Updated August 12, 2019
Algeria: In Focus
Large peaceful protests in Algeria have upended the
fourth five-year term in 2014 despite having suffered a
established political order since early 2019 and ushered in a
stroke that appeared to leave him physically debilitated.
new era of uncertainty. The protests first erupted in
Figure 1. Algeria at a Glance
February in response to then-President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika’s decision to seek a fifth term despite his evident
ill health and advanced age (81 at the time). Bouteflika
withdrew his reelection bid in March, then stepped down on
April 2 after military chief of staff General Ahmed Gaïd
Salah—a onetime ally—called for his impeachment.
Elections were originally scheduled for April 2019.
Following Bouteflika’s resignation, Algeria’s parliament
recognized Senate leader Abdelkader Bensalah as interim
president, with elections to be held within 90 days, in line
with constitutional succession provisions. In June, however,
Algeria’s Constitutional Council canceled elections planned
Source: CRS graphic; data from CIA World Factbook + IMF (2018).
for July 4 after disqualifying the only two candidates who
The bicameral parliament is institutionally weak and
had registered. Protesters have continued to take to the
dominated by two parties that backed Bouteflika: the
streets to demand more comprehensive political changes,
National Liberation Front (FLN), which led Algeria’s fight
albeit with few signs of consensus over process or outcome.
for independence and was the sole legal party for decades,
No clear road map has emerged to end the stalemate
and the National Rally for Democracy (RND), considered
between the street and the interim authorities, and it
close to the military. The political opposition is diverse and
remains unclear who might credibly negotiate one. General
divided, comprising leftist, Islamist, Berber-led, and
Gaïd Salah has positioned himself as a key power-broker
regionally focused groups. Many parties exhibit internal
without explicitly seizing control; Bensalah remains in
divisions. Some analysts argue that political Islam has been
office past the expiration of his 90-day mandate. Law
discredited in Algeria due to Islamists’ role in the 1990s
enforcement bodies have simultaneously arrested prominent
civil conflict, or—alternatively—due to some Islamist
business leaders, military intelligence officials, and
politicians’ accommodation with the state. The Islamic
politicians, mostly on anticorruption charges; some, but not
Salvation Front (FIS), whose rapid electoral gains in 1991
all, were seen as close to Bouteflika.
sparked a military coup and the subsequent conflict,
Politics: Context
remains banned. Religiously conservative Salafist social
movements have grown in prominence since the conflict.
Algeria withstood regional turmoil between 2011 and 2018,
but the prospect of an uncertain leadership transition
Terrorism and Counterterrorism
loomed large as members of the “revolutionary generation”
Internal security has improved markedly since the civil
that fought for independence aged or passed away. The
conflict of the 1990s. Today, cells linked to Al Qaeda and
political system under Bouteflika was defined by a strong
the Islamic State (IS) are reportedly active in some areas,
presidency and security apparatus, a state-centric economy,
but the pace of terrorist attacks has continuously decreased.
and social welfare programs fueled by oil and natural gas
State security forces conduct frequent counterterrorism
revenues. Decision-making was widely viewed as diffuse
operations, and they have bolstered their presence in border
and opaque, with politicians, military and intelligence
regions since the outbreak of wars in Libya and Mali in
officers, and business leaders reportedly wielding influence
2011. The government also runs de-radicalization programs
(and engaging in rivalry) behind the scenes. This system
and has sought to control the content of religious sermons.
brought relative stability and living standard improvements
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) originated as an
to a country wracked by internal conflict in the 1990s. Yet
insurgent faction in Algeria’s 1990s conflict and aligned
in recent years, analysts observed “political paralysis” due
to a lack of elite consensus over “
itself with Al Qaeda in 2006. An AQIM splinter faction
the post-Bouteflika era.”
claimed an assault in 2013 on a natural gas plant in
Bouteflika was first elected president in 1999, with military
southeastern Algeria in which 39 foreigners (including
backing, as Algeria’s decade-long counterinsurgency
three Americans) were killed. AQIM’s leader reportedly
against armed Islamist groups was winding down. He
remains based in northeast Algeria, but the group’s center
introduced reconciliation initiatives and sought to exert
of gravity has moved south and east over the past decade. In
greater presidential control over the army and powerful
2017, AQIM’s southern branch joined a Malian-led
military intelligence service. Bouteflika was reelected to a
coalition known as the Group for Supporting Islam and
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Algeria: In Focus
Muslims (JNIM after its transliterated Arabic name). AQIM
due to a rivalry for regional influence and opposing views
elements and offshoots are also active in Libya and Tunisia.
regarding the disputed territory of Western Sahara.
Morocco claims Western Sahara and administers most of it;
In 2014, an IS affiliate known as Jund al Khilafah (“soldiers
of the caliphate”)
Algeria hosts and backs the Polisario Front, which seeks
emerged in northern Algeria and
independence for the territory. Algeria participated in U.N.-
beheaded a French tourist. Algerian security forces
led talks on Western Sahara in 2018 and early 2019, but
reportedly killed the group’s leader the following year and
does not consider itself a party to the dispute.
they appear to have been effective in preventing the further
spread of IS-linked groups within the country.
Algeria mediated Mali’s 2015 peace accord and has backed
Algerian Islamist “foreign fighters” were prominent in the
the U.N.-led political process in Libya. Given its large
Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq in the 1980s-2000s.
military, financial resources, and aversion to Western direct
Relatively few Algerians reportedly joined the Islamic State
intervention, Algeria has also periodically sought to
at its height in Syria (2014-2015), however, compared to
coordinate a regional response to terrorism and other cross-
flows from neighboring Tunisia and Morocco. At one time,
border security threats in the Sahel region. Yet the
26 Algerians were held at the U.S. base in Guantánamo;
country’s complex and often distrustful relations with
nearly all have been repatriated or sent to third countries.
neighboring states have hindered cooperation, as has the
The Economy and Energy Sector
leadership’s current focus on domestic political questions.
Algeria has the world’s 11th-largest proven natural gas
Algeria’s foreign policy has often conflicted with that of the
reserves and 16th-largest proven oil reserves, and is the 8th-
United States; for example, Algeria has close ties to Russia,
largest natural gas exporter. It is also estimated to have the
is highly critical of Israel, opposed the 2011 NATO-led
world’s 3rd-largest recoverable shale gas reserves. Over half
intervention in Libya, and maintains relations with the Asad
of the formal economy is reportedly comprised of state-
government in Syria. With regard to Western Sahara, the
owned enterprises, led by the national oil and gas company
United States has recognized neither Morocco’s claim of
Sonatrach. Most of Algeria’s natural gas exports go to
sovereignty nor the Polisario’s self-proclaimed Sahrawi
Europe, by pipeline or ship. Italy is Algeria’s top export
Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which Algeria
destination and China its top source of imports.
recognizes as an independent state. The United States has
backed U.N.-led talks on the territory’s final status.
Prior to 2014, high global energy prices allowed Algeria to
accrue large foreign exchange reserves, which financed its
U.S. Relations
large military and social programs that arguably assuaged
Like its predecessors, the Trump Administration has
domestic dissent. Since then, the drop in global prices has
emphasized the value of U.S.-Algerian cooperation to
caused fiscal deficits and prompted new concerns about the
counter terrorism (notably via information sharing and
sustainability of Algeria’s economic model. The country’s
coordination in multilateral forums) and respond to crises in
foreign reserves declined by more than half between 2014
Libya and Mali, while occasionally criticizing Algeria’s
and 2018, according to the IMF, while its “oil stabilization
challenging business environment. Algeria’s reliance on
fund” decreased from $20 billion to about $7 billion as of
Russia for most of its defense acquisitions remains a point
late 2017. The IMF also has documented rising un-
of friction, though Algeria has increased its purchases of
employment (which is higher among youth), and criticized
U.S. equipment in recent years. U.S. foreign direct
Algeria’s reliance on monetary expansion to finance deficit
investment (FDI) stocks totaled $3.6 billion as of 2018
spending. (Algeria does not borrow from the IMF.)
(latest), concentrated in the energy sector.
Algerian leaders have called for diversification and more
During a visit to Algiers in 2018, Deputy Secretary of State
foreign investment, but reforms that could encourage such
John Sullivan emphasized the United States’ “commitment
outcomes have not advanced. Foreign investment projects
to strengthening and broadening U.S.-Algerian relations.”
are required to be 51% locally owned, there are limits on
In early 2019, the Administration hosted a high-level U.S.-
capital flows and currency exchange, and the process of
Algeria Strategic Dialogue, which had last convened in
setting up a business is “heavily bureaucratic,” according to
2015. Officials also meet regularly for bilateral
the State Department. Analysts further point to the absence
counterterrorism and joint military consultations. U.S.
of a modern financial market and an underdeveloped stock
educational and cultural exchange programs seek to build
exchange and banking system. The government imposed
relations with young Algerians and other emergent actors.
import restrictions in 2017, causing trade to plummet and
U.S. bilateral aid in FY2018 comprised $1.3 million for
possibly fueling inflation and smuggling. Weak
International Military Education and Training (IMET) and
infrastructure linkages with neighboring countries and the
$0.8 million for Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining,
closure of the border with Morocco since 1994 also
and Related Programs (NADR). The Administration has
arguably inhibit growth. Algeria has applied to join the
requested similar funding for FY2020. Additional regional
World Trade Organization (WTO) but has yet to qualify.
or global funds have periodically been provided to promote
Foreign Policy and Regional Issues
economic growth, strengthen civil society, and counter
Algeria’s foreign policy emphasizes sovereignty and
violent extremism. Algeria participates in the State
noninterference; skepticism of Western powers and NATO
Department-led Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
is a legacy of its history of French colonization (1848-1962)
Partnership (TSCTP), but has not been a top recipient of aid
and armed struggle for independence. Algeria’s defense
under the program and appears to prefer bilateral activities.
budget (about $10 billion in recent years) is the largest in
In contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, Congress has not granted
Africa, though longstanding policy prohibits deployments
specific authority to the Department of Defense to aid
beyond its borders. Relations with Morocco remain tense
Algeria in securing its border with Libya.
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Algeria: In Focus
IF11116
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
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