Updated September 11, 2019
Venezuela: International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis
Background
Almagro has issued reports on the situation in Venezuela,
The international community remains divided over how to
convened special sessions of the Permanent Council to
respond to the political crisis in Venezuela. The United
discuss regional responses to the crisis, and spoken out
States and 54 other countries have formally recognized the
against Maduro. Member states remain divided on how to
interim government of Juan Guaidó, who Venezuela’s
respond to the crisis, with countries in the Caribbean
democratically elected National Assembly named president
Community (CARICOM) particularly reluctant to intervene
in January 2019. These countries have placed pressure on
in Venezuela’s internal affairs. Many of those countries had
authoritarian leader Nicolás Maduro, in power since 2013,
close ties with Venezuela under Maduro’s predecessor, the
to leave office and allow a political transition to occur.
late president Hugo Chávez, and until recently received
Other countries, such as China, Cuba, Nicaragua, and
significant amounts of subsidized oil from Venezuela. In
Russia, have provided diplomatic, financial, and military
2017, Maduro denounced the OAS for meddling in his
support to Maduro and sought to block anti-Maduro actions
country’s domestic affairs and began a two-year process to
within international organizations. A third group of
withdraw from the organization.
countries, including Mexico, Norway, Uruguay, and some
The OAS requires 18 votes to pass a resolution of the
Caribbean nations, has remained neutral in the crisis.
Permanent Council. In June 2018, 19 of 34 member states
These international dynamics appear to have contributed to
passed a resolution stating that the May 2018 presidential
a political stalemate in Venezuela, even as conditions
election in Venezuela lacked legitimacy and authorizing
within the country have deteriorated. On April 30, 2019, a
countries to take measures, including sanctions, necessary
Guaidó-led uprising failed to garner enough military
to hasten a return to democracy. In January 2019, the same
support to compel Maduro to leave office. While some
19 states approved a resolution that refused to recognize the
observers maintain that Maduro is weak politically, others
legitimacy of Maduro’s second term, called for new
fear a prolonged, potentially violent, standoff. Observers
presidential elections, and urged all member states to adopt
hope that talks led by Norway, which began in May 2019,
measures to facilitate the prompt restoration of democratic
lead to free and fair elections. Those talks have been on
order in Venezuela. After Maduro withdrew his OAS
hold, however, since the United States imposed new
ambassador, the Permanent Council welcomed the
sanctions on the Maduro government in August 2019.
Venezuelan National Assembly’s permanent representative
Others hope that sanctions lead to fissures in the Maduro
to the OAS on April 9, 2019. Some observers have praised
government, which could prompt a political transition.
Secretary-General Almagro’s activism on Venezuela, which
United Nations
has included calling for international intervention in the
country. Others have asserted that he has sided too closely
The United Nations (U.N.) Security Council has discussed
with the opposition and is unlikely to help broker a
the political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, but
diplomatic solution to the current crisis.
divisions among U.N. members have stalled action. Russia
and, to a lesser extent, China support Maduro. The United
Lima Group
States and most countries in Europe and the Western
In mid-2017, efforts to reach a consensus at the OAS on
Hemisphere support Guiadó. Despite that polarization, U.N.
how to respond to the crisis in Venezuela appeared to stall.
agencies are increasing humanitarian relief in Venezuela
On August 8, 2017, 12 Western Hemisphere countries
after securing approval in April 2019 from Maduro and
signed the Lima Accord, which rejected what it described
Guaidó. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the
as the rupture of democracy and systemic human rights
International Organization for Migration are coordinating to
violations in Venezuela. The signatory countries included
serve some of the roughly 4.3 million Venezuelans who had
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
left the country as of August 2019 and the communities
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and
hosting them. In July 2019, the U.N. High Commissioner
Peru. In 2018, Guyana and St. Lucia joined the Lima
for Human Rights published a report documenting state
Group, which did not recognize Maduro’s May 2018
violence against civilians, which has included torture and
reelection.
extrajudicial killings. On September 9, the High
On January 4, 2019, 13 members of the Lima Group
Commissioner criticized the Maduro government for failing
to implement the report’s
(excluding Mexico) signed a declaration urging President
recommendations.
Maduro not to assume power on January 10, 2019. The
Organization of American States
countries resolved to reassess their level of diplomatic
The Organization of American States (OAS), a regional
engagement with Venezuela, implement travel bans or
multilateral organization that includes all 35 independent
sanctions on Maduro officials (as Canada and Panama
countries of the Western Hemisphere (Cuba currently does
have), suspend military cooperation with Venezuela, and
not participate), has focused attention on Venezuela’s
urge others in the international community to take similar
political crisis. Since 2016, OAS Secretary-General Luis
actions. Under leftist President Andrés Manuel López
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis
Obrador, Mexico no longer participates in the Lima Group.
international efforts to broker a solution to the crisis.
