
 
 
Updated August 14, 2019
Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions
On August 6, 2018, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo 
Administration expelled 60 officials intelligence operatives 
determined that in March 2018 the government of Russia 
and closed the Russian consulate in Seattle.  
used a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom in 
contravention of international law. This finding triggered 
In September 2018, British authorities charged two 
requirements under the Chemical and Biological Weapons 
individuals for the attack. British Prime Minister Theresa 
Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act; 
May said that the suspects “are officers from the Russian 
title III, P.L. 102-182; 22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.).  
military intelligence service, also known as the GRU.” In 
December 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
The CBW Act requires the President to impose economic 
imposed sanctions on the two individuals charged in the 
and diplomatic measures that first cut off foreign aid, arms 
attack for acting on behalf of the GRU. 
sales, and export licenses for controlled goods, services, 
and technology, and ratchet up in intensity if certain 
Russian authorities deny involvement in the attack and 
conditions are not met within 90 days. As of August 2019, 
possession of chemical weapons. In reference to Skripal, 
the United States has imposed two rounds of sanctions on 
however, Russian President Vladimir Putin said months 
Russia as required by the CBW Act. 
after the attack that “traitors must be punished.” 
The United States also imposes sanctions against Russia for 
The CBW Control and Warfare 
other reasons. See CRS In Focus IF10779, U.S. Sanctions 
Elimination Act 
on Russia: An Overview, and CRS Report R45415, U.S. 
Secretary Pompeo’s August 6, 2018, finding that a foreign 
Sanctions on Russia. 
government has used a chemical agent as a weapon 
triggered policy actions required by the CBW Act.  
The Poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal 
On March 4, 2018, in Salisbury, United Kingdom, British 
First Round of Sanctions 
citizen Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military 
When such a finding is made, the CBW Act first requires 
intelligence officer once imprisoned in Russia for allegedly 
the President (who, in 1993, delegated CBW Act authorities 
working as a UK double agent, his daughter, and a police 
to the Secretary of State) to  
officer were exposed to a highly toxic and potentially lethal 
  terminate foreign assistance other than that which 
chemical weapon agent. In July 2018, British media 
addresses urgent humanitarian situations or provides 
reported that another British citizen died after she and her 
food, agricultural commodities, or agricultural products; 
partner allegedly came into contact with a bottle containing 
the nerve agent. British authorities identified the substance 
  terminate arms sales;  
as a Novichok, an advanced nerve agent originally 
  terminate export licenses for U.S. Munitions List 
developed in the Soviet Union.    
(USML) items;  
  terminate foreign military financing; 
On March 15, 2018, President Trump and leaders of the 
UK, France, and Germany issued a joint statement 
  deny credit, credit guarantees, or other financial 
condemning the chemical attack, calling it “the first 
assistance from the U.S. government, including Export-
offensive use of a nerve agent in Europe since the Second 
Import Bank programs; and 
World War” and its use by a state party “a clear violation of 
  deny export licenses for goods or technology controlled 
the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] and a breach of 
for national security reasons (Commodity Control List). 
international law.” 
[CBW Act, Section 307(a); 22 U.S.C. 5605(a)] 
The CBW Act requires the imposition “forthwith” of these 
In April 2018, the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons “confirm[ed] the findings of the United 
sanctions on determining that a chemical weapon has been 
Kingdom relating to the identity” of the Novichok agent 
used. On August 27, 2018, Assistant Secretary of State for 
and noted that it “was of high purity.” 
International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher 
On April 12, 2018, 
the Trump Administration said it agreed “that Russia is 
Ford announced the imposition of this first round of 
sanctions but invoked national security waiver authority to 
responsible for the attack on UK soil using a chemical 
allow for the continuation of 
weapon—either through deliberate use or through its failure 
to declare and secure its stocks of this nerve agent.” 
  foreign assistance; 
  exports related to government space cooperation and 
In response to the attack, the UK, the United States, and at 
commercial space launches; and 
least 26 other countries expelled over 150 Russian 
  export licensing for national security-sensitive goods 
diplomats. Britain expelled 23 diplomats. The Trump 
and technology in specific categories, including exports 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions 
related to civil aviation safety, deemed exports or 
prohibited from participating in the secondary market for 
reexports, wholly owned U.S. and other foreign 
Russian sovereign debt. Prohibitions do not apply to 
subsidiaries operating in Russia, and commercial end-
transactions with Russian state-owned enterprises. 
users for commercial purposes. 
On August 2, the State Department announced the pending 
Second Round of Sanctions 
imposition of these sanctions, as well as a third: the 
Within three months after the initial determination (in this 
Department of Commerce would implement a “presumption 
case, by early November 2018), the CBW Act required the 
of denial” policy for export licenses for goods controlled 
President to take additional punitive steps unless he 
for their dual-use chemical and biological applications.  
determined and certified to Congress that Russia 
According to the State Department, the banking and export 
  “is no longer using chemical or biological weapons in 
restrictions enter into effect on or around August 19, 2019, 
violation of international law or using lethal chemical or 
biological weapons against its own nationals,”
and “could curtail Russia’s access to billions of dollars of 
 
bilateral commercial activity with the United States.” 
  “has provided reliable assurances that it will not in the 
future engage in any such activities, and” 
CBW-related sanctions remain in place for at least a year, 
  “is willing to allow on-site inspections by United 
and may be removed only after the President determines 
Nations observers or other internationally recognized, 
and certifies to Congress that the three conditions stated 
impartial observers, or other reliable means exist, to 
above have been met and that Russia is making restitution 
ensure that that government is not using chemical or 
to those affected by the use of the chemical weapon. 
biological weapons in violation of international law and 
is not using lethal chemical or biological weapons 
Lifting or Waiving CBW-Related 
against its own nationals….” [CBW Act, §307(b)(1); 22 
Sanctions 
U.S.C. 5605(b)(1)] 
The CBW Act authorizes the President to waive sanctions if 
he finds it essential to U.S. national security interests to do 
If the President could not certify on all these terms, he was 
so or if he finds that the violating government has 
required to execute, in consultation with Congress, at least 
undergone fundamental changes in its leadership and 
three additional measures among the following: 
policies. 
  oppose loans or financial or technical assistance to 
 
Russia by international financial institutions (IFIs); 
On August 2, 2019, the State Department stated that 
 
sanctions affecting bank loans would be waived in all 
prohibit U.S. banks from making loans or providing 
respects other than for lending non-ruble denominated 
credit to the Russian government, except for the 
funds to the Russian sovereign and participating in the 
purchase of food, or other agricultural commodities or 
primary market for non-ruble denominated bonds issued by 
products; 
the Russian sovereign. It also said that Commerce would 
  prohibit exports to Russia of all other goods and 
deny export licenses only for those chemical and biological 
technology, except food and other agricultural 
goods it controlled for weapons proliferation reasons. 
commodities and products; 
Finally, the State Department said that exports would 
  restrict importation into the United States of articles that 
continue for space cooperation and commercial space 
are of Russia-origin growth, product, or manufacture;  
launches, civil aviation safety, commercial end-users for 
  downgrade or suspend diplomatic relations; and 
civil end-uses, U.S. and foreign wholly owned subsidiaries 
operating in Russia, and deemed export licenses for Russian 
  set in motion the suspension of foreign air carriers 
owned or controlled by Russia “to engage in foreign air 
nationals working in the United States. 
transportation to or from the United States.” 
Earlier CBW Determinations 
[§307(b)(2); 22 U.S.C. 5605(b)(2)] 
The CBW Act has been invoked on two other occasions. 
On November 6, 2018, the State Department informed 
On August 2, 2013, the State Department determined that 
Congress that it “could not certify that Russia met the 
the government of Syria had used chemical weapons, but 
required conditions” and intends “to proceed in accordance 
for national security reasons sanctions decisions would be 
with the terms of the CBW Act, which directs the 
applied on a case-by-case basis. 
implementation of additional sanctions.” 
On February 22, 2018, the Secretary of State determined 
The Administration took its next steps on August 1-2, 2019. 
that the government of North Korea was responsible for the 
On August 1, President Trump issued Executive Order 
lethal 2017 nerve agent attack on Kim Jong Nam, the half-
13883 to require the Secretary of the Treasury to implement 
brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, in Malaysia. 
measures, “when necessary,” affecting international 
Sanctions that were largely redundant with restrictions 
financing and access to U.S. bank loans. On August 2, 
already in place went into effect on March 5, 2018. 
Treasury issued a directive (the “CBW Act Directive”) 
specifying that the latter measures prohibit U.S. banks from 
Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy 
“lending non-ruble denominated funds to the Russian 
Legislation   
sovereign” and participating “in the primary market for 
Cory Welt, Analyst in European Affairs   
non-ruble denominated bonds issued by the Russian 
IF10962
sovereign.” According to Treasury, U.S. banks are not 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions 
 
 
Disclaimer 
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to 
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. 
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has 
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10962 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED