Updated August 16, 2019
Conflict in Mali
Mali faces intertwined security and governance challenges.
and resources, mutual distrust, and divergent priorities
The government signed a peace accord with northern
among states in the region have hampered its effectiveness.
separatist rebels in 2015, but key provisions remain un-
implemented. Signatory armed groups continue to assert
Figure 1. Mali at a Glance
territorial control in much of the vast desert north. At the
same time, Islamist insurgent groups have expanded from
the north into previously stable central Mali, leveraging
(and fomenting) interethnic violence and local resentment
toward state actors to recruit supporters. Islamist extremists
have also carried out attacks in and near the capital,
Bamako. In the center and northeast, civilian massacres by
ethnic militias—some of which appear to have the tacit
backing of state actors—have contributed to worsening
insecurity. Rebel, terrorist, communal, and criminal armed
networks are fluid and shifting, complicating conflict
resolution. Some Malians have proposed peace talks with
jihadist groups, but the idea remains controversial.
These challenges have severely undermined already
daunting development prospects in Mali, one of the world’s
poorest countries. Poverty, high population growth, poor
infrastructure, environmental factors, and conflict have
driven widespread food insecurity. Security threats and
limited donor funding have constrained humanitarian relief.
As of mid-2019, about 148,000 Malians were internally

displaced (roughly double the number in 2018) and nearly
Source: CRS graphic, drawn from CIA World Factbook and IMF; 2018
140,000 were refugees in neighboring states. Insecurity and
estimates unless noted.
a lack of basic services have impeded refugee returns.
President Ibrahim Boubacar Kéïta won reelection to a
Background: Mali’s 2011-2013 Crisis
second five-year term in 2018 in a vote featuring low
Between 2011 and 2013, a complex political, security, and
turnout and some procedural irregularities. Security threats
humanitarian crisis devastated Mali’s military, central
disrupted or prevented voting in hundreds of polling
government institutions, and northern populations. In 2011,
stations, many of them in central Mali. Kéïta’s margin of
members of the semi-nomadic Tuareg minority launched a
victory and the number of votes cast for him were lower
separatist rebellion in the north, leveraging fighters and
than in his 2013 election, which restored civilian
arms flowing from war-torn Libya. They were supported by
government after a military coup. Corruption scandals may
a local group linked to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
have undermined faith in Kéïta’s leadership among
(AQIM), an Algerian-led regional terrorist network and
members of his largely southern constituency, along with
U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). In
his government’s inability to improve living standards,
early 2012, soldiers angered by their leaders’ mishandling
ensure security, or reassert state control over the north.
of the war ousted Mali’s elected president in a coup. Amid
the ensuing military collapse, the northern rebels declared
Foreign troops have deployed to Mali in an effort to bolster
stability and counter terrorism. The mandate of the U.N.
an independent state of “Azawad.” By mid-2012, however,
AQIM and its local allies and offshoots had outmaneuvered
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
the separatists and asserted control over most of the north,
(MINUSMA) includes supporting the 2015 peace accord
and protecting civilians. Over 1,000 French troops are also
an area about the size of Texas. These events displaced
hundreds of thousands and exacerbated a regional
based in the country as part of Operation Barkhane, a
regional counterterrorism mission that grew out of France’s
humanitarian emergency spurred by a severe drought.
2013 military intervention in Mali. The European Union
In early 2013, citing a sudden southward jihadist advance,
(EU) has a multi-year program to train and restructure the
France deployed its military to oust jihadists from northern
Malian military. In 2017, the G5 Sahel—a regional
towns. The United States provided logistical support, while
grouping of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, and
Chadian soldiers aided French ground operations. Separatist
Chad—launched a “joint force” to counter security threats
rebels then reasserted control over some of the territory
in border regions. The initiative has received donor backing
vacated by Islamist groups. A mid-2013 ceasefire between
but has conducted few operations to date; a lack of capacity
the transitional government and separatist rebels paved the
way for elections and peace talks. MINUSMA deployed
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Conflict in Mali
and absorbed an African Union (AU) intervention force.
personnel in the north and center—as well as large attacks
Kéïta, a veteran politician, was elected in late 2013, and his
in the capital of Burkina Faso in March 2018. A June 2018
coalition won a majority in parliament.
JNIM attack on the G5 Sahel joint force headquarters in
A Stalled Peace Accord
central Mali led the command to relocate to Bamako. A
separate AQIM offshoot active in Mali has affiliated with
The signatories to the Algerian-mediated 2015 peace accord
the Islamic State and claimed the October 2017 deadly
are the Malian government and two rival northern armed
attack on U.S. soldiers in Niger.
group coalitions: the Coordination of Azawad Movements
(CMA), whose stronghold is in far-north Tuareg-majority
While Islamist violence has continued to expand, civilian
Kidal, and the Platform, rooted in the more ethnically
deaths attributable to intercommunal violence surpassed
diverse northeast. The CMA includes former separatist
those from Islamist militants in 2019, according to open-
factions, while the Platform includes groups that opposed
source analysis by the Armed Conflict Location & Event
the separatist cause in 2012. They have periodically fought
Data Project. Ethnic militias have carried out a series of
each other, and the Platform is sometimes seen as a
civilian massacres since 2017, sometimes in the course of
government proxy. Various new factions have emerged
ostensible counterterrorism operations; some militias
since 2015, with differing views on the accord and the state.
appear to benefit from the support of state actors. Ethnic tit-
for-tat killings may further fuel recruitment by Islamist
The agreement commits the government to greater political
armed groups that offer a means of self-defense and
decentralization and increased development in the north, in
retribution. Malian soldiers also have been implicated in
exchange for armed groups ruling out territorial separation.
serious abuses during counterinsurgency operations.
The armed groups also committed to disarm, and
U.N. Peacekeeping Operation
potentially integrate into state security forces. Other
provisions also aim to foster northern representation in the
MINUSMA is authorized at up to 15,209 military and
central government, justice and security sector reforms, and
police personnel. Renewing its mandate in June 2019, the
investigation of past abuses. Designated terrorist groups
Security Council decided that MINUSMA’s “second
strategic priority”—
(including Malian-led groups) were not party to the talks;
after support for implementation of the
discussion of federalism or altering the secular structure of
2015 accord—is to “facilitate” a new strategy to protect
the state were ruled out by mediators and Bamako.
civilians, reduce intercommunal violence, and reestablish
state authority in central Mali, followed by other tasks.
International hopes that the peace process would lead to
MINUSMA faces stark logistical challenges and has had
deep political reforms and isolate jihadist actors have yet to
the highest annual fatality rate among current U.N.
be fulfilled. Signatory armed groups have yet to demobilize,
peacekeeping missions. Many of the top troop contributors
while steps toward decentralization, structural reforms,
are other African countries, and they have borne the brunt
accountability, and infrastructure improvements in the north
of fatalities. MINUSMA does not have an explicit mandate
have been slow to nonexistent. A lack of capacity and
to conduct counterterrorism operations, despite requests
flagging political will on the part of the government and
from Mali, the G5, and the AU that it be authorized to do
armed group signatories are key factors, as are actions by
so. The Security Council has authorized MINUSMA to
spoilers, including jihadists, to undermine peace.
provide logistical support to the G5 force, but—reflecting
The structure of the 2015 peace process arguably contained
stated U.S. concerns—only on a cost-reimbursable basis.
the seeds of Mali’s continued destabilization. Many
U.S. Policy and Aid
signatories are veterans of past conflicts who have cycled
U.S. officials have emphasized the importance of
through the government, military, and militias for decades.
implementing the 2015 peace accord as a step toward
The parties were asked to make concessions highly
greater stability. U.S. bilateral aid, totaling $140 million in
unpopular with their respective constituencies. Granting
FY2018, supports development, health, conflict mitigation,
largely Tuareg- and Arab-led armed groups a seat at the
governance, and military professionalization programs. The
table also arguably incentivized taking up arms in the name
United States also provides humanitarian aid ($82 million
of communal grievances, while alienating those who felt
in FY2018), financial support for MINUSMA ($317 million
themselves to be victims of both the state and ethnic Tuareg
in FY2018), military training and equipment for African
and Arab rivals (such as ethnic Fulani communities in
troops preparing to deploy with MINUSMA, military aid
central and northeastern Mali). U.N. sanctions monitors
for G5 Sahel members ($111 million pledged to date) and
have alleged involvement by some signatory armed group
logistical support for French operations.
elements in terrorism, drug trafficking, and ethnic conflict.
Islamist Insurgency
Mali participates in the State Department-led Trans-Sahara
Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), but it has not been
Despite territorial losses in 2013, Islamist armed groups
a major regional recipient of U.S. military aid since the
have proven resilient, withstanding French strikes and
2012 coup. Mali is also not expected to be a top recipient of
exploiting the evolving conflict to their advantage. In 2015,
U.S. aid to the G5 Sahel. Instead, U.S. security assistance
AQIM and its offshoot Al Murabitoun (“the sentinels”)
since 2012 has focused on defense sector reform and
jointly claimed a siege at a Bamako hotel in which 19
building the counterterrorism capacity of civilian security
civilians—including an American—were killed. In 2017,
AQIM’s Sahel branch
forces, while other countries in the G5 Sahel have received
merged with Al Murabitoun and two
sizable U.S. military training and equipment by regional
other Mali-based groups to form the Union for Supporting
standards. Mali is designated under the Child Soldiers
Islam and Muslims (JNIM, after its Arabic acronym). Iyad
Prevention Act of 2008 (Title IV of P.L. 110-457) and is
Ag Ghaly, a Malian Tuareg, heads the coalition. JNIM has
thus subject to legal restrictions on certain U.S. security
since claimed attacks on U.N., French, and local state
assistance, absent a presidential waiver.
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Conflict in Mali

IF10116
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs


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