Updated October 22, 2019
Iraq and U.S. Policy
Iraqis Struggle to Define a Way Forward
in spite of his reiteration by decree in July 2019 of their
Two years after victory was declared in the country’s years-
obligation to do so. Groups and individuals associated with
long military struggle against the Islamic State (IS, aka
the PMF, some of whom have close ties to Iran, won COR
ISIL/ISIS) unresolved issues involving governance,
seats in the 2018 election and remain politically influential.
territorial control, resources, and security cloud the path
Figure 1. Iraq
ahead for Iraq’s leaders. Among the issues they face in late
2019 are popular protests and discontent, balancing
competing priorities and competition between two of their
key allies, the United States and Iran, and the potential for
IS resurgence. Long-term fiscal challenges and
demographic pressures loom.
The May 2018 national election for Iraq’s unicameral
legislature, the Council of Representatives (COR),
proceeded without major security disruptions, but the
election’s disputed outcome delayed government formation.
In October 2018, the newly seated COR elected former
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister
Barham Salih as Iraq’s President. Salih, in turn, nominated
former Oil Minister Adel Abd al Mahdi, a Shia Arab, as
Prime Minister-designate. Lawmakers confirmed Prime
Minister Abd al Mahdi and some of his cabinet nominees
later that month. Abd al Mahdi, a consensus candidate, has
at times appeared unable to set the agenda amid ongoing
competition between and within rival COR blocs.
The summer months, which in recent years featured

Source: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
protests by civilians condemning corruption and calling for
better governance and more economic opportunity, passed
Islamic State Insurgency
without incident. In October, however, persistent frustration
Iraq’s government declared military victory against the
surfaced in a series of mass demonstrations, during which,
Islamic State in December 2017, but counterinsurgency and
in some cases, security forces used live ammunition against
counterterrorism operations against remaining supporters of
protestors. Nearly 150 civilians died and more than 6,000
the group are ongoing. Security conditions have improved
were injured. The unrest and the heavy handed, apparently
since 2017, but an estimated 15,000 IS fighters spread
unauthorized response led to calls for the government to
across Iraq and Syria pose a continuing threat and have the
resign. The Prime Minister has announced a series of
potential to regroup and escalate insurgent activities. The
socioeconomic support measures, fired military officers
Islamic State does not control territory, but carries out
following a probe, and proposed a cabinet reshuffle that has
frequent attacks in some areas. Iraqi forces, national
failed to gain COR approval. Protests have subsided, but
ministries, and local authorities are cooperating to protect
anger reportedly remains potent.
and stabilize liberated areas and prevent IS reinfiltration.
In August, Special Representative of the United Nations
Iraq’s military has said that U.S. military forces
Secretary-General for Iraq Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert had
withdrawing from northeastern Syria may transit Iraq, but
told the Security Council “the harsh reality is that the
do not have permission to remain in Iraq, where some
Government needs time to fight the many narrow partisan
groups continue to call for a full U.S. withdrawal.
interests and to deliver.” Without changes to underlying
The Islamic State left destruction, displacement, and
political dynamics and balances of political power, the
division in its wake. Explosive ordnance and infrastructure
prospects for improvement appear limited.
damage complicate civilian returns, with volatile
Behind the scenes, tensions between the national
interpersonal divisions remaining between those who fled
government and the KRG have diminished since the KRG’s
or fought against the Islamic State and those accused of
September 2017 advisory referendum on independence and
collaboration. Economic and humanitarian conditions
the subsequent return of Iraqi security forces to disputed
remain difficult in many areas, and more than 1.5 million
territories, but disputes remain over oil revenue. The
individuals remain internally displaced. Iraqi officials have
paramilitary Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) created to
identified more than $88 billion in recovery needs.
fight the Islamic State have resisted integration under
national security institutions on the Prime Minister’s terms,
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Iraq and U.S. Policy
Political and Economic Agenda
Minister Abd al Mahdi issued a decree restating a
National Elections and Political Scene
requirement that PMF units either serve as “an indivisible
part of the armed forces and be subject to the same
Iraq held national legislative elections for the 328-seat COR
regulations” or disarm. Recent changes in military
on May 12, 2018. KRG elections were held in September
command personnel are renewing questions about the
2018, and repeatedly postponed nation-wide provincial
integrity and political independence of the armed forces.
elections are now scheduled for April 2020. Iraq’s major
ethnic and religious constituencies are internally diverse in
Fiscal Challenges
political terms, as evident in the 2018 election results. A
High wage bills, corruption, and sclerotic bureaucracy
pan-ethnic and pan-sectarian coalition of interest groups
create public investment constraints and vex Iraqi decision-
agreed to support the new government, though differences
makers. Oil exports, the lifeblood of Iraq’s public finances
over policy priorities and leadership preferences exist
and economy, have brought volatile returns since 2014, and
within communal blocs. Prime Minister Abd al Mahdi
Iraq has limited its oil production in line with OPEC
emerged as a consensus candidate acceptable to the Sa’irun
decisions. Notwithstanding Iraq’s 2018 budget surplus, the
(On the March) coalition led by populist Shia cleric and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) warns that current
longtime U.S. antagonist Muqtada al Sadr; the
spending on wages is expected to contribute to rising fiscal
predominantly Shia Fatah (Conquest) coalition led by Hadi
deficits that may crowd out public investment and increase
al Ameri of the Badr Organization; the Nasr (Victory)
reliance on lending. Iraq’s Standby Arrangement with the
coalition of former prime minister Hayder al Abadi; and,
IMF and billions more in World Bank programs commit it
Kurdish and Sunni Arab blocs. Fatah includes several
to a set of fiscal and administrative reform benchmarks.
individuals formerly associated with the mostly Shia PMF
U.S. loan guarantees and U.S. technical assistance also have
militias, including figures and movements with ties to Iran.
helped Iraq attract billions in lending to meet pressing
Sadr expressed solidarity with protesters in October 2019
needs. The KRG has welcomed Baghdad’s resumption of
and called for the government to resign.
payments for KRG salaries, but unresolved oil and budget
differences could renew the Kurdistan region’s own fiscal
The Kurdistan Region and Disputed Territories
crisis at any time.
Already-difficult relations between the KRG and the
Iraq-U.S. Relations
national government in Baghdad deteriorated further over
the KRG’s September 2017 advisory referendum on
The Iraqi government seeks continued U.S. and coalition
independence. The vote overwhelmingly favored
security assistance to Iraq, including the continuation of
independence, but the United States did not recognize the
U.S. military training. U.S. forces are hosted by Iraq
result. In its wake, Iraqi leaders reintroduced national
pursuant to an exchange of diplomatic notes under the 2008
government forces into disputed territories where they had
U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. Some Iraqis
been present prior to the Islamic State’s 2014 advance. The
remain deeply critical of and hostile to the foreign military
risks of conflict since have declined, and U.S. officials urge
presence in Iraq, while others express concern that U.S. and
Iraqis to engage in constitution-based dialogue.
other forces could be drawn down precipitously or become
involved in conflict with neighboring Iran or its proxies.
In the May 2018 national elections, the two largest Kurdish
parties, the Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
Security Assistance and Foreign Aid
and the Suleimaniyah-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
The United States provides foreign aid and security
(PUK), won nationally significant numbers of seats despite
assistance to Iraq in support of Iraqi operations against the
stiff but diffuse competition from Kurdish opposition
Islamic State, Iraqi security force development, Iraqi public
parties. The KDP won 45 of 111 legislative seats in the
financial management reform, United Nations-coordinated
KRG’s September 2018 election, followed by the PUK and
stabilization programs, and other objectives. Reflecting
smaller parties. In July 2019, the KRG parliament
Iraq’s needs, fiscal situation, and status as a major oil
confirmed KDP leader Masrour Barzani as KRG Prime
exporter, U.S. aid to Iraq blends U.S.-funded programs with
Minister. His cousin Nechirvan Barzani is KRG President.
lending and credit guarantees. Congress has authorized U.S.
train and equip programs in Iraq through December 2020,
The Future of the Popular Mobilization Forces
including aid to KRG forces. Congress has appropriated
Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces contributed to Iraq’s
more than $5.8 billion for these security programs since
fight against the Islamic State, though ties between some
2014. More than $365 million in U.S. stabilization aid has
PMF components and Iran have prompted Iraqi and
flowed to liberated areas of Iraq, largely through the United
international concerns. In 2016, the COR adopted a law to
Nations Development Program’s Funding Facility for
provide for a permanent role for the PMF as part of Iraq’s
Stabilization (FFS), with some of this aid directed toward
national security sector. The law calls for the PMF to be
religious and ethnic minority communities. President
placed under the authority of the Prime Minister as
Trump requested additional foreign aid ($165 million) and
commander-in-chief and to be subject to military discipline
defense funds ($745 million) for Iraq for FY2020. The
and organization. Some PMF units have demobilized, but
United States has provided more than $2.5 billion in
many remain outside the law’s defined structure, including
humanitarian funding for Iraq programs since 2014.
some units associated with groups identified by the State
Department as receiving Iranian support. U.S. officials have
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
expressed concern about potential attacks by Iran-linked
Affairs
PMF forces and other militias amid U.S. tensions with Iran,
and reduced the number of personnel deployed to the U.S.
IF10404
Embassy in Baghdad in May 2019. In July 2019, Prime
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Iraq and U.S. Policy


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