Updated October 16, 2019
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
For more than a decade, the United States has employed
Designated individuals include several current or former
sanctions as a policy tool in response to activities of the
Venezuelan officials. Some of the more recent sanctions
Venezuelan government and Venezuelan individuals. As
include then-Vice President Tareck el Aissami in 2017 and
Venezuela’s political and economic crisis under the
Pedro Luis Martin (a former senior intelligence official) and
leadership of Nicolás Maduro has deepened, the Trump
two associates in May 2018. Others designated include drug
Administration has significantly expanded sanctions. The
trafficker Walid Makled, three dual Lebanese-Venezuelan
Treasury Department has sanctions on at least 132
citizens allegedly involved in a drug money laundering
Venezuelan or Venezuelan-connected individuals and the
network, and several Colombian drug traffickers with
State Department has revoked the visas of hundreds of
activity in Venezuela.
individuals. The Trump Administration also has imposed
sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil company (Petróleos de
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic
Venezuela, S.A., or PdVSA), government, and central bank.
Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption
In response to increasing repression in Venezuela, Congress
Sanctions have increased pressure on the Maduro
enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil
government, including accelerating the decline in
Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) in
Venezuela’s oil production. However, sanctions have not
2014. Among its provisions, the law requires the President
yet led to a political transition. Maduro remains in power,
to impose sanctions (asset blocking and visa restrictions)
even though it has been nearly 10 months since the United
against those whom the President identifies as responsible
States recognized Juan Guidó, the head of Venezuela’s
for significant acts of violence or serious human rights
National Assembly, as the country’s interim president and
abuses or anyone who has ordered the arrest or prosecution
ceased to recognize Maduro as the president of Venezuela.
of a person because of the person’s legitimate exercise of
freedom of expression or assembly. In 2016, Congress
Terrorism-Related Sanctions
extended this act through 2019 in P.L. 114-194.
Since 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual
determination that Venezuela is not “cooperating fully with
In March 2015, President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to
United States anti-terrorism efforts” pursuant to Section
implement P.L. 113-278, and the Treasury Department
40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781). The
issued regulations in July 2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The
most recent determination was made in May 2019. As a
E.O. targets (for asset blocking and visa restrictions) those
result, the United States has prohibited all U.S. commercial
involved in actions or policies undermining democratic
arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela since 2006.
processes or institutions; those involved in acts of violence
or conduct constituting a serious human rights abuse; those
In 2008, the Treasury Department imposed financial
taking actions that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise
sanctions on two individuals and two travel agencies in
of freedom of expression or peaceful assembly; public
Venezuela for providing financial support to the radical
corruption by senior Venezuelan officials; and any person
Lebanon-based Islamic Shiite group Hezbollah. Pursuant to
determined to be a current or former leader of any entity
E.O. 13224, the action aimed at impeding terrorist funding.
engaged in any activity described above or a current or
former official of the government of Venezuela.
Drug Trafficking-Related Sanctions
Since 2005, pursuant to procedures in the Foreign Relations
Currently, the Treasury Department has financial sanctions
Authorization Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228, §706; 22 U.S.C.
on 89 Venezuelans pursuant to E.O. 13692. Under the
2291j), the President has made an annual determination that
Obama Administration, the Treasury Department froze the
Venezuela has failed demonstrably to adhere to its
assets of seven Venezuelans—six members of Venezuela’s
obligations under international narcotics agreements.
security forces and a prosecutor who repressed protesters.
President Trump made the most recent determination for
Under the Trump Administration, the Treasury Department
FY2020 in August 2019 but waived foreign aid restrictions
currently has sanctions on an additional 82 Venezuelan
for programs that support the interim government.
officials, including President Maduro; his wife, Cecilia
Flores, and son, Nicolás Maduro Guerra; Executive Vice
The Treasury Department has imposed economic sanctions
President Delcy Rodriguez; Diosdado Cabello (Socialist
on at least 22 individuals with connections to Venezuela
party president); eight supreme court judges; the leaders of
and 27 companies by designating them as Specially
Venezuela’s army, national guard, and national police; four
Designated Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign
state governors; the director of the central bank; and the
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120, Title
foreign minister. On May 7, 2019, the Treasury Department
VIII; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.).
lifted sanctions against the former head of Venezuela’s
intelligence service, General Manuel Cristopher Figuera,
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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
who broke ranks with Maduro and is now in the United
Additional Financial Sanctions
States.
President Trump has imposed financial sanctions on
Venezuela through three additional executive orders
Broader Sectoral Sanctions
because of the government’s serious human rights abuses
On November 1, 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850,
and antidemocratic actions. In August 2017, he issued E.O.
setting forth a framework to block the assets of, and
13808, which prohibits access to the U.S. financial markets
prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by
by the Venezuelan government, including PdVSA, with
the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
certain exceptions to minimize the impact on the
Secretary of State, to operate in the gold sector (or any
Venezuelan people and U.S. interests.
other sector of the economy as determined in the future by
the Secretary of the Treasury) or to be responsible for or
In March 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13827 to
complicit in transactions involving deceptive practices or
prohibit transactions involving the Venezuelan
corruption and the Venezuelan government. Currently, 19
government’s issuance of digital currency, coin, or token.
individuals are sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 13850. They
include five people and 23 entities for involvement in a
In May 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13835, which
$2.4 billion currency exchange corruption scheme; the
prohibits transactions related to the purchase of Venezuelan
president of the state gold mining company; and 13
debt, including accounts receivable, and to any debt owed
individuals and 19 entities for siphoning millions of dollars
to Venezuela pledged as collateral.
from Venezuela’s emergency food distribution system.
Sanctions on the Maduro Government and Persons
On January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Treasury
Transacting with or Assisting That Government
Department designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector
On August 5, 2019, President Trump issued E.O. 13884,
of the Venezuelan economy, and Secretary of the Treasury
blocking (freezing) the property and interests of the Maduro
Steven Mnuchin determined that the company was subject
government in the United States and within the control of
to U.S. sanctions. As a result, all property and interests in
U.S. persons. The order also prohibits U.S. persons from
property of PdVSA subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked,
engaging in transactions with the Maduro government
and U.S. persons (companies or individuals) generally are
unless authorized by OFAC. E.O. 13884 also authorized
prohibited from engaging in transactions with the company.
financial sanctions and visa restrictions on non-U.S.
persons that assist or support the Maduro government,
At the same time, the Treasury Department’s Office of
which could lead to U.S. sanctions on foreign energy
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued general licenses to
companies whose joint ventures with PdVSA have kept
allow certain transactions and activities related to PdVSA
Venezuela’s oil industry afloat. To allow continued
and its subsidiaries, some for specified wind-down periods.
humanitarian assistance to the Venezuelan people, OFAC
OFAC first authorized transactions with U.S.-based PdVSA
issued licenses authorizing transactions involving the
subsidiaries, PDV Holding, Inc. (PDVH) and CITGO
delivery of food, agricultural commodities, and medicine;
Holding, Inc. through July 27, 2019. In March 2019, the
personal remittances; the work of international
general license for those entities was extended for 18
organizations; and communications services.
months. OFAC authorized PDVH, CITGO, and other U.S.
companies to import petroleum from PdVSA through April
Policy Considerations
28, 2019, but payments had to be made to a blocked U.S.
There has been bipartisan support in Congress and the
account. OFAC initially authorized several U.S. companies
international community for targeted sanctions against
with operations in Venezuela involving PdVSA (including
Maduro officials, but opinions on broader economic
Chevron) to continue operating through July 27, 2019; that
sanctions vary. Some strongly support U.S. sanctions as a
authorization now extends through October 25, 2019.
way to increase economic pressure on the Maduro
government, but others are concerned about the
In March 2019, the Treasury Department sanctioned the
humanitarian effects of those sanctions. It remains unclear
Moscow-based Evrofinance Mosnarbank, (owned by Russia
whether the most recent sanctions will hinder efforts to
and Venezuela) for helping PdVSA funnel revenue from oil
foster a negotiated solution to the political crisis leading to
sales. Treasury then sanctioned Venezuela’s state-owned
free and fair elections. S. 1025 would codify many of the
gold sector company, Minerven, for using illicit gold
sanctions discussed above.
operations to support Maduro. It also sanctioned the state-
affiliated Venezuelan Economic and Social Development
See also U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Venezuela-
Bank and subsidiaries that the Maduro government uses to
Related Sanctions,” at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
move money abroad. In April, the Treasury Department
center/sanctions/programs/pages/venezuela.aspx; and U.S.
sanctioned Venezuela’s central bank; in July, it sanctioned
Department of State, “Venezuela-Related Sanctions,” at
Venezuela’s military counterintelligence agency.
https://www.state.gov/venezuela-related-sanctions/.
In April and in September 2019, the Treasury Department
Also see CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political
sanctioned companies and vessels involved in transporting
Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS Report R44841, Venezuela:
Venezuelan oil to Cuba. Companies that have stopped those
Background and U.S. Relations.
shipments have been delisted. On July 3, Treasury
designated Cuba’s state oil import and export company, due
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
to Cuba’s continued support for the Maduro government.
Affairs
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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions

IF10715


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10715 · VERSION 25 · UPDATED

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