence since the conflict.
Politics: Context
Terrorism and Counterterrorism
Algeria remained politically stable amid regional turmoil
Cells linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) are
between 2011 and 2018, but the prospect of an uncertain
reportedly active in some areas, but the pace of terrorist
leadership transition loomed as members of the
attacks has continuously decreased since the early 2000s.
“revolutionary generation” that fought for independence
State security forces conduct frequent counterterrorism
from France aged. A strong presidency and security
operations, and they have bolstered their presence in border
apparatus, a state-centric economy with an emerging
regions since the outbreak of wars in Libya and Mali in
oligarchic business class, and social welfare programs
2011. The government also runs de-radicalization programs
fueled by oil and natural gas revenues have defined the
and has sought to control the content of religious sermons.
political system. Decision-making under Bouteflika was
often opaque, with politicians, security officials, and
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional
business leaders reportedly wielding influence. This system
network, originated as a faction in Algeria’s 1990s conflict
brought relative stability and living standard improvements
and aligned itself with Al Qaeda in 2006. AQIM’s leader
to a country wracked by violence in the 1990s. In recent
reportedly remains based in northeast Algeria, but the
group’s center of
years, however, analysts observed “political paralysis” due
gravity has moved south and east over the
to a lack of elite consensus over “the post-Bouteflika era.”
past decade. An AQIM splinter faction claimed an assault
in 2013 on a natural gas plant in southeast Algeria in which
Bouteflika was first elected president in 1999 with military
39 foreigners (including three Americans) were killed. In
backing, as Algeria’s decade-long conflict with Islamist
2017, AQIM’s southern branch joined a Malian-led
armed groups was waning. He introduced reconciliation
coalition known as the Group for Supporting Islam and
initiatives and sought to exert greater control over the army
Muslims (JNIM after its transliterated Arabic name). AQIM
and intelligence service.
elements and offshoots are also active in Libya and Tunisia.
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Algeria
In 2014, an IS-affiliated group emerged in northern Algeria
remain tense due to a rivalry for regional influence and
and beheaded a French tourist. Algerian security forces
tensions over Western Sahara. Morocco claims and largely
reportedly killed the group’s leader the following year. The
administers Western Sahara, while Algeria hosts and backs
further spread of IS-linked activity within the country
the independence-seeking Polisario Front.
appears to have been limited, though in late 2019, IS
Algeria mediated Mali’s 2015 peace accord and backed the
claimed an attack on soldiers in Tamanrasset, in the south.
U.N.-led political process in Libya. Given its large military,
Algerian Islamist “foreign fighters” were prominent in
financial resources, and aversion to Western direct
Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Iraq in the 1980s-2000s.
intervention, Algeria has periodically sought to coordinate a
Relatively few Algerians reportedly joined the Islamic State
regional response to terrorism and other cross-border
at its height in Syria (2014-2015), however, compared to
security threats in the Sahel region. Yet the country’s
flows from neighboring Tunisia and Morocco. At one time,
complex and often distrustful relations with neighboring
26 Algerians were held at the U.S. base in Guantánamo;
states have hindered cooperation, as has the leadership’s
nearly all have been repatriated or sent to third countries.
current focus on domestic political questions.
The Economy and Energy Sector
Algeria’s foreign policy has often conflicted with that of the
Algeria has the world’s 11th-largest proven natural gas
United States. For example, Algeria has close ties to Russia,
reserves and 16th-largest proven oil reserves, and is the 8th-
is highly critical of Israel, opposed the 2011 NATO-led
largest natural gas exporter. It is also estimated to have the
intervention in Libya, and maintains relations with the Asad
world’s 3rd-largest recoverable shale gas reserves. Over half
government in Syria. With regard to Western Sahara, the
of the formal economy is reportedly comprised of state-
United States has recognized neither Morocco’s claim of
owned enterprises, led by the national oil and gas company
sovereignty nor the Polisario’s self-proclaimed Sahrawi
Sonatrach. Most of Algeria’s natural gas exports go to
Arab Democratic Republic, which Algeria recognizes as an
Europe, by pipeline or ship. Italy is Algeria’s top export
independent state. Successive U.S. Administrations have
destination. China its top source of imports, as well as a key
expressed support for U.N.-facilitated talks to determine
player in the infrastructure and construction sector.
Western Sahara’s final status.
Prior to 2014, high global energy prices allowed Algeria to
U.S. Relations
accrue sizable foreign reserves, which financed its large
Like its predecessors, the Trump Administration has
military and social programs that arguably assuaged dissent.
emphasized the value of U.S.-Algerian cooperation to
Since then, the drop in global prices has caused fiscal
counter terrorism (notably via information sharing and
deficits and prompted concerns about the sustainability of
coordination in multilateral forums) and respond to regional
Algeria’s economic model. The country’s foreign reserves
crises, while criticizing Algeria’s challenging business
declined by more than half between 2014 and 2018,
environment. Algeria’s reliance on Russia for most of its
according to the IMF, while its “oil stabilization fund”
defense acquisitions is also a point of friction, though
decreased from $20 billion to about $7 billion as of late
Algerian purchases of U.S. equipment have increased in
2017. The IMF has also reported rising unemployment
recent years. U.S. foreign direct investment stocks totaled
(which is higher among youth) and criticized Algeria’s
$3.6 billion as of 2018 (latest), mostly in the energy sector.
reliance on monetary expansion to finance deficit spending.
During a visit to Algiers in 2018, Deputy Secretary of State
(Algeria has little debt and does not borrow from the IMF.)
John Sullivan emphasized the United States’ “commitment
Algerian leaders have long called for diversification and
to strengthening and broadening U.S.-Algerian relations.”
increased foreign investment, but reforms that could
In early 2019, the Administration hosted a high-level U.S.-
encourage such outcomes have largely stalled,
Algeria Strategic Dialogue, which had last convened in
notwithstanding revisions to the hydrocarbons law and
2015. Officials also meet regularly for bilateral
annual finance law provisions in late 2019. Most foreign
counterterrorism and joint military consultations. U.S.
investment projects are required to be 51% locally owned,
educational and cultural exchange programs seek to build
there are limits on capital flows and currency exchange, and
relations with young Algerians and other emergent actors.
the process of setting up a business is “heavily
U.S. bilateral aid in FY2018 comprised $1.3 million for
bureaucratic,” according to the State Department. Analysts
International Military Education and Training (IMET) and
further point to the absence of a modern financial market,
$0.8 million for Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining,
and an underdeveloped stock exchange and banking system.
and Related Programs (NADR). The Administration has
The government imposed import restrictions in 2017,
requested similar funding for FY2020. The United States
causing trade to drop and possibly fueling inflation and
has periodically provided additional funds via regional or
smuggling. Weak infrastructure links to neighboring states
global programs to promote economic growth, strengthen
and the closure of the border with Morocco since 1994 also
civil society, and counter violent extremism. Algeria
arguably inhibit trade. Algeria has applied to join the World
participates in the State Department-led Trans-Sahara
Trade Organization (WTO) but has yet to qualify.
Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), but has not been a
Foreign Policy and Regional Issues
top recipient of aid under the program. Congress has not
Algeria’s foreign policy emphasizes sovereignty and
granted authority to the Department of Defense to aid
noninterference; skepticism of Western powers and NATO
Algeria in securing its border with Libya on a
is a legacy of its history of French colonization (1848-1962)
reimbursement basis, as it has for Tunisia and Egypt.
and armed struggle for independence. Algeria’s defense
budget (about $10 billion in recent years) is the largest in
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
Africa, though long-standing policy prohibits military
IF11116
deployments outside its borders. Relations with Morocco
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Algeria
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