Updated June 26, 2019
U.S. Relations with Burma: Key Issues in 2019
Some Members of Congress have been critical of the
refugees and local host communities. The U.S. government
Trump Administration’s Burma policy, particularly its
has provided $240.9 million.
limited response to atrocities committed by the Burmese
military (Tatmadaw), the intensification of the nation’s
Figure 1. Map of Burma (Myanmar)
long-standing civil war, and rising concerns about political
repression and civil rights. In December 2018, Congress
passed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (P.L.
115-409), which prohibits funding for International Military
Education and Training (IMET) and the Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) Program in Burma for fiscal years 2019
through 2023. The Burma Unified through Rigorous
Military Accountability (BURMA) Act of 2019 (H.R.
3190) and Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act of 2019
(S. 1186) would place additional restrictions on relations
with Burma, particularly military and trade relations.
The Rohingya Crises Continue
More than 700,000 Sunni Rohingya fled northern Rakhine
State to Bangladesh in late 2017, seeking to escape
Tatmadaw forces that destroyed almost 400 Rohingya
villages, killed at least 6,700 Rohingya (according to human
rights groups and Doctors Without Borders). Repatriation
under an October 2018 agreement between the two nations
is stalled as the Burmese government is unable or unwilling
to establish conditions that would allow the voluntary, safe,
dignified, and sustainable return of the Rohingya. The
Rohingya also seek return to locations at or near their
original villages, recognition as an indigenous ethnic
minority, restoration of their full citizenship, establishment
of an accountability mechanism to investigate and
prosecute the alleged atrocities, and the termination of laws
and policies that discriminate against Muslims as
preconditions for their return. The prospects for return
continued to diminish in 2019, in part due to the outbreak of
fighting between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Tatmadaw
Source: CRS.
in northern Rakhine State.
Escalating Fighting Despite Ceasefire
Burma’s mixed military/civilian government has so far
Burma has been embroiled in a low-grade civil war
denied any systematic and/or widespread misconduct by the
between the Tatmadaw and over 20 ethnic armed
Tatmadaw, and continues to deny the United Nations,
organizations (EAOs) since 1962. Significant portions of
international humanitarian assistance organizations, and
the nation are effectively under EAO control, particularly in
local and international media unrestricted access to northern
Kachin and Shan States. Since the Tatmadaw transferred
Rakhine State. In June 2019, the topic of Rohingya
power to a mixed civilian-military government in 2011,
repatriation emerged as a key issue at the 34th ASEAN
fighting has been largely limited to Kachin and Shan States,
Summit in Bangkok. ASEAN leaders stressed their
with periodic skirmishes in Kayin State. The government of
commitment to support Burma in creating a safe
former President Thein Sein and the current NLD-led
environment for the Rohingya.
government have attempted to negotiate a nationwide
ceasefire agreement and an end to the nation’s civil war, but
According to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of
these efforts have had limited success, largely due to the
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), over 909,000 Rohingya
Tatmadaw’s unwillingness to compromise with the
were in refugee camps in Bangladesh as of March 2019. A
demands of the EAOs.
Joint Response Plan for calendar year 2019 sought $920.5
million for humanitarian assistance for the Rohingya
In December 2018, the AA launched coordinated attacks on
security outposts in northern Rakhine State as part of its
plan to establish an autonomous Arakan region, similar to
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.S. Relations with Burma: Key Issues in 2019
that controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in
militants and the Tatmadaw in Rakhine State. In November
eastern Shan State. AA attacks continued in January.
2017, then-Secretary Tillerson determined that the
Tatmadaw’s “clearance operation” constituted “ethnic
Following the December AA attack, Commander-in-Chief
cleansing,” and announced that United States would
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing announced a four-month
“pursue accountability through U.S. law, including possible
unilateral ceasefire in eastern (but not western) Burma, and
targeted sanctions.”
reversed his previous objection to the inclusion of the
Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance
The Trump Administration responded in several ways,
Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army in the
including providing funding for humanitarian assistance in
peace talks. On April 30, 2019, Min Aung Hlaing extended
Bangladesh and Rakhine State (nearly $500 million), no
the ceasefire for two more months.
longer providing visa waivers for senior Tatmadaw officers,
placing economic sanctions on five Tatmadaw officers and
The 3rd session of the 21st Century Panglong Conference—
two military units under the Global Magnitsky Act, and
an effort to forge a nationwide ceasefire agreement between
calling for a global ban on arms sales to Burma.
the government, the military, and EAOs—was held in July
2018, but made little progress. Two of the larger EAOs, the
On September 18, 2018, an independent U.N. fact-finding
Karen National Union and the Restoration Council of Shan
mission on Myanmar determined that the actions of
State, subsequently suspended their participation in the
Burma’s security forces in Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan
formal peace process, citing Tatmadaw intransigence.
States possibly constituted genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. It recommended the U.N.
Violation of Human Rights and Civil Liberties
Security Council “refer the situation to the International
According to some analysts, Burma’s mixed
Criminal Court or create an ad hoc international criminal
military/civilian government has responded to criticism by
tribunal.” On September 24, 2018, the State Department
curtailing freedom of speech and press freedom. In
released the findings of its own study, which were
September 2018, Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone, reporters
consistent with those of the U.N. fact-finding mission. The
investigating a mass murder by Tatmadaw soldiers in
State Department also stated “that the recent violence in
Rakhine State, were convicted of violating Burma’s 1923
northern Rakhine State was extreme, large-scale,
Official Secrets Act, and sentenced to seven years in prison.
widespread, and seemingly geared toward both terrorizing
They were granted a presidential pardon on May 7, 2019.
the population and driving out the Rohingya residents,” and
Other journalists have been arrested for interviewing EAO
“(t)he scope and scale of the military’s operations indicate
leaders or for publishing articles critical of the Tatmadaw.
they were well-planned and coordinated.” The Trump
Administration has declined to characterize the human
Peaceful protesters have faced criminal charges for
rights abuses as either genocide or crimes against humanity.
allegedly violating the 2011 Peaceful Processions and
Peaceful Assembly Act. Several critics of the government
Looking Ahead: Leading Policy Issues
have been charged under section 66(d) of the 2013
Given the humanitarian situation in Bangladesh and
Telecommunications Act for allegedly defaming or
Rakhine State, Congress may consider funding for
threatening government officials. According to the
assistance to the displaced Rohingya. Congress may also
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), as
examine ways to ensure that a credible, independent
of May 2019, 388 people were either serving sentences or
investigation of the alleged abuses in Kachin, Rakhine, and
awaiting trial for their political activities.
Shan States occurs, and that those determined to be
culpable are held accountable for their actions.
State of Political Reforms
Many observers expected Aung San Suu Kyi and the
Another issue Congress may consider is what ways the
National League for Democracy (NLD) to implement
United States can best serve to promote the peaceful
political reforms following their parliamentary victory in
resolution of Burma’s civil war. In addition, Congress may
2015. However, since taking power in 2016, the NLD has
weigh what forms of assistance to provide in Burma, and if
made little progress on political reforms, and in some cases,
any of that assistance should be contingent on the behavior
it appears that the mixed military/civilian government has
of Aung San Suu Kyi, her government, or the Tatmadaw in
found it advantageous to use various restrictive laws to
addressing the issues mentioned above.
suppress political opposition. A special commission set up
by the NLD-led government identified more than 140 laws
Both the Obama and Trump Administrations based their
that should be abolished or amended; a few have been
policies on the premise that Burma is part way through a
addressed by the Union Parliament.
transition from a military junta to a democratically-elected
civilian government. Some analysts argue that recent events
Status of U.S. Policy Toward Burma
indicate that Burma’s military leaders never supported such
The Trump Administration has largely continued the
a transition, and that the current governance system, as
Obama Administration’s approach of supporting Aung San
embodied in the 2008 constitution, was the intended
Suu Kyi and her government in hopes of fostering a
endpoint for any political reforms. Congress’s sense of
transition to a democratically-elected civil government and
which assessment is more convincing may guide its actions
the end of Burma’s long-standing civil war. After the
towards Burma in 2019 and beyond.
Rohingya crises arose, the Trump Administration
condemned the violence committed by both Rohinyga
Michael F. Martin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.S. Relations with Burma: Key Issues in 2019
IF11068
Kirt Smith, Research Assistant
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11068 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED