Updated June 24, 2019
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
private sector and slowed implementation of a controversial
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
decree regulating artistic expression, actions that appeared
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
to demonstrate responsiveness to public criticism and
isolating the government.
independence from the previous government. Díaz-Canel
continues to faces two significant challenges—moving
In December 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a
forward with economic reforms that produce results and
major policy shift moving away from sanctions toward
responding to citizens’ desires for greater freedom. The
engagement and the normalization of relations. The policy
Cuban economy is being hard-hit by the increase in U.S.
change included the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
sanctions and by Venezuela’s economic crisis, which has
state sponsor of international terrorism in May 2015; the
limited Venezuela’s financial support to Cuba.
restoration of diplomatic relations in July 2015; and efforts
to increase travel, commerce, and the flow of information to
In February 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a new
Cuba by easing restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
constitution in a national referendum. Among the changes
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
are the addition of an appointed prime minister to oversee
(accomplished through amendments in 2015 and 2016 to
government operations; age and term limits on the
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations [CACR],
president; and some market-oriented economic reforms,
administered by the Department of the Treasury, and the
including the right to private property and the promotion of
Export Administration Regulations [EAR], administered by
foreign investment. However, the new constitution ensures
the Commerce Department). The restoration of relations led
the state sector’s dominance over the economy and the
to increased government-to-government engagement, with
predominant role of the Communist Party.
over 20 bilateral agreements negotiated and bilateral
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
dialogues conducted in numerous areas of cooperation.
issued a national security presidential memorandum on
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
Cuba in June 2017 that introduced new sanctions. These
2017 introducing new sanctions and rolling back some of
included restrictions on transactions with companies
the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations.
controlled by the Cuban military, and the elimination of
In 2019, the Administration has increased economic
people-to-people travel for individuals. To implement these
sanctions significantly to pressure the Cuban government
changes, the Treasury and Commerce Departments
on its human rights record and its support for the regime of
amended the CACR and EAR in November 2017.
Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. These include actions
The Department of State issued a list of “restricted entities”
allowing lawsuits to go forward against those trafficking in
in November 2017; it has been updated several times, most
property confiscated by the Cuban government and
recently in April 2019. The list currently includes 214
tightening restrictions on nonfamily travel to Cuba,
entities and subentities, including 2 ministries, 5 holding
including the termination of cruise ship travel to Cuba from
companies and 49 of their subentities, 102 hotels, 2 tourist
the United States. With these actions, U.S. policy toward
agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 39
Cuba has again shifted to a policy of strong economic
entities serving the defense and security sectors.
pressure. In response to the increased sanctions, Cuban
President Miguel Díaz-Canel asserted “We Cubans do not
In April and May 2019, the Department of the Treasury
surrender.”
imposed sanctions on eight shipping companies and seven
vessels that have transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba (39
Cuban Political Developments. In April 2018, Díaz-
other vessels transporting Venezuelan oil were sanctioned).
Canel, who was serving as first vice president, succeeded
Venezuela currently provides some 40,000-50,000 barrels
Raúl Castro as president, but Castro continues to head the
of oil per day to Cuba, about one-third of its consumption.
Cuban Communist Party until 2021. The selection of Díaz-
Canel, now 59 years old, reflects the generational change in
On April 8, 2019, the Department of the Treasury scuttled
Cuban leadership that began several years ago and marks
an agreement between Major League Baseball and the
the first time since the 1959 Cuban revolution that a Castro
Cuban Baseball Federation, announced in December 2018,
is not in charge of the government. While in power from
which would have allowed Cuban baseball players to sign
2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to implement significant
with U.S. teams directly. Trump Administration officials
economic policy changes, moving toward a more mixed
maintained that the Cuban Baseball Federation is part of the
economy with a stronger private sector, but his
Cuban government and therefore no payments could be
government’s slow, gradualist approach did not produce
made to the federation under U.S. sanctions.
major improvements to the Cuban economy, which has
experienced minimal growth in recent years.
On April 17, 2019, the Administration announced
significant new sanctions. Secretary of State Michael
In December 2018, President Díaz-Canel backtracked on
Pompeo announced that the Administration would,
implementing regulations that likely would have shrunk the
effective May 2, 2019, allow the right to file lawsuits
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
against those trafficking in confiscated property in Cuba
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
pursuant to Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
According to the Department of State, 26 U.S. Embassy
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114).
community members suffered a series of unexplained
Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national, including
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
those who were not U.S. nationals at the time of the
occurred from November 2016 to August 2017, but two
confiscation. The first such lawsuits were filed in U.S.
incidents occurred in May 2018.) The Department of State
federal court in Miami against Carnival Corporation, the
maintains that the U.S. investigation has not reached a
Miami-based cruise ship operator, on May 2, 2019.
definitive conclusion regarding the cause, source, or any
kind of technologies that might have been used.
Prior to this action, all Administrations had suspended, at
six-month intervals, the right to file such lawsuits pursuant
In September 2017, the Department of State ordered the
to the provisions of the law. Secretary Pompeo cited Cuba’s
departure of nonemergency personnel from the U.S.
repression of its own people and its support for the Maduro
Embassy to minimize the risk of their exposure to harm;
regime in Venezuela as reasons for the implementation of
embassy staff was reduced by about two-thirds. In October
Title III. The European Union and Canada criticized the
2017, the Department of State ordered the departure of 15
Administration’s action, vowing to ban enforcement or
diplomats from the Cuban Embassy in Washington, DC.
recognition of any judgement, allow counterclaims in
According to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the
European and Canadian courts, and potentially seek action
action was taken because of Cuba’s failure to protect U.S.
in the World Trade Organization.
diplomats in Havana and to ensure equity in the impact on
diplomatic operations. Cuba strongly denies responsibility
Also on April 17, National Security Adviser John Bolton
for the injuries. The staff reduction at the U.S. Embassy has
announced that future regulatory changes would restrict
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing,
nonfamily travel to Cuba, limit remittances to $1,000 per
and has made bilateral engagement more difficult.
person per quarter, and end the use of “U-turn transactions”
(in which funds from a bank outside the United States may
116th Congress Action. The 116th Congress has continued
pass through one or more U.S. financial institutions before
to provide funding for democracy assistance and U.S.-
being transferred to a bank outside the United States).
government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2019,
Congress appropriated $20 million for democracy programs
On June 5, 2019, the Treasury Department amended the
in Cuba and $29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting in the
CACR to eliminate the permissible travel category of
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6,
people-to-people educational travel altogether, and the
H.J.Res. 31, conference report H.Rept. 116-9) approved in
Commerce Department amended the EAR to generally
February 2019.
prohibit private cruise ships, private and corporate aircraft,
sailboats, and fishing boats from going to Cuba.
For FY2020, the Administration requested $6 million for
Bolton began the Administration’s strong criticism of Cuba
Cuba democracy programs, a 70% cut from FY2019, and
$12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting, a 55% cut from
for its support of Venezuela in a November 2018 speech in
FY2019. The House-passed FY2020 Department of State,
which he asserted that Cuba was responsible for enabling
the Venezuelan regime’s repression
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS)
; in rhetoric reminiscent
appropriations measure, Division D of the minibus H.R.
of the Cold War, he referred to Cuba, Venezuela, and
2740 (which references the report, H.Rept. 116-78, to the
Nicaragua as the “Troika of Tyranny” in the hemisphere
and its leaders as the “three stooges of socialism.”
House Appropriations Committee-reported SFOPS bill,
He has
H.R. 2839) would fully fund the Administration’s request
alleged that Cuba has 20,000 to 25,000 security forces in
for Cuba broadcasting but would provide $20 million for
Venezuela, but some U.S. analysts say the number is far
Cuba democracy programs, the same appropriated in
smaller and the forces do not have combat capability. Cuba
FY2019. H.Rept. 116-78 also would direct the State
maintains that its 20,000 workers in Venezuela are
Department to submit a strategy to Congress to provide
providing health care and other social services. On April
certainty for U.S. businesses legally operating in Cuba.
30, 2019, President Trump threatened Cuba with “a full and
complete embargo” and “highest
According to the report, the strategy should include (1) how
-level sanctions” unless it
to ensure that engagement advances the interest of the U.S.
stops military support for Venezuela. Secretary of State
and Cuban people, including encouraging the growth of
Pompeo indicated several days later, however, that the
Cuba’s priva
United States is “working with the Cubans” regarding the
te sector; (2) the impact of the U.S. Embassy
Havana staff reduction on embassy operations, including
situation in Venezuela.
visa processing; and (3) a timeline for the safe return of
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
embassy staff to previous levels.
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11120,
policy concern for many years. In October 2018, the U.S.
Cuba: Trump Administration Expands Sanctions; CRS
Mission to the United Nations launched a campaign to call
attention to Cuba’s “estimated 130 political prisoners.”
Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress;
In
CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel
recent years, Cuba has shifted to using short-term
and Remittances; and CRS Report R43888, Cuba
detentions and harassment to repress dissent, with at least
Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the
5,155 such detentions in 2017 and 2,873 in 2018 (the lowest
Normalization of Relations.
level since 2010) according to the Cuban Commission for
Human Rights and National Reconciliation. In the first
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
three months of 2019, there were 639 short-term detentions
IF10045
(about a 36% decline from the same period in 2018).
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 53 · UPDATED

---