Updated December 19, 2019
Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies
Senior U.S. defense and intelligence officials have
the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 115-
identified a number of emerging technologies that could
232, §1051) established a National Security Commission on
have a disruptive impact on U.S. national security in the
Artificial Intelligence to assess U.S. competitiveness in AI
years to come. These technologies include
and offer recommendations to Congress.
artificial intelligence,
Lethal Autonomous Weapons
lethal autonomous weapons,
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) are a class
of weapon systems capable of independently identifying a
hypersonic weapons,
target and employing an onboard weapon system to engage
directed-energy weapons,
and destroy the target without manual human control.
LAWS require computer algorithms and sensor suites to
biotechnology, and
classify an object as hostile, make an engagement decision,
quantum technology.
and guide a weapon to the target. This capability would
enable the system to operate in communications-degraded
As these technologies continue to mature, they could hold
or -denied environments where traditional systems may not
significant implications for congressional oversight, U.S.
be able to operate.
defense authorizations and appropriations, military concepts
of operations, and the future of war.
LAWS generally do not yet exist, and some senior military
Artificial Intelligence
and defense leaders have expressed concerns about the
ethics of ever fielding such systems. For example, in 2017
Although there is no official U.S. government definition of
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
artificial intelligence (AI), AI generally refers to a computer
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul
system capable of human-level cognition. AI is currently
Selva stated, “I do not think it is reasonable for us to put
being incorporated into a number of military applications,
robots in charge of whether or not we take a human life.”
including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
Currently, there are no domestic or international legal
logistics; cyber operations; command and control; and
prohibitions on the development of LAWS; however, an
semi-autonomous and autonomous vehicles. As it develops,
international group of government experts has begun to
AI could enable new concepts of operations, such as
discuss the issue. Approximately 25 countries have called
swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which uninhabited
for a preemptive ban on the systems due to ethical
vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task), that
considerations, while others have called for formal
could present both challenges and opportunities for the U.S.
regulation. DOD Directive 3000.09 establishes department
military.
guidelines for the development and fielding of LAWS to
ensure that they comply with “the law of war, applicable
Recent news reports and analyses have highlighted the role
treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of
of AI in enabling increasingly realistic photo, audio, and
engagement.”
video digital forgeries, popularly known as “deep fakes.”
Adversaries could potentially deploy this AI capability as
Hypersonic Weapons
part of their information operations in a “gray zone”
Hypersonic weapons—which fly at speeds of at least Mach
conflict. Deep fake technology could be used against the
5—are in development in a number of countries, including
United States and its allies to generate false news reports,
the United States. There are two categories of hypersonic
influence public discourse, erode public trust, and attempt
weapons:
to blackmail diplomats. Some have suggested that AI could
be used to create full digital “patterns-of-life,” in which an
individual’s digital footprint
Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) are launched from a
is mapped against other
rocket before gliding to a target.
personal information, such as spending habits and job
history, to create comprehensive behavioral profiles of
Hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM) are powered by
servicemembers, suspected intelligence officers,
high-speed engines throughout the duration of their
government officials, and private citizens. Similar to deep
flight.
fakes, this information could, in turn, be used for targeted
influence operations or blackmail.
In contrast to ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not
follow a ballistic trajectory and can maneuver en route to
To coordinate defense-wide AI efforts, the Pentagon
their destination, making defense against them difficult.
established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC,
Currently, no such defense against hypersonic weapons
pronounced “jake”) in June 2018 under the Department of
Defense’s (DOD’
exists, and experts disagree on the affordability,
s) Chief Information Officer. In addition,
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies
technological feasibility, and utility of hypersonic missile
Quantum Technology
defense options. These options could include interceptor
Quantum technology, which employs the principles of
missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser guns, and
quantum physics, has not yet reached maturity; however, it
electronic attack systems.
could hold significant implications for the future of
encryption and stealth technologies. GAO reports that
According to open-source reporting, China and Russia have
DOD, State, DHS, and the ODNI have assessed that
conducted successful hypersonic weapons tests and are
“quantum communications could enable adversaries to
expected to have an operational HGV capability as early as
develop secure communications that U.S. personnel would
2020. The United States is unlikely to field an operational
not be able to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing
HGV system before 2022. Although HCM technology is
may allow adversaries to decrypt [unclassified, classified,
less mature than HGV technology, reports suggest that it
or sensitive] information, which could enable them to target
could be fielded by Russia in 2023. Other countries—
U.S. personnel and military operations.”
including France, Australia, India, Germany, and Japan—
also have research programs in hypersonic weapons.
Quantum technology could have other military applications,
such as quantum radar systems hypothesized to be capable
Directed-Energy Weapons
of identifying the performance characteristics (e.g., radar
DOD defines directed-energy (DE) weapons as those using
cross-section, speed) of objects with a greater level of
concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather than kinetic
accuracy than conventional radar systems. This would
energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy
significantly ease the tracking and targeting of U.S. low-
equipment, facilities, and/or personnel.” DE weapons—
observable, or stealth, aircraft such as the F-22, F-35, and
often colloquially referred to as “lasers”—could be used by
B-2. Similarly, advances in quantum sensing could
ground forces in counter rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-
theoretically enable significant improvements in submarine
RAM) or short-range air defense (SHORAD) missions.
detection, rendering the oceans “transparent.” This could, in
They could offer low costs per shot and nearly limitless
turn, hold implications for the survivability of the U.S. sea-
magazines that, in contrast to existing conventional
based nuclear deterrent.
systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of
defending against missile salvos and swarms of uninhabited
CRS Products
vehicles. Theoretically, DE weapons could also provide
options for boost-phase missile intercept, given their speed-
CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National Security,
of-light travel time; however, as in the case of hypersonic
by Kelley M. Sayler
missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability,
CRS In Focus IF11333, Deep Fakes and National Security, by
technological feasibility, and utility of this application.
Kelley M. Sayler and Laurie A. Harris
CRS Report R44466, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems:
High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons, a subset of DE
Issues for Congress, by Nathan J. Lucas
weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic means of disabling
electronics, communications systems, and improvised
CRS In Focus IF11150, Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal
explosive devices in the event of a conflict. In addition, the
Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler
U.S. military has explored using HPM in a nonlethal “heat
CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and
ray” system for crowd control; however, the system was
Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler
recalled—likely due to ethical and operational
CRS Report R45098, U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed
considerations.
Energy (DE) Programs: Background and Potential Issues for
Congress, by Andrew Feickert
Biotechnology
CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched
Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological
Guided Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
applications. A number of developments in biotechnology
O'Rourke
hold potential implications for national security. As a 2018
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report notes, the
CRS Report R44824, Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by
Departments of Defense, State (State), and Homeland
Marcy E. Gallo et al.
Security (DHS), and the Office of the Director of National
CRS Report R45409, Quantum Information Science: Applications,
Intelligence (ODNI), all assess that biotechnologies, such as
Global Research and Development, and Policy Considerations, by
the low-cost gene-editing tool CRISPR-Cas9, have the
Patricia Moloney Figliola
potential to “alter genes or create DNA to modify plants,
animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies could be used
Other Resources
to enhance [or degrade] the performance of military
personnel. The proliferation of synthetic biology—used to
Government Accountability Office, National Security: Long-
create genetic code that does not exist in nature—may
Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States as Identified by
increase the number of actors that can create chemical and
Federal Agencies, December 2018, https://www.gao.gov/assets/
biological weapons.” U.S. adversaries may be less
700/695981.pdf.
restrained in both researching and applying biotechnology,
particularly as it relates to human performance modification
and biological weapons.
Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and
Global Security
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies
IF11105
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