Updated December 6, 2019
Algeria
Months of large, peaceful protests in Algeria have upended
Figure 1. Algeria at a Glance
the political establishment and ushered in a new era of
uncertainty. The protests began in February 2019, sparked
by then-President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s decision to seek a
fifth term in a vote due that April, despite his evident ill
health and advanced age (81). Bouteflika withdrew from
the race in March, then resigned on April 2 after military
chief of staff General Ahmed Gaïd Salah (a onetime ally)
called for his impeachment. Law enforcement bodies have
since arrested business leaders, military intelligence
officials, and politicians on corruption and state security
charges; some, but not all, were seen as close to Bouteflika.
Source: CRS graphic; data from CIA World Factbook + IMF (2018).
Senate leader Abdelkader Bensalah assumed the position of
interim president after Bouteflika resigned, in line with
The bicameral parliament is institutionally weak and
constitutional succession provisions. He has remained in
dominated by two parties that backed Bouteflika: the
that post despite the expiration of his 90-day mandate under
National Liberation Front (FLN), which led Algeria’s fight
the constitution, as elections planned for July were canceled
for independence and was the sole legal party for decades,
after the Constitutional Council disqualified the two
and the National Rally for Democracy (RND), considered
candidates who had registered.
close to the military. The political opposition is diverse and
divided, comprising leftist, Islamist, Berber-led, and
The presidential election has since been rescheduled for
regionally focused groups. Many parties exhibit internal
December 12. Five candidates have registered, all of whom
divisions. Some analysts argue that political Islam has been
served either in the cabinet or legislature under Bouteflika.
discredited in Algeria due to Islamists’ role in the 1990s
Tens of thousands of protesters have continued to turn out
civil conflict, or—alternatively—due to some Islamist
weekly. Many reject the election as premature, the
politicians’ accommodation with the state. The Islamic
candidates as representing political continuity, and military
Salvation Front (FIS), whose rapid electoral gains in 1991
leaders for steering the transition. Dozens have been
sparked a military coup and the subsequent conflict,
arrested in recent months on various, often vague charges.
remains banned. Religiously conservative Salafist social
General Gaïd Salah, who has positioned himself as a power
movements have grown in prominence since the conflict.
broker without explicitly seizing control, has strongly
backed the election calendar, characterizing protests as the
Terrorism and Counterterrorism
dangerous product of outside interference.
Cells linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) are
Politics: Context
reportedly active in some areas, but the pace of terrorist
attacks has continuously decreased since the early 2000s.
Algeria remained politically stable amid regional turmoil
State security forces conduct frequent counterterrorism
between 2011 and 2018, but the prospect of an uncertain
operations, and they have bolstered their presence in border
leadership transition loomed large as members of the
regions since the outbreak of wars in Libya and Mali in
“revolutionary generation” (which fought for independence
2011. The government also runs de-radicalization programs
from France) aged. A strong presidency and security
and has sought to control the content of religious sermons.
apparatus, a state-centric economy with an emerging
oligarchic business class, and social welfare programs
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional
fueled by oil and natural gas revenues have defined the
network, originated as an insurgent faction in Algeria’s
political system. Decision-making under Bouteflika was
1990s conflict and aligned itself with Al Qaeda in 2006.
often opaque, with politicians, security officials, and
AQIM’s leader reportedly remains based in northeast
business leaders reportedly wielding influence. This system
Algeria, but the group’s center of gravity has moved south
brought relative stability and living standard improvements
and east over the past decade. An AQIM splinter faction
to a country wracked by violence in the 1990s. Yet in recent
claimed an assault in 2013 on a natural gas plant in
years, analysts observed “political paralysis” due to a lack
southeast Algeria in which 39 foreigners (including three
of elite consensus over “the post-Bouteflika era.”
Americans) were killed. In 2017, AQIM’s southern branch
joined a Malian-led coalition known as the Group for
Bouteflika was first elected president in 1999 with military
Supporting Islam and Muslims (JNIM after its transliterated
backing, as Algeria’s decade-long conflict with Islamist
Arabic name). AQIM elements and offshoots are also active
armed groups was waning. He introduced reconciliation
in Libya and Tunisia.
initiatives and sought to exert greater control over the army
and intelligence service. Bouteflika was reelected in 2014
In 2014, an IS affiliate known as Jund al Khilafah (“soldiers
despite being physically debilitated from a stroke.
of the caliphate”) emerged in northern Algeria and
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Algeria
beheaded a French tourist. Algerian security forces
remain tense due to a rivalry for regional influence and
reportedly killed the group’s leader the following year. The
tensions over Western Sahara. Morocco claims and largely
further spread of IS-linked activity within the country
administers Western Sahara, while Algeria hosts and backs
appears to have been limited, though IS claimed an attack
the independence-seeking Polisario Front.
on soldiers in Tamanrasset, in the south, in late 2019.
Algeria mediated Mali’s 2015 peace accord and backed the
Algerian Islamist “foreign fighters” were prominent in
U.N.-led political process in Libya. Given its large military,
Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Iraq in the 1980s-2000s.
financial resources, and aversion to Western direct
Relatively few Algerians reportedly joined the Islamic State
intervention, Algeria has periodically sought to coordinate a
at its height in Syria (2014-2015), however, compared to
regional response to terrorism and other cross-border
flows from neighboring Tunisia and Morocco. At one time,
security threats in the Sahel region. Yet the country’s
26 Algerians were held at the U.S. base in Guantánamo;
complex and often distrustful relations with neighboring
nearly all have been repatriated or sent to third countries.
states have hindered cooperation, as has the leadership’s
The Economy and Energy Sector
current focus on domestic political questions.
Algeria has the world’s 11th-largest proven natural gas
Algeria’s foreign policy has often conflicted with that of the
reserves and 16th-largest proven oil reserves, and is the 8th-
United States. For example, Algeria has close ties to Russia,
largest natural gas exporter. It is also estimated to have the
is highly critical of Israel, opposed the 2011 NATO-led
world’s 3rd-largest recoverable shale gas reserves. Over half
intervention in Libya, and maintains relations with the Asad
of the formal economy is reportedly comprised of state-
government in Syria. With regard to Western Sahara, the
owned enterprises, led by the national oil and gas company
United States has recognized neither Morocco’s claim of
Sonatrach. Most of Algeria’s natural gas exports go to
sovereignty nor the Polisario’s self-proclaimed Sahrawi
Europe, by pipeline or ship. Italy is Algeria’s top export
Arab Democratic Republic, which Algeria recognizes as an
destination. China its top source of imports, as well as a key
independent state. Successive U.S. Administrations have
player in the infrastructure and construction sector.
expressed support for U.N.-facilitated talks to determine
Prior to 2014, high global energy prices allowed Algeria to
Western Sahara’s final status.
accrue sizable foreign reserves, which financed its large
U.S. Relations
military and social programs that arguably assuaged dissent.
Like its predecessors, the Trump Administration has
Since then, the drop in global prices has caused fiscal
emphasized the value of U.S.-Algerian cooperation to
deficits and prompted concerns about the sustainability of
counter terrorism (notably via information sharing and
Algeria’s economic model. The country’s foreign reserves
coordination in multilateral forums) and respond to regional
declined by more than half between 2014 and 2018,
crises, while criticizing Algeria’s challenging business
according to the IMF, while its “oil stabilization fund”
environment. Algeria’s reliance on Russia for most of its
decreased from $20 billion to about $7 billion as of late
defense acquisitions is also a point of friction, though
2017. The IMF has also documented rising unemployment
Algerian purchases of U.S. equipment have increased in
(which is higher among youth) and criticized Algeria’s
recent years. U.S. foreign direct investment stocks totaled
reliance on monetary expansion to finance deficit spending.
$3.6 billion as of 2018 (latest), mostly in the energy sector.
(Algeria has little sovereign debt and does not borrow from
the IMF.)
During a visit to Algiers in 2018, Deputy Secretary of State
Algerian leaders have long called for diversification and
John Sullivan emphasized the United States’ “commitment
increased foreign investment, but reforms that could
to strengthening and broadening U.S.-Algerian relations.”
encourage such outcomes have largely stalled—
In early 2019, the Administration hosted a high-level U.S.-
notwithstanding minor revisions to the hydrocarbons law in
Algeria Strategic Dialogue, which had last convened in
November 2019. Foreign investment projects are required
2015. Officials also meet regularly for bilateral
to be 51% locally owned, there are limits on capital flows
counterterrorism and joint military consultations. U.S.
and currency exchange, and the process of setting up a
educational and cultural exchange programs seek to build
business is “heavily bureaucratic,” according to the State
relations with young Algerians and other emergent actors.
Department. Analysts further point to the absence of a
U.S. bilateral aid in FY2018 comprised $1.3 million for
modern financial market, and an underdeveloped stock
International Military Education and Training (IMET) and
exchange and banking system. The government imposed
$0.8 million for Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining,
import restrictions in 2017, causing trade to plummet and
and Related Programs (NADR). The Administration has
possibly fueling inflation and smuggling. Weak
requested similar funding for FY2020. The United States
infrastructure linkages with neighboring countries and the
has periodically provided additional funds via regional or
closure of the border with Morocco since 1994 also
global programs to promote economic growth, strengthen
arguably inhibit growth. Algeria has applied to join the
civil society, and counter violent extremism. Algeria
World Trade Organization (WTO) but has yet to qualify.
participates in the State Department-led Trans-Sahara
Foreign Policy and Regional Issues
Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), but has not been a
Algeria’s foreign policy emphasizes sovereignty and
top recipient of aid under the program. Congress has not
noninterference; skepticism of Western powers and NATO
granted authority to the Department of Defense to aid
is a legacy of its history of French colonization (1848-1962)
Algeria in securing its border with Libya on a
and armed struggle for independence. Algeria’s defense
reimbursement basis, as it has for Tunisia and Egypt.
budget (about $10 billion in recent years) is the largest in
Africa, though longstanding policy prohibits military
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
deployments outside its borders. Relations with Morocco
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Algeria
IF11116
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