Updated August 29, 2019
U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty: What’s Next?
U.S. Withdrawal
and mandated that DOD begin a program of record to
On August 2, 2019, the United States withdrew from the
develop a new U.S. ground-launched cruise missile. Some
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It had
Members, have, however, criticized the decision to
notified Russia of its intent to withdraw on February 2,
withdraw from the treaty and proposed legislation that
2019, and, consistent with Article XV of the treaty, the
would limit the production and deployment of new systems.
withdrawal took effect six months later. The United States
withdrew from the treaty in response to Russia’s
Some analysts argue that the United States does not have to
deployment of an INF-range ground-launched cruise
deploy new land-based missiles to respond to Russia’s new
missile, which violated the treaty’s ban on missiles with a
missile or to address challenges from China; it could deploy
range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (see CRS Report
more sea-based or air-delivered weapons that are not
R43832, Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range
limited by the INF Treaty.
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for
Congress).
In a briefing on February 1, 2019, a senior U.S. government
official noted that the United States does not plan to deploy
President Trump first indicated that the United States would
any INF-range systems immediately, as it had not
withdraw from INF on October 20, 2018. He not only cited
developed such systems while the treaty was in force. The
Russia’s violation, but also argued that the United States is
official also noted that the United States was considering
at a disadvantage with respect to China because the latter is
only conventional options and did not, at this time, plan to
not bound by the treaty’s limits. On December 4, 2018,
develop new nuclear-armed INF-range missiles.
after a meeting of NATO’s foreign ministers, Secretary of
State Pompeo declared that Russia was in material breach
The United States could pursue a number of INF-range
of the treaty and announced that the United States would
programs and technologies that could add potentially
suspend its obligations, effective in 60 days, “unless Russia
valuable capabilities. For example, the Army is developing
returns to full and verifiable compliance.” This 60-day
a new Precision Strike Missile with a range of 499
period ended on February 2, 2019.
kilometers (consistent with the INF Treaty), but could
extend it with little difficulty. The United States could also
U.S. Military Options
adapt existing sea-based Tomahawk cruise missiles for
The United States first assessed in 2014 that Russia was in
land-based delivery by developing new or adapting existing
violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty. It
land-based launchers, such as the MK-41 launchers that are
determined that Russia had developed an intermediate-
part of the U.S. missile defense system in Romania. (Russia
range ground-launched cruise missile, now known as the
has expressed concerns about these launchers precisely
9M729. At the time, the Pentagon initiated a study to
because it fears they could be adapted to launch Tomahawk
evaluate whether the United States needed new military
cruise missiles.) It could also acquire a new intermediate-
capabilities to offset any advantage Russia might acquire by
range ballistic missile and deploy it with either existing
deploying a ground-launched cruise missile of INF range
reentry vehicle technology (essentially replacing the
(between 500 and 5,500 kilometers). While the results of
Pershing II missiles destroyed under INF), or design a new
the study were not made public, Brian McKeon, then the
trajectory-shaping reentry vehicle that could maneuver and
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
glide to evade an adversary’s missile defenses.
noted that the United States could respond by deploying
new defenses against cruise missiles, developing and
In March 2019, the Pentagon announced that it would test a
possibly deploying new intermediate-range missiles, and
ground-launched cruise missile in August 2019 and a new
deploying other military capabilities to counter the new
intermediate-range ballistic missile in November 2019. The
Russian capabilities.
cruise missile might be deployed 18 months after the test
while the ballistic missile, which would be similar to the
While generally supportive of diplomatic efforts to bring
Pershing II missile deployed in the 1980s, would take at
Russia back into compliance with INF, Congress also
least five years to reach deployment. The cruise missile test
supported the development of a military response. The
occurred on August 18, 2019, when the Pentagon fired a
FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-291,
Tomahawk cruise missile from an MK-41 launcher attached
§1651) and FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act
to flat-bed trailer. According to Pentagon sources, the
(P.L. 114-92, §1243) called on the Pentagon to study and
missile flew to more than 500 kilometers and provided data
plan for the development of possible military options. The
that would inform the development of future systems.
FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 115-91,
§1243) authorized funding for research into defenses,
counterforce capabilities, and countervailing capabilities
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty: What’s Next?
Issues in Asia
class of nuclear weapons.” Japanese officials also expressed
Several analysts have argued that the INF Treaty places the
concern, calling the withdrawal “undesirable” and noting
United States at a disadvantage when addressing challenges
that it could accelerate an arms race with Russia and China,
from China because China has deployed thousands of land-
and hinder progress toward North Korea’s denuclearization.
based intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles that
Press reports indicate that the United States had planned to
threaten U.S. forces and allies in Asia. Some, including
submit the official notice of withdrawal on December 4,
President Trump, have identified this imbalance as a part of
after the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting. It delayed this
the rationale for the U.S. to withdraw from the treaty.
for 60 days after the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel,
Others, however, have questioned whether the United
and other European leaders argued that the United States
States needs to deploy land-based missiles to address its
should allow time for additional consultations with Russia,
concerns with China. They note that the United States
in an effort to convince it to return to compliance.
should not simply mirror Chinese capabilities, as U.S.
missiles would not be intended to offset or attack Chinese
The Russian Response
missiles. In addition, the United States has limited access to
Russia has consistently denied that it has violated the INF
land areas in Asia that are within intermediate-range
Treaty and initially denied that the missile in question even
distances from China. It does enjoy far greater access to
existed. After the United States provided further details and
open ocean areas, which may argue for greater deployments
the designation for the missile, it denied that the missile had
at sea than on land. Those who support land-based
been tested to INF range. It has also accused the United
deployments respond by noting that sea-based and air-
States of violating the treaty by using intermediate-range
delivered capabilities would be both more expensive and
missiles as targets during tests of U.S. missile defense
more vulnerable than mobile land-based missiles and that
systems, employing armed drones, and by deploying
U.S. assets at sea are already burdened with expanding
missile defense interceptors on land in the Navy’s MK-41
missions and responsibilities.
missile launchers. (The United States has denied these
accusations.) Russian officials, including President Putin,
Allied Views
have asserted that if the United States withdraws from the
In the joint statement released after their December 4
treaty and deploys new missiles in Europe, Russia could
meeting, NATO foreign ministers stated that they “strongly
both respond in kind and, using existing capabilities, target
support the finding … that Russia is in material breach of
U.S. allies hosting new U.S. missiles in any subsequent
its obligations under the INF Treaty.” In a statement
military exchange.
released on February 1, 2019, the North Atlantic Council
U.S. and Russian officials met on January 15, 2019, in a
noted that Russia had “taken no demonstrable steps toward
last attempt to resolve the dispute. According to press
returning to full and verifiable compliance” and that
“
reports, Russian diplomats said that Russia would display
Russia will bear sole responsibility for the end of the
the 9M729 missile and demonstrate that it could not fly to
Treaty.” At the same time, the statement noted that the
“allies are firmly committed to the preservation o
INF range, while the United States, in exchange, could
f effective
demonstrate that the MK-41 launchers in Romania could
international arms control, disarmament and non-
proliferation” and
not be converted to launch INF-range cruise missiles. The
“will continue to uphold, support, and
United States rejected this proposal. Andrea Thompson, the
further strengthen arms control, disarmament and non-
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security.”
Security, noted that an inspection of the missile would not
Over the past few years, NATO, as a whole, has echoed
allow the United States to “confirm the distance that missile
U.S. concerns about Russia’s new missile, but some
can travel,” and that the “verifiable destruction of the non-
Members have expressed doubt about whether the United
compliant system” was the only way for Russia “to return
States had enough evidence to conclude that the missile
to compliance in a manner that we can confirm.” Moreover,
violated the INF Treaty. This lingering uncertainty was
although the United States has provided Russia with
evident as recently as October 2018, when, after a meeting
technical details to demonstrate that the MK-41 launchers
of NATO defense ministers, NATO’s Secretary General,
in Romania cannot launch offensive cruise missiles, it
Jens Stoltenberg, noted that Russia had failed to provide
would be unwilling to link Russia’s objections to U.S.
“any credible answers on this new missile.” He did not,
missile defense programs with the INF dispute by including
though, affirm the U.S. conclusion with the certainty
them in an inspection regime.
contained in the December 4 statement, stating, instead, that
After receiving the U.S. notice of withdrawal, Russia’s
the “allies agree that the most plausible assessment would
be that Russia is in violation of the Treaty.”
President Putin announced that Russia would also suspend

its participation in the INF Treaty. He also indicated that
According to press reports, U.S. allies in Europe and Asia
Russia would develop INF-range missiles—including a
were surprised by the President’s October 20
land-based version of the sea-based Kalibr cruise missile
announcement; several suggested that the United States
and hypersonic intermediate-range and shorter-range
exercise caution before withdrawing from the treaty. For
missiles—to counter new U.S. systems. However, he
example, Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas noted
indicated that Russia would only deploy intermediate-range
that the INF Treaty had been an “important pillar of our
systems in Europe or Asia after the United States deployed
European security architecture” for over 30 years and said
these types of weapons in these regions. It is not clear that
that “the United States should consider the consequences,
this pledge applies to the 9M729 cruise missile, as Russia
both for Europe and for future disarmament efforts, of
continues to deny that this missile can fly to INF range.
pulling out of an international treaty aimed at eliminating a
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty: What’s Next?

IF11051
Amy F. Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11051 · VERSION 7 · UPDATED

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