Updated November 13, 2019
Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are
Since September 2019, more than 40 people have died
diverse and include economic, political, security, and
in Haiti during widespread anti-government
humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured
demonstrations against corruption and deteriorating
strong economic linkages between the United States and the
economic conditions, with protesters and opposition
region, with the United States being a major trading partner
forces calling for President Jovenel Moïse to resign.
and source of foreign investment for many Latin American
and Caribbean countries. Free-trade agreements (FTAs)
Ecuador experienced two weeks of anti-austerity
have augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries
protests in the first half of October 2019.
in the region. The Western Hemisphere is a large source of
U.S. immigration, both legal and illegal; geographic
Chile has experienced widespread public demonstrations
proximity and economic and security conditions are major
since mid-October 2019 in which protestors are calling
factors driving migration trends.
for greater economic and social equality.
Curbing the flow of illicit drugs from Latin America and
Among other regional challenges are high rates of crime
the Caribbean has been a key component of U.S. relations
and violence in several countries, including Mexico and the
with the region and a major interest of Congress for more
Central American “Northern Triangle” countries of El
than three decades. The flow of illicit drugs, including
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In some countries,
heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl from Mexico and
human rights and environmental activists and journalists
cocaine from Colombia, poses risks to U.S. public health
have been targeted. Although Cuba transitioned to a new
and safety. Colombia has received long-standing support
president in 2018, the government continues to restrict
through Plan Colombia and its successor programs. For
freedoms of expression and other basic rights.
over a decade, the United States has engaged in close
partnerships to combat drug trafficking and related violence
Trump Administration Policy
and advance citizen security: the Mérida Initiative began in
In its policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, the
2007 to support Mexico; the Central America Regional
Trump Administration has retained many of the same
Security Initiative (CARSI) began in 2008; and the
priorities and programs of past Administrations, but it has
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) began in 2009.
also diverged considerably in generally adopting a more
confrontational approach. In 2018, the State Department set
Increasing Challenges in the Region
forth a framework for U.S. policy toward the region
Although many countries in the region have made
focused on three pillars for engagement—economic growth
enormous strides in terms of democratic political
and prosperity, security, and democratic governance. The
development since the 1980s, several Latin American and
framework reflects continuity with long-standing U.S.
Caribbean countries currently are facing political and social
policy priorities for the region, but it also appears at odds
unrest fueled by antidemocratic practices, corruption
with the Administration’s sometimes antagonistic actions
scandals, and poor economic conditions.
and statements on immigration, trade, and foreign aid. The
Administration’s proposed foreign aid budgets for FY2018
The political and economic crisis in Venezuela under
and FY2019 would have cut assistance to the region by
the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro has intensified
more than a third; the FY2020 proposed budget request
over the past two years, resulting in mass migration to
would cut funding to the region by about 29%. Meanwhile,
neighboring countries.
according to Gallup polls in 2018 and 2019, negative views
of U.S. leadership in the region have increased markedly
Bolivian President Evo Morales resigned on November
since the Trump Administration took office.
10, 2019, after weeks of protests alleging fraud in the
country’s October 20, 2019, presidential elections in
On trade, in 2017, President Trump ordered U.S.
which Morales was seeking a fourth term.
withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) free trade agreement that had been negotiated in
Since April 2018, the government of Nicaraguan
2015; the TPP would have increased U.S. economic
President Daniel Ortega has continued to use violence to
linkages with three Latin American countries that were
repress the political opposition.
parties to the agreement—Chile, Mexico, and Peru. The
President strongly criticized the North American Free Trade
Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández is alleged
Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada, repeatedly
to have received drug trafficking proceeds, according to
warned that the United States might withdraw from
U.S. federal court prosecutors who convicted his brother
NAFTA, and initiated renegotiations in 2017. The three
on drug charges in October 2019.
countries agreed in September 2018 to a new United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which includes
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
some modernizing updates and changes, such as provisions
cut the staff of U.S. Embassy Havana by about two-thirds in
on digital trade and the dairy and auto industries.
response to unexplained injuries of U.S. diplomatic staff.
Beyond trade, relations with Mexico have been tested
Since political unrest began to grow in Nicaragua in 2018,
because of inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric and
the Trump Administration has employed targeted sanctions
immigration actions that have shifted the burden of
against several individuals responsible for human rights
interdicting migrants and offering asylum to Mexico. In
abuses or significant corruption.