El Salvador and Ecuador currently participate as observers
Congress has held hearings on Venezuela’s political crisis
at Lima Group meetings.
and U.S. policy responses; the country’s humanitarian
crisis; the regional migration crisis that Venezuela’s unrest
On January 23, 2019, and in subsequent statements,
has wrought; the influence of Russia and China in
11 members of the Lima Group have recognized the
Venezuela; and Congress’s role in authorizing any use of
Guaidó government and pledged to support a
U.S. military force in Venezuela. The role of international
democratic transition in Venezuela. On February 4,
actors and U.S. coordination with them may influence
2019, the Guaidó government joined the Lima Group
congressional consideration of legislative initiatives to
and signed its statement calling “for a peaceful
require, authorize, or constrain certain Administration
transition … without the use of force.”
actions regarding Venezuela (e.g., H.R. 920, H.R. 1477, S.
1025, H.R. 1004, and S.J.Res. 11).
The Lime Group has denounced human rights violations by
the Maduro government and the presence of “security and
International perspectives may influence oversight of the
intelligence agents from countries” supporting Maduro, but
$333.5 million in U.S. humanitarian assistance dedicated
it also has opposed U.S. or regional military intervention.
from FY2017 to FY2019 to support Venezuelans in the
On July 23, 2019, the goup issued a declaration signed by
region. They also may inform decisions about the amounts
12 countries (including the Guaidó government but not St.
and types of U.S. funds most needed to support entities
Lucia or Guyana) pledging to coordinate with “relevant
working in Venezuela, now and in the future. The
Administration’s
actors,” such as the International Contact Group (see
FY2020 budget request asked for $9
below) and CARICOM, to help resolve the crisis.
million in democracy aid and the authority to transfer up to
$500 million to support a transition or respond to a crisis in
European Union
Venezuela. Should Maduro leave office, the Administration
The European Union (EU) has imposed targeted sanctions
proposes that such funds could support international
on Maduro officials and adopted an arms embargo against
election observers, increased humanitarian assistance in
Venezuela. The EU Parliament and most member states
Venezuela, or a potential International Monetary Fund
have recognized the Guaidó government. However, the EU
package.
has opposed military intervention and “any form of
violence” in the country, most recently in an April 30,
Although there generally has been international support for
2019, statement. Instead, the EU backed the formation of an
U.S. policy toward Venezuela, some U.S. actions have
International Contact Group (ICG).
prompted concern among partners working to resolve the
crisis. Most of these countries have supported U.S. targeted
International Contact Group
sanctions on Maduro officials. Some are concerned,
The EU-backed ICG, now composed of several European
however, about the humanitarian impacts of U.S. sanctions
countries (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
imposed on Venezuela’s state oil company, Petróleos de
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) and
Venezuela, S. A. (PdVSA), in January 2019 and sanctions
Latin American countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
imposed on the entire Maduro government in August 2019.
Panama, and Uruguay) first convened in February 2019. It
Others fear the new sanctions may inhibit progress in the
aimed to “establish necessary guarantees” for free,
Norway-led dialogue process. Some countries also have
transparent presidential elections and to hasten the delivery
expressed concern about repeated U.S. threats to use
of humanitarian aid to Venezuela through dialogue. ICG
military force in Venezuela despite opposition from
supporters maintain the “necessary guarantees” include
neighboring countries (such as Brazil and Colombia), the
naming a new electoral council, releasing political
Lima Group, and the EU.
prisoners, and ending bans on parties and candidates. Since
February, the ICG has met at least three times, including in
Threats of U.S. military action have occurred alongside
June with Lima Group representatives; sent political
denunciations of Russian and Cuban military assistance to
missions to Caracas; and supported the dialogue process led
Maduro. Some observers predict the Trump Administration
by Norway.
could lose support from some partners because of the U.S.
decision to impose strong sanctions on Cuba and secondary
Dialogue Effort Led by Norway
sanctions on any entities that do business with the Maduro
In May 2019, the Norwegian government confirmed it had
government or PdVSA. Some U.S. partners on Venezuela
been facilitating talks between negotiating teams for
have commercial ties with Cuba; others have energy
Maduro and Guaidó. The negotiations’ goal has been to
companies that do business with PdVSA. Many also have
determine the conditions under which free and fair elections
urged the United States to prevent the situation from
can be held. Points of contention include whether Maduro
turning into a proxy conflict with Russia for regional and
will remain in office during the convening of the elections
global influence.
and whether he can run. Skeptics assert that, as in the past,
Maduro is using negotiations as a delaying tactic. As noted
Also see CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political
above, Maduro called off participation in the negotiations
Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS Insight IN11163, New U.S.
after new U.S. sanctions were announced in August 2019.
Sanctions on Venezuela; CRS In Focus IF10715,
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions; and CRS Report
Implications for U.S. Policy
R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations.
The 116th Congress has closely followed developments in
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Venezuela, Trump Administration policy responses, and
Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis
IF11216
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11216 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED