Updated December 16, 2019
Iraq and U.S. Policy
Protests and Violence Spur Transition
Some Iraqi officials, Iran’s Supreme Leader, and Iran-
Mass protests and state violence against some protestors
aligned Iraqi militia leaders have contended that the protest
have shaken Iraq since October 2019, with more than 450
movement is a foreign-backed conspiracy. Iran maintains
Iraqis killed by security forces and militiamen in Baghdad
ties to some armed groups in Iraq, including some units of
and several southern Iraqi cities. Thousands more civilian
the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Some PMF units
demonstrators have been injured. After security forces and
complied with the prime minister’s July 2019 decree
gunmen killed 45 protestors on November 27 and 28, 2019,
ordering them to comply with a law calling for PMF
Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abd Al Mahdi publicly stated his
subordination to national security command structures.
intent to resign, which protestors and some prominent
Others did not. Iranian officials, including Islamic
political figures had been demanding since October.
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force Commander
General Qassem Soleimani, reportedly are working to shape
Iraqi legislators in the Council of Representatives (COR)
Iraq’s transition.
acknowledged the prime minister’s
However, like U.S. and Iraqi leaders,
resignation on
Iranian leaders also now face new Iraqi political dynamics
December 1, but he remains in office as a caretaker until the
introduced by the nationalist protest movement.
a replacement is endorsed. Procedures for prime-ministerial
replacement in cases of resignation are ambiguous under
Figure 1. Iraq
Iraq’s constitution, and political differences among leading
factions may preclude a prompt resolution. Demonstrations
continue, as protestors demand systemic change and an end
to corruption and foreign interference, especially by Iran.
Iraq’s government declared military victory against the
Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) in December 2017, but
operations against remaining supporters of the group are
ongoing. Security has improved since 2017, but thousands
of IS fighters in Iraq and Syria pose a continuing threat. IS
fighters do not control territory, but carry out frequent
attacks in some areas.
The nature and duration of the protests and the Iraqi
government’s responses have deepened U.S. concerns about
Iraq’s stability. Rocket attacks attributed by U.S. officials to
Iranian proxies threaten U.S. personnel and Iraqis. Related
future developments, including the treatment of protestors
and the outcome of possible national elections in 2020,
could complicate U.S. efforts to cooperate with and assist
Iraq’s government. Congress is considering President
Donald Trump’s requests for additional

military and
Sources: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
civilian aid for Iraq without certainty about the future of
Iraq’s governing arrangements or how further changes in
Iraq’s major ethnic and religious constituencies are
Iraq’s politics and security might affect U.S. interests.
internally diverse in political terms, as evident in May 2018
Iraqi Perspectives
national election results for the 328-seat COR. A pan-ethnic
and pan-sectarian coalition of interest groups agreed to
Leaders of Iraq’s Shia Muslim religious establishment have
support the Abd al Mahdi government, though differences
expressed solidarity with peaceful protestors, rejected
over policy and leadership within and between rival blocs
foreign interference, and condemned killings of civilians.
prevented progress on several issues through October 2019.
Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani on December 6
The Sa’irun (On the March) coalition led by populist Shia
demanded that a transitional government be chosen swiftly
cleric and longtime U.S. antagonist Muqtada al Sadr and
and independently. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
the predominantly Shia Fatah (Conquest) coalition led by
leaders have recognized protestors’ concerns and criticized
Hadi al Ameri of the Badr Organization hold the largest
repressive violence, while convening to unify positions on
number of COR seats. Fatah includes individuals formerly
proposed reforms that some Kurds fear could undermine the
associated with Shia PMF militias with ties to Iran. Sadr
Kurdistan region’s rights under Iraq’s constitution. Arrests
has expressed solidarity with protesters and demanded Abd
and official discouragement reportedly have prevented the
al Mahdi’s resignation, but his coalition has declined to
spread of protests to areas of western Iraq predominantly
nominate a replacement. COR members are debating
inhabited by Sunni Arabs, but Sunni Arab political figures
electoral system reform to guide elections in 2020.
are now involved in transition negotiations.
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Iraq and U.S. Policy
The two largest Kurdish parties, the Erbil-based Kurdistan
and excessive use of (lethal and less-lethal) force” by
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Suleimaniyah-based
security forces, along with “credible allegations of
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), hold significant
deliberate killings, abduction and arbitrary detention carried
numbers of COR seats and won the most seats in the
out by unknown armed men.” U.S. officials state they are
KRG’s September 2018 election. In July 2019, the KRG
actively reviewing reports of violence against protestors to
parliament confirmed KDP leader Masrour Barzani as KRG
inform future decisions about the participation of Iraqi
Prime Minister. His cousin Nechirvan Barzani is KRG
personnel and units in U.S. security assistance programs.
President. KRG leaders had negotiated with Prime Minister
Outlook
Abd al Mahdi over unresolved oil export and budget
Prime Minister Adel Abd al Mahdi’s resignation may mark
transfers, but resolution likely awaits a new government.
the beginning of an extended political transition period that
U.S. Policy
could reopen several contentious issues for debate and
The impasse in Iraq presents dilemmas for the
negotiation. Principal decisions now before Iraqi leaders
Administration and Congress as they contemplate how best
concern 1) identification and endorsement of a caretaker
to promote Iraqi unity and stability, prevent an IS
prime minister and cabinet, 2) consideration of proposed
resurgence, and limit Iranian influence. Protestor calls for
electoral system reforms, and, 3) the proposed holding of
improved governance, reliable local services, more
COR and provincial council elections in 2020. In the wake
trustworthy and capable security forces, and greater
of new elections, government formation negotiations would
economic opportunity broadly correspond to stated U.S.
recur, taking into consideration domestic and international
goals. U.S. officials are advocating for the protestors’ rights
developments during the interim period.
to demonstrate and express themselves freely and signaling
U.S. willingness to work with any Iraqi leaders who will
“Nothing will change [in Iraq] until political leaders
move forward on reform priorities. In a series of statements
decide that government agencies should provide
since October 2019, U.S. officials have urged Iraqi leaders
public services rather than serve as ATM machines for
to respond seriously to protestors’ demands and to avoid
their parties. Until that happens, the people’s demands
attacks against unarmed protestors, while expressing broad
for a clean and effective government will not be met,
U.S. goals for continued partnership with “a free and
no matter who serves as Prime Minister or in Cabinet
independent and sovereign Iraq.”
positions.”
Security Assistance and Foreign Aid
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near
The United States provides foreign aid and security
Eastern Affairs Joey Hood, Testimony before the
assistance to Iraq in support of Iraqi operations against the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 2019
Islamic State, Iraqi security force development, de-mining,
Iraqi public financial management reform, United Nations-
coordinated stabilization programs, and other objectives.
Early elections under a revamped system could introduce
Reflecting Iraq’s needs, fiscal situation, and status as a
new political currents and leaders, but fiscal pressures,
major oil exporter, U.S. aid to Iraq blends U.S.-funded
political rivalries, and the limited capacity of some state
programs with lending and credit guarantees. Congress has
institutions may present lasting hurdles to reform. Whether
authorized U.S. train and equip programs in Iraq through
or not reforms are implemented in response to protestors’
December 2020, including aid to KRG forces. U.S. military
demands, the threat of an IS resurgence, security force
personnel are present in Iraq to provide related assistance
management issues, reconstruction needs, and demographic
pursuant to an exchange of diplomatic notes under the 2008
pressures are expected to present continuing challenges.
U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. Since 2014,
More than 1.4 million Iraqis remain internally displaced.
Congress has appropriated more than $5.8 billion for U.S.
military train and equip programs for Iraqis.
With leadership and systemic changes under review in Iraq,
continuity in U.S.-Iraqi cooperation is not guaranteed. New
More than $365 million in U.S. stabilization aid has flowed
leadership and systemic reform might present new
to liberated areas of Iraq, largely through the United
opportunities, but also might further empower Iraqis
Nations Development Program’s Funding Facility for
seeking to minimize U.S. influence. Iraqis who oppose a
Stabilization (FFS). U.S. officials have directed some of
continued U.S. military presence in Iraq could seek to re-
this aid to religious and ethnic minority communities.
litigate the issue during transition and government
President Trump requested additional foreign aid ($165
formation negotiations. U.S. officials state that the U.S.
million) and defense funds ($745 million) for Iraq for
government does not seek to sever all of Iraq’s relationships
FY2020. The United States has provided more than $2.5
with neighboring Iran, but warn that if Iran-backed attacks
billion in humanitarian funds for Iraq programs since 2014.
harm U.S. personnel, then the United States will respond
Human Rights and Security Partnership
decisively. Policymakers may continue to debate how best
to compete with Iran-linked Iraqi groups and support
U.S. official acknowledge that some Iraqi military leaders
reform, while protecting U.S. civilian and military
and units recently have used violence against protestors,
personnel and respecting Iraq’s sovereignty.
and accuse some Iran-linked militia forces of leading and
participating in attacks on protestors since October 2019
and other human rights abuses. The United Nations
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) in December 2019
Affairs
reported that it has received reports of “unlawful, improper
IF10404
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Iraq and U.S. Policy


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