Updated November 18, 2019
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
5-year terms) and age (60, beginning first term); and some
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
market-oriented economic reforms, including the right to
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
private property and the promotion of foreign investment.
isolating the government.
However, the new constitution ensures the state sector’s
dominance over the economy and the predominant role of
In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy
the Communist Party. In October 2019, Cuba’s National
shift moving away from sanctions toward engagement and
Assembly appointed Díaz-Canel as president under the new
the normalization of relations. The policy change included
constitution, and two remaining old-guard revolutionary
the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of
leaders were removed from the downsized Council of State,
international terrorism in May 2015; the restoration of
a reflection of generational change in the government.
diplomatic relations in July 2015; and efforts to increase
Díaz-Canel has three months to nominate a prime minister.
travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba by
easing restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the increase in
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
U.S. sanctions, which impede international financial
(accomplished through amendments in 2015 and 2016 to
transactions with Cuba, and by Venezuela’s economic
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations [CACR],
crisis, which has limited Venezuela’s support to Cuba.
administered by the Treasury Department, and the Export
Cuba reported that, as of July 2019, tourism arrivals had
Administration Regulations [EAR], administered by the
dropped by almost 24% compared to the previous year,
Commerce Department). The restoration of relations led to
hurting restaurants and other private sector businesses. In
increased government-to-government engagement, with
September and October 2019, Cuba experienced severe fuel
over 20 bilateral agreements negotiated and bilateral
shortages limiting transportation and resulting in planned
dialogues conducted in numerous areas of cooperation.
blackouts. In November 2019, the Economist Intelligence
Unit forecast that the economy would grow by 0.5% in
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
2019 but contract by 0.7% in 2020.
2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back some of
the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations.
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
By 2019, the Trump Administration had largely abandoned
issued a national security presidential memorandum in June
the previous Administration’s policy of engagement by
2017 that introduced new sanctions. These included
increasing economic sanctions significantly to pressure the
restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by
Cuban government on its human rights record and its
the Cuban military and the elimination of people-to-people
support for the regime of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. It
travel for individuals. To implement these changes, in
also took actions to allow lawsuits against those trafficking
November 2017, the Treasury and Commerce Departments
in property confiscated by the Cuban government and
amended the CACR and EAR and the State Department
tightened restrictions on travel to Cuba, including the
issued a list of “restricted entities.” Updated several times,
termination of cruise ship travel from the United States.
most recently in November 2019, the list currently includes
With these actions, U.S. policy toward Cuba has again
223 entities and subentities, including 2 ministries, 5
shifted to a policy of strong economic pressure.
holding companies and 49 of their subentities, 109 hotels, 2
tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 41
Cuban Political Developments. In April 2018, Miguel
entities serving the defense and security sectors.
Díaz-Canel, who was serving as first vice president,
succeeded Raúl Castro as president, but Castro continues to
The Administration’s strong criticism of Cuba for its
head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021. The selection
support of Venezuela began in November 2018, when then-
of Díaz-Canel, now 59 years old, reflects the generational
National Security Adviser John Bolton asserted in a speech
change in Cuban leadership that began several years ago
that Cuba was responsible for enabling the Venezuelan
and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban revolution
regime’s repression. In rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold
that a Castro is not in charge of the government. While in
War, Bolton referred to Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua as
power from 2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to implement
the “Troika of Tyranny” in the hemisphere and its leaders
significant economic policy changes, moving toward a
as the “three stooges of socialism.”
more mixed economy with a stronger private sector, but his
government’s
In 2019, the Trump Administration has imposed a series of
slow, gradualist approach did not produce
sanctions against Cuba for its poor human rights record and
major improvements to the Cuban economy, which has
its support for the Maduro government in Venezuela.
experienced minimal growth in recent years.
Among the sanctions imposed are the following:
In February 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a new
Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba.
constitution in a national referendum. Among the changes
Since April 2019, the Treasury Department has imposed
are the addition of an appointed prime minister to oversee
sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels
government operations; limits on the president’s terms (two
that have transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. In July
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
2019, it imposed sanctions on Cuba’s state-run oil
two children in November 2019 for human rights
import and export company. Cuba and Venezuela signed
violations in Cuba and Venezuela.
a preferential oil agreement in 2000 whereby Cuba
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
received some 90,000-100,000 barrels of oil per day
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
(bpd), but Venezuela’s economic crisis reduced this to
policy concern for many years. According to the Havana-
between 40,000-50,000 bpd (about one-third of Cuba’s
based Cuban Center for Human Rights, Cuba held at least
consumption) in early 2019. U.S. sanctions contributed
107 political prisoners at the end of October 2019; Amnesty
to severe fuel shortages in September and October 2019.
International (AI) has named six of these as prisoners of
Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective
conscience, including independent journalist Roberto
May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file
Quiñones, sentenced to 1 year in prison in August 2019. AI
lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property
also has called for the release of José Daniel Ferrer, leader
in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
of the opposition Patriotic Union of Cuba, who has been
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
held in detention since October 1, 2019. In recent years,
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
Cuba has shifted to using short-term detentions and
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time
harassment to repress dissent.
of the confiscation. To date, some 20 lawsuits have been
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
filed against U.S. and foreign companies, including
According to the State Department, 26 U.S. Embassy
cruise ship operators, airlines, travel booking
community members suffered a series of unexplained
companies, and hotels. Previous Administrations had
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
suspended, at six-month intervals, the right to file such
incidents occurred in late 2016 and 2017, but two occurred
lawsuits pursuant to the provisions of the law. Secretary
Pompeo cited Cuba’s repression of its own people and
in May 2018). The State Department maintains that the U.S.
investigation has not reached a definitive conclusion
its support for the Maduro regime in Venezuela as
regarding the cause or source of the injuries. Cuba strongly
reasons for the implementation of Title III. The
denies responsibility for the injuries. In September 2017,
European Union and Canada criticized the
Administration’s action, vowing to ban enforcement or
the State Department ordered the departure of
nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to
recognition of any judgement, allow counterclaims in
minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff
European and Canadian courts, and potentially seek
was reduced by about two-thirds. The staff reduction has
action in the World Trade Organization.
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing.
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. In June
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued
2019, the Treasury Department eliminated the category
to fund democracy assistance and U.S.-government
of people-to-people educational travel altogether and the
sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2019, Congress
Commerce Department generally prohibited cruise
appropriated $20 million for democracy programs and
ships, private and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and
$29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 116-6, H.Rept.
fishing boats from going to Cuba. In September 2019,
116-9) approved in February 2019.
the Treasury Department capped family remittances to
$1,000 per quarter (previously, such remittances were
For FY2020, the Administration requested $6 million for
not limited) and eliminated the category of donative
Cuba democracy programs, a 70% cut from FY2019, and
remittances. In October 2019, the Transportation
$12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting, a 55% cut from
Department announced that, effective December 10,
FY2019. Both the House-passed FY2020 Department of
2019, it was ending flights by U.S. carriers between the
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS)
United States and Cuba, with the exception of Havana;
bill, Division D of H.R. 2740 (which references H.Rept.
this largely affects family travel.
116-78 to H.R. 2839), and the Senate SFOPS bill, S. 2583
(S.Rept. 116-126), would provide $20 million for Cuba
Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September
democracy programs. The House bill would fully fund the
2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn
Administration’s request for Cuba broadcasting, whereas
transactions, which allowed banking institutions to
the Senate bill would provide $20.973 million.
process certain funds transfers originating and
terminating outside the United States. In October 2019,
Among other bills introduced, several would ease or lift
the Commerce Department restricted Cuba’s access to
U.S. sanctions: H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R.
leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de
1898/S. 1447 (financing for U.S. agricultural exports); H.R.
minimis rule (up from 25%) requiring a third country-
2404 (overall embargo); and H.R. 3960/H.R. 2303 (travel).
based company exporting goods to Cuba with more than
Another bill, H.R. 4884, would direct the Administration to
10% U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and
reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program.
imposed licensing requirements for the export of certain
Several resolutions would express concerns regarding:
donated items to organizations controlled by the Cuban
Cuba’s foreign medical missions (S.Res. 14/H.Res. 136);
government or Communist Party and items for
U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba (H.Res. 92/S.Res. 232);
telecommunications infrastructure.
and religious and political freedom in Cuba (S.Res. 215).
Visa Restrictions. The State Department imposed visa
Also see CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the
restrictions on Raúl Castro and his four children in
116th Congress.
September 2019 and on Cuba’s Interior Minister and his
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
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