2017, the Administration announced it would end the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program; begun in
Congressional Action in the 116th Congress
2012, the program provides relief from deportation for
Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy
certain immigrants who arrived as children. The program’s
toward Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of both
future remains uncertain, given challenges in federal court;
legislation and oversight. Given the region’s proximity,
if ended, some 536,000 Mexicans could be affected.
U.S. foreign and domestic policy often overlap, particularly
Despite tensions, U.S.-Mexican relations remain friendly,
in areas of immigration and trade.
especially economic and energy ties and security
The 116th Congress completed action on FY2019 foreign
cooperation related to drug interdiction.
aid appropriations when it enacted the Consolidated
Since 2017, the Administration has announced plans to
Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) in February 2019;
terminate Temporary Protected Status designations for
amounts appropriated for key U.S. initiatives and countries
Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and Honduras, but federal
significantly exceeded the Administration’s request.
court challenges have put the terminations on hold.
Congress also began action on the Administration’s
FY2020 foreign aid budget request for almost $1.2 billion
Unauthorized migration from Central America’s Northern
for the region (down from $1.7 billion in FY2018); House-
Triangle countries has increased in recent years, fueled by
passed and Senate-reported foreign aid appropriations bills
difficult socioeconomic and security conditions and poor
(Division D of H.R. 2740, and S. 2583) would provide
governance. To deter such migration, the Trump
more assistance than requested, equaling or exceeding
Administration implemented a “zero tolerance” policy
FY2018 levels for some countries and initiatives.
toward illegal border crossings in 2018 and restrictions on
access to asylum at the U.S. border. The Administration
On Venezuela, the House approved three bills in March
also has used aid cuts of previously appropriated assistance
2019: H.R. 854, to provide humanitarian assistance; H.R.
for FY2017 and FY2018 and threats of increased U.S.
920, to restrict the export of defense articles and crime
tariffs and taxes on remittances to compel Central American
control materials; and H.R. 1477, to require a threat
countries and Mexico to curb unauthorized migration to the
assessment and strategy to counter Russian influence in
United States. This year, the Administration has used
Venezuela. Both the House- and Senate-passed versions of
Migration Protection Protocols negotiated with Mexico to
the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R.
deter Central American migration and negotiated
2500 and S. 1790, now in conference) have a provision that
agreements with each of the Northern Triangle countries
would prohibit federal contracting with persons who do
that, when implemented, will permit the United States to
business with the Maduro government.
transfer asylum applicants from third countries to the
Northern Triangle countries.
In other action, the House approved H.R. 133 in January
As the situation in Venezuela has deteriorated under the
2019 to promote U.S.-Mexican economic partnership and
Maduro government, the Trump Administration has
cooperation, and the Senate approved S.Res. 35 in April
imposed targeted and broader financial sanctions, including
2019 expressing support for democratic principles in
sanctions against the state oil company, the country’s main
Bolivia and throughout Latin America. Both houses also
source of income. In January 2019, the Administration
approved resolutions (H.Res. 441 in July 2019 and S.Res.
recognized the head of Venezuela’s National Assembly,
277 in October 2019) commemorating the 25th anniversary
Juan Guaidó, as interim president. In September 2019, the
of the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual
United States joined with 11 other Western Hemisphere
Association in Buenos Aires. Looking ahead, the proposed
countries to invoke the Rio Treaty to facilitate a regional
USMCA faces potential consideration in the 116th
response to the Venezuelan crisis. The Administration also
Congress; Congress must approve implementing legislation
is providing humanitarian and development assistance for
for the agreement before it can enter into force.
Venezuelans who have fled to other countries, especially
Colombia, as well as for Venezuelans inside Venezuela.
To date in the first session, several oversight hearings have
been held on Venezuela, Central America (including the
On Cuba, the Trump Administration largely has abandoned
impact of U.S. aid cuts), relations with Colombia, human
the policy of engagement advanced by the Obama
rights in Cuba, China’s engagement in Latin America,
Administration and imposed a series of economic sanctions
environmental concerns in the Amazon, and repression in
on Cuba for its poor human rights record and support for
Nicaragua.
the Maduro government in Venezuela. Economic sanctions
have included restrictions on travel and remittances, efforts
For background, see CRS Insight IN11045, Latin America:
to disrupt oil flows from Venezuela, and authorization
Challenges for U.S. Policymakers in 2019; and CRS Report
(pursuant to Title III of the LIBERTAD Act, P.L. 104-114),
R45120, Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues in the
of the right to file lawsuits against those trafficking in
115th Congress.
confiscated property in Cuba. In 2017, the State Department
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
IF10460
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10460 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED