Updated August 22, 2019
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
For more than a decade, the United States has employed
Designated individuals include several current or former
sanctions as a policy tool in response to activities of the
Venezuelan officials. Some of the more recent sanctions
Venezuelan government and Venezuelan individuals. As
include then-Vice President Tareck el Aissami in 2017 and
Venezuela’s political and economic crisis under the
Pedro Luis Martin (a former senior intelligence official) and
leadership of Nicolás Maduro has deepened, the Trump
two associates in May 2018. Others designated include drug
Administration has significantly expanded sanctions.
trafficker Walid Makled, three dual Lebanese-Venezuelan
Currently, the Treasury Department has sanctions on 129
citizens allegedly involved in a drug money laundering
Venezuelan or Venezuelan-connected individuals and the
network, and several Colombian drug traffickers with
State Department has revoked the visas of hundreds of such
activity in Venezuela.
persons. The Trump Administration also has imposed
sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil company (Petróleos de
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic
Venezuela, S.A, or PdVSA), government, central bank,
Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption
gold industry, and other entities, and it is increasingly
In response to increasing repression in Venezuela, Congress
turning to secondary sanctions.
enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil
Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) in
Sanctions have increased pressure on the Maduro
2014. Among its provisions, the law requires the President
government, including accelerating the decline in
to impose sanctions (asset blocking and visa restrictions)
Venezuela’s oil production. However, sanctions have not
against those whom the President identifies as responsible
yet led to a political transition. Maduro remains in power,
for significant acts of violence or serious human rights
even though it has been eight months since the United
abuses or anyone who has ordered the arrest or prosecution
States recognized Juan Guidó, the head of Venezuela’s
of a person because of the person’s legitimate exercise of
National Assembly, as the country’s interim president and
freedom of expression or assembly. In 2016, Congress
ceased to recognize Maduro as the president of Venezuela.
extended this act through 2019 in P.L. 114-194.
Terrorism-Related Sanctions
In March 2015, President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to
Since 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual
implement P.L. 113-278, and the Treasury Department
determination that Venezuela is not “cooperating fully with
issued regulations in July 2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The
United States anti-terrorism efforts” pursuant to Section
E.O. targets (for asset blocking and visa restrictions) those
40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781). The
involved in actions or policies undermining democratic
most recent determination was made in May 2019. As a
processes or institutions; those involved in acts of violence
result, the United States has prohibited all U.S. commercial
or conduct constituting a serious human rights abuse; those
arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela since 2006.
taking actions that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise
of freedom of expression or peaceful assembly; public
In 2008, the Treasury Department imposed financial
corruption by senior Venezuelan officials; and any person
sanctions on two individuals and two travel agencies in
determined to be a current or former leader of any entity
Venezuela for providing financial support to the radical
engaged in any activity described above or a current or
Lebanon-based Islamic Shiite group Hezbollah. Pursuant to
former official of the government of Venezuela.
E.O. 13224, the action aimed to impede terrorist funding.
Currently, the Treasury Department has financial sanctions
Drug Trafficking-Related Sanctions
on 89 Venezuelans pursuant to E.O. 13692. Under the
Since 2005, pursuant to procedures in the Foreign Relations
Obama Administration, the Treasury Department froze the
Authorization Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228, §706; 22 U.S.C.
assets of seven Venezuelans—six members of Venezuela’s
2291j), the President has made an annual determination that
security forces and a prosecutor who repressed protesters.
Venezuela has failed demonstrably to adhere to its
Under the Trump Administration, the Treasury Department
obligations under international narcotics agreements.
currently has sanctions on an additional 82 Venezuelan
President Trump made the most recent determination for
officials, including President Maduro; his wife, Cecilia
FY2020 in August 2019 but waived foreign aid restrictions
Flores, and son, Nicolás Maduro Guerra; Executive Vice
for programs that support the interim government.
President Delcy Rodriguez; Diosdado Cabello (Socialist
party president); eight supreme court judges; the leaders of
The Treasury Department has imposed economic sanctions
Venezuela’s army, national guard, and national police; four
on at least 22 individuals with connections to Venezuela
state governors; the director of the Central Bank of
and 27 companies by designating them as Specially
Venezuela; and the foreign minister. On May 7, 2019, the
Designated Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign
Treasury Department lifted sanctions against the former
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120, Title
head of Venezuela’s intelligence service, General Manuel
VIII; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.).
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
Cristopher Figuera, who broke ranks with Maduro and is
Cuba’s state oil import and export company, due to Cuba’s
now in the United States.
continued support for the Maduro government.
Broader Sanctions on the Oil and Gold Sectors
Additional Financial Sanctions
On November 1, 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850,
President Trump has imposed financial sanctions on
setting forth a framework to block the assets of, and
Venezuela through three additional executive orders
prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by
because of the government’s serious human rights abuses
the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
and antidemocratic actions. In August 2017, he issued E.O.
