Updated August 30, 2019
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
private sector and slowed implementation of a controversial
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
decree regulating artistic expression, actions that appeared
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
to demonstrate responsiveness to public criticism and
isolating the government.
independence from the previous government. Díaz-Canel
continues to faces two significant challenges—moving
In December 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a
forward with economic reforms that produce results and
major policy shift moving away from sanctions toward
responding to citizens’ desires for greater freedom.
engagement and the normalization of relations. The policy
change included the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
In February 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a new
state sponsor of international terrorism in May 2015; the
constitution in a national referendum. Among the changes
restoration of diplomatic relations in July 2015; and efforts
are the addition of an appointed prime minister to oversee
to increase travel, commerce, and the flow of information to
government operations; age and term limits on the
Cuba by easing restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
president; and some market-oriented economic reforms,
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
including the right to private property and the promotion of
(accomplished through amendments in 2015 and 2016 to
foreign investment. However, the new constitution ensures
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations [CACR],
the state sector’s dominance over the economy and the
administered by the Department of the Treasury, and the
predominant role of the Communist Party.
Export Administration Regulations [EAR], administered by
The Cuban economy is being hit hard by the increase in
the Commerce Department). The restoration of relations led
U.S. sanctions and by Venezuela’s economic crisis, which
to increased government-to-government engagement, with
has limited Venezuela’s financial support to Cuba. The
over 20 bilateral agreements negotiated and bilateral
Cuban government reported that, as of July 2019, tourism
dialogues conducted in numerous areas of cooperation.
arrivals had dropped by almost 24% compared to the
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
previous year, hurting many restaurant and other private
2017 introducing new sanctions and rolling back some of
sector businesses supporting the tourist sector. The
the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations.
Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that the economy will
In 2019, the Administration has increased economic
grow 0.6% in 2019 but contract by 0.2% in 2020.
sanctions significantly to pressure the Cuban government
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
on its human rights record and its support for the regime of
issued a national security presidential memorandum on
Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. These include actions
Cuba in June 2017 that introduced new sanctions. These
allowing lawsuits to go forward against those trafficking in
included restrictions on transactions with companies
property confiscated by the Cuban government and
controlled by the Cuban military, and the elimination of
tightening restrictions on nonfamily travel to Cuba,
people-to-people travel for individuals. To implement these
including the termination of cruise ship travel to Cuba from
changes, the Treasury and Commerce Departments
the United States. With these actions, U.S. policy toward
amended the CACR and EAR in November 2017.
Cuba has again shifted to a policy of strong economic
pressure. In response to the increased sanctions, Cuban
The Department of State issued a list of “restricted entities”
President Miguel Díaz-Canel asserted “We Cubans do not
in November 2017; it has been updated several times, most
surrender.”
recently in July 2019. The list currently includes 218
entities and subentities, including 2 ministries, 5 holding
Cuban Political Developments. In April 2018, Díaz-
companies and 49 of their subentities, 104 hotels, 2 tourist
Canel, who was serving as first vice president, succeeded
agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 41
Raúl Castro as president, but Castro continues to head the
entities serving the defense and security sectors.
Cuban Communist Party until 2021. The selection of Díaz-
Canel, now 59 years old, reflects the generational change in
In April and May 2019, the Department of the Treasury
Cuban leadership that began several years ago and marks
imposed sanctions on eight shipping companies and seven
the first time since the 1959 Cuban revolution that a Castro
vessels that have transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba (39
is not in charge of the government. While in power from
other vessels transporting Venezuelan oil were sanctioned).
2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to implement significant
Venezuela currently provides some 40,000-50,000 barrels
economic policy changes, moving toward a more mixed
of oil per day to Cuba, about one-third of its consumption.
economy with a stronger private sector, but his
government’s slow, gradualist approach did not produce
On April 8, 2019, the Department of the Treasury scuttled
major improvements to the Cuban economy, which has
an agreement between Major League Baseball and the
experienced minimal growth in recent years.
Cuban Baseball Federation, announced in December 2018,
which would have allowed Cuban baseball players to sign
In December 2018, President Díaz-Canel backtracked on
with U.S. teams directly. Trump Administration officials
implementing regulations that likely would have shrunk the
maintained that the Cuban Baseball Federation is part of the
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Cuban government and therefore no payments could be
level since 2010) according to the Cuban Commission for
made to the federation under U.S. sanctions.
Human Rights and National Reconciliation. In the first
three months of 2019, there were 639 short-term detentions
Effective May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right
(about a 36% decline from the same period in 2018).
to file lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated
property in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L.
According to the Department of State, 26 U.S. Embassy
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national,
community members suffered a series of unexplained
including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time of
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
the confiscation. The first of such lawsuits were filed
occurred from November 2016 to August 2017, but two
against Carnival Corporation, the Miami-based cruise ship
incidents occurred in May 2018.) The Department of State
operator, by descendants of two families who owned port
maintains that the U.S. investigation has not reached a
facilities in Cuba confiscated in 1960 and against Cuban
definitive conclusion regarding the cause, source, or any
state-owned companies by Exxon Mobil Corporation for
kind of technologies that might have been used.
the expropriation of an oil refinery, production terminals,
In September 2017, the Department of State ordered the
and service stations in 1960.
departure of nonemergency personnel from the U.S.
Prior to the Trump Administration action on Title III,
Embassy to minimize the risk of their exposure to harm;
previous Administrations had suspended, at six-month
embassy staff was reduced by about two-thirds. In October
intervals, the right to file such lawsuits pursuant to the
2017, the Department of State ordered the departure of 15
provisions of the law. Secretary Pompeo cited Cuba’s
diplomats from the Cuban Embassy in Washington, DC.
repression of its own people and its support for the Maduro
According to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the
regime in Venezuela as reasons for the implementation of
action was taken because of Cuba’s failure to protect U.S.
Title III. The European Union and Canada criticized the
diplomats in Havana and to ensure equity in the impact on
Administration’s action, vowing to ban enforcement or
diplomatic operations. Cuba strongly denies responsibility
recognition of any judgement, allow counterclaims in
for the injuries. The staff reduction at the U.S. Embassy has
European and Canadian courts, and potentially seek action
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing,
in the World Trade Organization.
and has made bilateral engagement more difficult.
Also in April 2019, National Security Adviser John Bolton
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued
announced that future regulatory changes would restrict
to provide funding for democracy assistance and U.S.-
nonfamily travel to Cuba, limit remittances to $1,000 per
government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2019,
person per quarter, and end the use of “U-turn transactions”
Congress appropriated $20 million for democracy programs
(in which funds from a bank outside the United States may
in Cuba and $29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting in the
pass through one or more U.S. financial institutions before
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6,
being transferred to a bank outside the United States). On
H.J.Res. 31, conference report H.Rept. 116-9) approved in
June 5, 2019, the Department of the Treasury amended the
February 2019.
CACR to eliminate the permissible travel category of
For FY2020, the Administration requested $6 million for
people-to-people educational travel altogether, and the
Cuba democracy programs, a 70% cut from FY2019, and
Commerce Department amended the EAR to generally
$12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting, a 55% cut from
prohibit cruise ships, private and corporate aircraft,
FY2019. The House-passed FY2020 Department of State,
sailboats, and fishing boats from going to Cuba.
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS)
Bolton began the Administration’s strong criticism of Cuba
appropriations measure, Division D of the minibus H.R.
for its support of Venezuela in a November 2018 speech in
2740 (which references H.Rept. 116-78 to the House
which he asserted that Cuba was responsible for enabling
Appropriations Committee-reported SFOPS bill, H.R.
the Venezuelan regime’s repression; in rhetoric reminiscent
2839) would fully fund the Administration’s request for
of the Cold War, he referred to Cuba, Venezuela, and
Cuba broadcasting but would provide $20 million for Cuba
Nicaragua as the “Troika of Tyranny” in the hemisphere
democracy programs. H.Rept. 116-78 also would direct the
and its leaders as the “three stooges of socialism.” He has
State Department to submit a strategy to Congress to
alleged that Cuba has 20,000 to 25,000 security forces in
provide certainty for U.S. businesses legally operating in
Venezuela, but some U.S. analysts say the number is far
Cuba. According to the report, the strategy should include
smaller and the forces do not have combat capability. At the
(1) how to ensure that engagement advances the interest of
end of April 2019, President Trump threatened Cuba with
the U.S. and Cuban people, including encouraging the
“a full and complete embargo” and “highest-level
growth of Cuba’s private sector; (2) the impact of the U.S.
sanctions” unless it stops military support for Venezuela.
Embassy Havana staff reduction on embassy operations,
including visa processing; and (3) a timeline for the safe
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
return of embassy staff to previous levels.
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
policy concern for many years. In October 2018, the U.S.
Also see CRS Insight IN11120, Cuba: Trump
Mission to the United Nations launched a campaign to call
Administration Expands Sanctions and CRS Report
attention to Cuba’s “estimated 130 political prisoners.” In
R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress.
recent years, Cuba has shifted to using short-term
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
detentions and harassment to repress dissent, with at least
5,155 such detentions in 2017 and 2,873 in 2018 (the lowest
IF10045
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 56 · UPDATED