
Updated June 28, 2019
Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2020
Violent criminal organizations have threatened security and
and (3) institution building. U.S. assistance and intelligence
governance in parts of Mexico for more than a decade. This
supported Mexico’s strategy of arresting (and extraditing)
situation affects U.S. security interests, particularly in the
kingpins from each of the major TCOs, but this strategy
Southwest border region. Although the illicit drug trade has
also fueled violence, as fractured criminal groups fought to
long been prevalent in Mexico, violence has escalated as
regroup and reorganize. Congress withheld 15% of certain
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) have fought for
U.S. aid for the Mexican military and police until the State
control of smuggling routes into the United States.
Department submitted an annual report stating that Mexico
was taking steps to meet human rights requirements.
In 2007, Mexico and the United States created the Mérida
Initiative, a security and rule-of-law partnership to address
The Four-Pillar Strategy:
drug trafficking and crime. Through this partnership, which
FY2011-FY2017
has since been the centerpiece of bilateral security
The Obama and Calderón Administrations broadened the
cooperation, both countries have invested in a broad range
scope of bilateral efforts to a four-pillar strategy that
of efforts to combat transnational crime and its
prioritized institution building. In 2012, incoming Mexican
consequences. U.S. appropriations for the Mérida Initiative
President Enrique Peña Nieto initially scaled back U.S.
since FY2008 (some $3.0 billion) have constituted only 2%
involvement in some law enforcement operations. By mid-
of Mexico’s total security budget but have enabled the U.S.
2013, however, the U.S. and Mexican governments agreed
government to help shape Mexico’s policies.
to focus on these four pillars:
The Mérida Initiative has strengthened U.S.-Mexican law
1. Combating TCOs through intelligence
enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing.
sharing and law enforcement operations;
Nevertheless, homicides in Mexico and opioid-related
2. Institutionalizing the rule of law while
deaths in the United States have surged. Against that
protecting human rights through justice
backdrop, the Mérida Initiative may change its emphasis
sector reform, forensic equipment and
under Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador.
training, and federal- and state-level
López Obrador, a populist, won 53% of the vote and
police and corrections reform;
captured a legislative majority in elections held on July 1,
3. Creating a 21st century U.S.-Mexican
2018. Six months in to his six-year term, President López
border, while improving immigration
Obrador remains extremely popular.
enforcement in Mexico and security along
Origins of the Mérida Initiative
Mexico’s southern borders; and,
Prior to FY2007, Mexico did not receive large amounts of
4. Building strong and resilient
U.S. antidrug assistance, partially due to Mexican
communities by piloting approaches to
sensitivity about U.S. involvement in the country’s internal
address root causes of violence and
affairs. In March 2007, then-Mexican President Felipe
supporting efforts to reduce drug demand
Calderón asked for U.S. assistance in combating drug and
and build a “culture of lawfulness”
weapons trafficking. In response to this historic request, the
through education programs.
George W. Bush and Calderón Administrations proposed
Some analysts praised the wide-ranging cooperation
the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counter-drug and
between the governments; others criticized the increasing
anti-crime assistance to Mexico (and Central America) in
number of priorities they adopted. Experts warned that it
October 2007. As part of the Mérida Initiative’s emphasis
would be difficult for Mexico to implement an accusatorial
on shared responsibility, the Mexican government pledged
justice system requiring better evidence collection by police
to tackle crime and corruption and the U.S. government
and public trials with oral arguments in only eight years.
pledged to address drug demand and the illicit trafficking of
firearms and bulk currency to Mexico. Both governments
U.S. technology and training under pillar one supported
have struggled to fulfill those commitments.
Mexican intelligence-gathering and information-sharing
efforts, including biometrics and telecommunications.
Initial Funding for the Mérida Initiative:
Under pillar two, U.S. agencies provided more than $400
FY2008-FY2010
million in training, courtroom infrastructure, and technical
During the first phase of the Mérida Initiative, Congress
assistance to support Mexico’s transition to an accusatorial
appropriated some $1.5 billion, including $420.7 million in
justice system (adopted in 2008) at the federal and state
foreign military financing (FMF), which enabled the
levels. Pillar three expanded beyond efforts to modernize
purchase of equipment, including aircraft and helicopters,
the U.S.-Mexican border to include more than $100 million
to support Mexico’s federal security forces (military and
in training and equipment for securing Mexico’s southern
police). U.S. assistance focused on (1) counternarcotics,
border. Under pillar four, the U.S. Agency for International
border security, and counterterrorism; (2) public security;
Development implemented $25 million in human rights
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2020
programs and $90 million in crime prevention projects.
youth, human rights, drug policy reform, and transitional
FMF has not been part of the Mérida Initiative since
justice for nonviolent criminals. Others maintain that López
FY2011, although the State Department and the U.S.
Obrador has thus far accommodated the Trump
Department of Defense coordinate their assistance. Unlike
Administration’s emphasis on combating Central American
FMF, Mérida Initiative funds have not been subject to
migration and may back other U.S. priorities.
human rights conditions since FY2016.
Mexico’s security strategy, released in February 2019,
Trump Administration’s Focus for the
includes a focus on addressing the socioeconomic drivers of
Mérida Initiative: FY2018-FY2019
violent crime. López Obrador has launched a program to
President Trump’s executive orders on combatting TCOs
provide scholarships to youth to attend university or to
(E.O. 13773) and enhancing border security (E.O. 13767)
complete internships. He has created a presidential
led to a new focus for the Mérida Initiative. Trump
commission to coordinate efforts to investigate the
Administration officials held several Cabinet-level
Ayotzinapa case and launched a national commission to
dialogues on security with the Peña Nieto government
locate the estimated 40,000 people who have gone missing
focused on attacking the TCOs’ business model. As a
in Mexico over the past decade. His National Development
result, recent Mérida Initiative programs have focused on
Plan calls for decriminalizing drugs and redirecting funds
combating the production and distribution of opioids and
from enforcement operations toward treatment programs.
other drugs, improving border interdiction and port
At the same time, President López Obrador has backed
security, training forensic experts to gather evidence and
constitutional reforms to allow military involvement in
testify in criminal trials, and combating money laundering.
public security to continue for five more years, despite a
Assessing the Mérida Initiative
2018 Supreme Court ruling that prolonged military
involvement in public security violated the constitution. He
Many analysts have observed the need for more reporting
secured congressional approval of a new National Guard
on Mérida Initiative outcomes, such as the impact of U.S.
(composed of military police, federal police, and new
training on police performance. The State Department has
recruits) to combat crime. The congress modified López
pointed to some indicators of success: (1) intelligence-
Obrador’s original proposal to ensure the National Guard
sharing and law enforcement cooperation that has helped
will be under civilian command. López Obrador also has
capture high-profile criminals; (2) the establishment of
deployed security forces to secure oil pipelines and
national training standards for police, investigators,
facilities in an effort to combat oil theft and, more recently,
prosecutors, and judges; (3) increased extraditions,
to help detain Central American migrants.
including Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán (extradited in 2017
and sentenced to life in U.S. prison in February 2019);
Civil society and the private sector are urging President
(4) Mexico’s seizure of more than $4 billion in illicit drugs
López Obrador to fulfill his pledges to combat corruption.
and currency; and, (5) Mexico’s apprehension of more than
Mexico’s congress approved the creation of an independent
520,000 Central American migrants from 2015 to 2018.
attorney general’s office, but some are concerned that the
Critics of the Mérida Initiative have focused on continued
individual selected for that nine-year post is a longtime
violence, the Mexican government’s poor human rights
associate of the president. Despite those misgivings, in May
record, and prosecutors’ inability to secure convictions.
2019, federal prosecutors charged the former head of
Homicides in Mexico are at record levels. Fighting among
Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) with bribery and tax fraud.
TCOs has intensified as new criminal organizations have
The government also has not yet specified how it will move
emerged and more groups are competing for control over
forward to implement the national anti-corruption system
drug production and trafficking, including synthetic
established through constitutional reforms in 2017.
opioids. They also have expanded their involvement in oil
Congressional Action
theft, kidnapping, extortion, and other crimes.
There has been bipartisan support in Congress for the
Mexico’s human rights record has been widely criticized, as
Mérida Initiative. In FY2019, Congress provided $139
has the justice system’s inability to address corruption and
million for the initiative in P.L. 116-6 ($61 million above
impunity. In 2018, 49 human rights defenders and 9
the budget request), with additional funds aimed at
journalists were killed. In the past, Mexico’s attorney
addressing the flow of U.S.-bound opioids. H.Rept. 116-9
general’s office has failed to resolve those types of killings.
required a State Department strategy on international efforts
Even the high-profile case of 43 students forcibly
to combat opioids and a report on how the Mérida Initiative
disappeared in Ayotzinapa, Guerrero, in 2014 remains
was combating cocaine and methamphetamine flows. The
unresolved. Prosecutors have not pursued many credible
Administration’s FY2020 budget request asked for $76.3
reports of corruption, with those accused of massive
million for the Mérida Initiative. The House-passed
corruption, including several former governors, often
FY2020 minibus, H.R. 2740 (Division D covers foreign
receiving minimal sentences for their crimes.
operations appropriations and references H.Rept. 116-78 to
H.R. 2839) would provide $126.8 million for the Mérida
López Obrador’s Security Strategy
Initiative. See CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background
The future of the Mérida Initiative is yet unclear. Some
and U.S. Relations; CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s
observers predict the four-pillar strategy may reemerge with
Immigration Control Efforts; CRS In Focus IF10400,
an emphasis on pillar four, in line with López Obrador’s
Transnational Crime Issues: Heroin Production, Fentanyl
campaign pledges. López Obrador pledged to implement
Trafficking, and U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation.
anti-corruption initiatives, social investments in at-risk
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2020
IF10578
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10578 · VERSION 14 · UPDATED