August 1, 2019
U.S. Military Presence in Poland
Introduction
elements of a rotational Army Armored Brigade Combat
Poland has been a major focus of U.S. and NATO efforts to
Team (ABCT) and support units;
deter potential Russian aggression in Europe. This is in part
an Army Aviation Task Force;
due to its geographic location situated on NATO’s eastern
flank, providing land access to the Baltic States. Although
an approximately 750 person Army Logistics Task
Ukraine is not a NATO ally, the Russian annexation of
Force based in Poland but with logistics hubs also in
Crimea in 2014 and subsequent initiation of a proxy war in
Lithuania and Romania;
Eastern Ukraine underscored to many international security
observers that NATO allies, particularly those in Eastern
a U.S. Air Force Detachment at Lask, Poland; and
Europe, could once again be threatened by Moscow. In
a U.S. Navy Detachment in Redzikowo, Poland working
response, the United States and its NATO allies have
on the Aegis Ashore missile defense site as part of
undertaken a number of initiatives to underscore NATO’s
NATO Missile Defense efforts.
collective defense agreements, thereby assuring allies of
their own security while simultaneously deterring Russian
The U.S.-led NATO Enhanced Forward Presence Battle
aggression. Poland is a critical partner in these efforts.
Group stationed in Orzysz, Poland, includes a 889-soldier
Armored Cavalry Squadron from the Vilseck, Germany-
The United States has bolstered security in Central and
based U.S. Army 2nd Cavalry Regiment.
Eastern Europe with an increased rotational military
presence, additional exercises and training with allies and
U.S.-Poland Joint Declaration
partners, improved infrastructure to allow greater
responsiveness, enhanced prepositioning of U.S.
On June 12, 2019, the United States and Poland signed a
equipment, and intensified efforts to build partner capacity
Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation Regarding
for newer NATO members and other non-NATO countries.
United States Force Posture in the Republic of Poland. The
The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), launched in 2014
declaration proposes adding an additional 1,000 U.S.
(originally called the European Reassurance Initiative), an
rotational military personnel. The Joint Declaration
Overseas Contingency Operations account in the defense
proposes establishing the following:
budget, is the key fiscal mechanism by which it does so.
An Army Division Headquarters (Forward). This could
U.S. military operational activities of EDI are executed as
build on the existing Mission Command Element by
part of Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR). Approximately
adding additional staff and command, control,
6,000 U.S. military personnel are involved in OAR at any
communications, and intelligence, and planning
given time, with units typically operating in the region
capabilities.
under a rotational nine-month deployment.
A joint U.S./Polish Combat Training Center (CTC) in
A key strategic question facing policymakers in the
Drawsko Pomorskie and other locations in Poland.
executive branch and Congress is whether existing efforts
are sufficient, or whether more should be done to militarily
A U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Intelligence, Surveillance, and
reinforce Europe generally, and Poland specifically. This
Reconnaissance Squadron to share information, as
discussion was in part prompted in 2018, when the Polish
appropriate, with Poland.
government, which is in favor of an increased U.S. presence
An Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) to support the
on its territory, released a proposal under which it would
movement of forces for training or contingency
contribute $2 billion toward establishing a U.S. military
operations.
base in Poland.
An Army Area Support Group (ASG) to provide
Current U.S. Rotational Forces in Poland
maintenance and supply support to current and future
As of June 2019, the United States had a rotational military
U.S. forces in Poland.
presence in Poland of approximately 4,500 personnel,
A U.S. special operations forces capability in Poland to
including those involved in OAR, U.S. forces involved in
support, air, ground, and maritime operations. It is
NATO Missile Defense efforts, and forces assigned to one
unclear if this capability is intended to be for command
of four NATO Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Groups.
and control and planning purposes only, an actual
U.S. OAR forces and NATO Missile Defense forces in
operational capability, or a combination of both.
Poland include
Infrastructure to support the presence of an Army
an Army division-level Mission Command Element
ABCT, an Army Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB), and
(MCE) in Poznan, Poland;
an Army Combat Sustainment Support Battalion.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.S. Military Presence in Poland
Permanent Basing vs. Rotational Forces?
NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable
Several observers have asserted that it might be more
security environment, the Alliance will carry out its
politically reassuring and financially efficient to
collective defence and other missions by ensuring the
permanently station these “heel-to-toe” rotational forces in
necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for
Poland. Such observers look to the experience of the Cold
reinforcement rather than by additional permanent
War; permanent stationing of conventional forces and their
stationing of substantial combat forces.
families in Europe had the effect of ensuring that the United
Accordingly, the enhanced NATO presence has been
States could have “skin in the game” in the event that
referred to as “continuous,” but rotational. Proponents of
hostilities broke out, and that Washington would respond
extended permanent basing assert that the “current security
accordingly. As the logic goes, permanently stationing U.S.
environment” has changed considerably since 1997, largely
forces in Poland today could have a similar deterrent
due to Russian activities, and that NATO should therefore
impact. Those in favor of permanent basing also note that
no longer be constrained by the NRFA.
understanding the region’s human and geographic terrain
requires forces that are present for longer than nine months.
Figure 1. Poland and Its Environs
Others contend that these rotations force military units in
the continental United States to routinely test their ability to
deploy to other theaters and exercise critical logistics and
mobility capabilities. According to this view, after nearly
20 years of expeditionary operations in the Middle East
region, the skills and capabilities necessary to mass U.S.
forces onto the European continent and transit them to the
front lines have not been sufficiently trained and exercised.
Heel-to-toe rotations could also allow U.S. forces to
develop those skills while simultaneously identifying and
developing solutions to logistical issues in Eastern Europe
that might slow down a U.S./NATO response to a crisis.
From a military standpoint, most observers contend that
regardless of whether forces are permanent or rotational,
Source: CRS. Data from U.S. Department of State.
exercising these capabilities is critical. In the event of war
on the European continent, the United States may choose to
Burden (Cost) Sharing?
flow significant additional forces across the Atlantic, an
Some observers, including President Trump, contend that
undertaking that would be complex under optimal
European allies have not invested sufficient resources in
circumstances, and exponentially more so under conditions
their militaries, and that, as a result, the United States has
of war, when an adversary might seek to actively prevent
shouldered too much of the financial burden associated with
the arrival of U.S. service members and equipment (“Anti-
Europe’s defense. Such observers often note that most of
Access/Area Denial”). Some officials have also expressed
NATO’s allies in Europe have yet to meet a pledge made in
that the United States’ ability to move equipment in a
Wales in 2014 to increase their defense budgets to 2% of
timely fashion, in particular heavy tanks and fighting
GDP by 2024. According to NATO, Poland’s defense
vehicles, from U.S. bases to the ports from which the
expenditures were 2.05% of GDP in 2018. The Polish
equipment is shipped, is an area that requires improvement.
government plans to gradually increase defense spending to
Concerns Regarding Russian Reactions?
2.5% of GDP by 2030.
Much of the concern regarding U.S. forces in Poland
Congressional Response
centers on how Russia might interpret, or respond, to those
Congress has raised questions regarding the issue of
forces. This calculation is complicated by Kaliningrad, a
permanently stationing U.S forces in Poland. Section 1280
5,800-square-mile Russian exclave wedged between Poland
of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act
and Lithuania. Kaliningrad is a key strategic territory for
for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-232) required the Secretary
Russia, allowing the country to project military power into
of Defense to report to the congressional defense
NATO’s northern flank. The territory has a heavy Russian
committees on the “feasibility and advisability” of
military presence, including the Baltic Fleet and two
permanently stationing U.S. forces in Poland by March
airbases. Russia has repeatedly deployed Iskander short-
2019 (as of July 31, 2019, the report had not yet been
range nuclear-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, and reports
submitted). In a House Armed Services Committee hearing
indicated that a new deployment in February 2018 could be
on March 13, 2019, acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
permanent.
for International Security Affairs Kathryn Wheelbarger
Some analysts express concern that additional U.S. forces
stated that the negotiations with Poland about a possible
in Poland could escalate tensions in and around
permanent U.S. base were underway.
Kaliningrad. NATO continues to resist calls to deploy
troops permanently in countries that joined after the
For additional information, see CRS Report R45784,
collapse of the Soviet Union due to concerns in some
Poland: Background and U.S. Relations, by Derek E. Mix.
member states that this would violate the terms of the 1997
NATO-Russia Founding Act (NRFA), which states,
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Kathleen J. McInnis, Specialist in International Security
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.S. Military Presence in Poland
IF11280
Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11280 · VERSION 1 · NEW