Secretary of State, to operate in the gold sector (or any
13808, which prohibits access to the U.S. financial markets
other sector of the economy as determined in the future by
by the Venezuelan government, including PdVSA, with
the Secretary of the Treasury) or to be responsible for or
certain exceptions to minimize the impact on the
complicit in transactions involving deceptive practices or
Venezuelan people and U.S. interests.
corruption and the Venezuelan government. Currently, 16
individuals are sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 13850. They
In March 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13827 to
include five people sanctioned for involvement in a $2.4
prohibit transactions involving the Venezuelan
billion currency exchange corruption scheme; the president
government’s issuance of digital currency, coin, or token.
of the state gold mining company; and 10 individuals (5
Colombians) who siphoned millions of dollars from
In May 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13835, which
Venezuela’s emergency food distribution system.
prohibits transactions related to the purchase of Venezuelan
debt, including accounts receivable, and to any debt owed
On January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Treasury
to Venezuela pledged as collateral. The action intended to
Department designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector
deny corrupt Venezuelan officials the ability to improperly
of the Venezuelan economy, and Secretary of the Treasury
value and sell off public assets in return for kickbacks.
Steven Mnuchin determined that the company was subject
to U.S. sanctions. As a result, all property and interests in
August 2019 Sanctions
property of PdVSA subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked,
On August 5, 2019, President Trump issued E.O. 13884,
and U.S. persons (companies or individuals) generally are
blocking (freezing) the property and interests of the Maduro
prohibited from engaging in transactions with the company.
government in the United States and prohibiting U.S.
persons from engaging in transactions with the Maduro
At the same time, the Treasury Department’s Office of
government unless authorized by OFAC. E.O. 13884 also
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued general licenses to
authorized secondary sanctions (financial sanctions and visa
allow certain transactions and activities related to PdVSA
restrictions) on non-U.S. persons that assist or support the
and its subsidiaries, some for specified wind-down periods.
Maduro government, which could lead to U.S. sanctions on
OFAC first authorized transactions with U.S.-based PdVSA
foreign energy companies whose joint ventures with
subsidiaries, PDV Holding, Inc. (PDVH) and CITGO
PdVSA have kept Venezuela’s oil industry afloat. To allow
Holding, Inc. through July 27, 2019. In March 2019, the
continued humanitarian assistance to the Venezuelan
general license for those entities was extended for 18
people, OFAC issued licenses authorizing transactions
months. OFAC authorized PDVH, CITGO, and other U.S.
involving the delivery of food, agricultural commodities,
companies to import petroleum from PdVSA through April
and medicine; personal remittances; the work of
28, 2019, but payments had to be made to a blocked U.S.
international organizations; and communications services.
account. OFAC initially authorized several U.S. companies
with operations in Venezuela involving PdVSA (including
Policy Considerations
Chevron) to continue operating through July 27, 2019; that
There has been bipartisan support in Congress and the
authorization now extends through October 25, 2019.
international community for targeted sanctions against
Maduro officials, but opinions on broader economic
In March 2019, the Treasury Department expanded
sanctions vary. Some strongly support U.S. sanctions as a
sanctions pursuant to EO 13850. On March 11, it
way to increase economic pressure on the Maduro
sanctioned the Moscow-based Evrofinance Mosnarbank,
government, but others are concerned about the
(owned by Russia and Venezuela) for helping PdVSA
humanitarian effects of those sanctions. It is as yet unclear
funnel revenue from oil sales. On March 19, it sanctioned
whether the most recent sanctions will hinder ongoing
Venezuela’s state-owned gold sector company, Minerven,
efforts led by Norway to foster a negotiated solution to the
for using illicit gold operations to support Maduro. On
political crisis leading to free and fair elections. S. 1025
March 22, it sanctioned the state-affiliated Venezuelan
would codify many of the sanctions discussed this product.
Economic and Social Development Bank and subsidiaries
that the Maduro government uses to move money abroad.
See also U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Venezuela-
Related Sanctions,” at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
In April 2019, Treasury sanctioned six shipping companies
center/sanctions/programs/pages/venezuela.aspx; and U.S.
involved in transporting Venezuelan oil, five of which
Department of State, “Venezuela-Related Sanctions,” at
transported oil to Cuba. On April 17, Treasury sanctioned
https://www.state.gov/venezuela-related-sanctions/.
Venezuela’s central bank to cut off its access to U.S.
currency and limit its ability to conduct international
Also see CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political
financial transactions. On July 3, Treasury designated
Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS Report R44841, Venezuela:
Background and U.S. Relations
.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions

IF10715
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs


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