Updated June 6, 2019
North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs
Overview
North-South Pyongyang Summit, the North stated its
North Korea has made recent advancements in its nuclear
willingness to “permanently disable” the Yongbyon
weapons and ballistic missile programs. Since Kim Jong-un
facilities if the United States took “corresponding
came to power in 2012, North Korea has conducted over 80
measures.” U.S. officials have said that it is likely other
ballistic missile test launches. In 2016, North Korea
clandestine enrichment facilities exist. Open-source
conducted two nuclear weapons tests and 26 ballistic
reports, citing U.S. government sources, identified one such
missile flight tests on a variety of platforms. In 2017, North
site at Kangson.
Korea test launched 18 ballistic missiles (with five failures),
including two launches in July and another in November
There is no public U.S. Intelligence Community (IC)
that many ascribe as ICBM tests (intercontinental ballistic
consensus of North Korea’s fissile material stockpiles.
missiles). Most recently, North Korea tested short-range
News reports in August 2017 said that one component of
ballistic missiles on May 4 and 9. It last conducted a
the IC, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), had
nuclear test in September 2017. In April 2018, Kim Jong
estimated a stockpile of up to 60 nuclear warheads.
Un said that nuclear and ICBM testing was no longer
Nongovernmental open source estimates are based on
necessary. UN Security Council resolutions ban all ballistic
material production activities at the Yongbyon site as well
missile tests by the DPRK.
as past stockpile estimates. Some experts believe that North
Korea could have potentially produced enough material for
Testing as well as official North Korean statements suggest
approximately 35 nuclear weapons, and that North Korea
that North Korea is striving to build a credible regional
could now potentially produce enough nuclear material for
nuclear warfighting capability that might evade regional
an additional 7 warheads per year.
ballistic missile defenses. Such an approach likely
reinforces a deterrence and coercive diplomacy strategy—
Doctrine
lending more credibility as it demonstrates capability—but
North Korean statements, taken at face value, appear to
it also raises serious questions about crisis stability and
describe North Korea’s nuclear arsenal as a deterrent to the
escalation control. Congress may further examine these
U.S. “nuclear war threats.” In his 2017 New Year’s address,
advances’ possible effects on U.S. policy.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un stated that the North had
“achieved the status of a nuclear power,” and promised to
Nuclear Tests
continue to “build up our self-defense capability, the pivot
On September 3, 2017, North Korea announced that it had
of which is the nuclear forces, and the capability for
tested a hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear
preemptive strike ... to defend peace and security of our
warhead) that it said it was perfecting for delivery on an
state.” Kim also said at the 2016 Workers’ Party Congress
intercontinental ballistic missile. North Korea has tested a
that “nuclear weapons of the DPRK can be used only by a
nuclear explosive device five other times since 2006.
final order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean
According to U.S. and international estimates, each test
People’s Army (Kim Jong Un) to repel invasion or attack
produced underground blasts that were progressively higher
from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory
in magnitude and estimated yield. According to the North
strikes.”
Korean test announcement, the country had achieved
“perfect success in the test of a hydrogen bomb for
The U.S. intelligence community has characterized the
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).” In April 2018,
purpose of North Korean nuclear weapons as intended for
North Korea announced that it had achieved its goals and
“deterrence, international prestige, and coercive
would no longer conduct nuclear tests, and would close
diplomacy,” and that DPRK leaders view nuclear weapons
down its test site. It dynamited the entrances to two test
as “critical to regime survival.” The North Korean leader
tunnels in May prior to the Trump-Kim summit. Kim Jong
pledged to work toward “complete denuclearization of the
Un told Secretary Pompeo in an October meeting that he
Korean Peninsula” in the U.S.-DPRK Singapore Summit
“invited inspectors to visit the Punggye Ri nuclear test site
June 2018 statement. In its 2019 assessment to Congress,
to confirm that it has been irreversibly dismantled.” Such an
the DNI said that “North Korea is unlikely to give up all of
inspection has not yet occurred.
its nuclear weapons and production capabilities, even as it
seeks to negotiate partial denuclearization steps to obtain
Nuclear Material Production
key US and international concessions.”
North Korea continues to produce fissile material
(plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons.
Warheads and Delivery Systems
North Korea restarted its plutonium production facilities
According to the U.S. intelligence community, the prime
after it withdrew from a nuclear agreement in 2009, and is
objective of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is to
operating at least one centrifuge enrichment plant at its
develop a nuclear warhead that is “miniaturized,” or
Yongbyon nuclear complex. During the September 2018
sufficiently lighter and smaller to be mounted on long-range
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North Korea’s Nuclear and Bal istic Missile Programs
ballistic missiles. One of the most acute near-term threats to
stand at the Sohae satellite launch complex. Although the
other nations may be from the medium-range Nodong
test stand could be rebuilt, some observers see this as a
missile, which could reach all of the Korean Peninsula and
positive development toward denuclearization while others
some of mainland Japan. Outside the intelligence
have suggested the stand was no longer needed for liquid-
community, U.S. officials have articulated conflicting
fuel engines, as North Korea may be opting instead to test
assessments of North Korea’s ability to produce a nuclear
and deploy solid rocket motors for their missiles. There
warhead for its intercontinental-range missiles. The
have also been reports that North Korea may now be
intelligence community believes that North Korea has an
producing liquid-fueled ICBMs at another facility outside
ICBM capability, but that neither North Korea nor the
the North Korean capital, but other experts point out
United States knows whether that capability will work.
developments there are not yet clear. Other observers note
that closing a test stand would not prevent mass production
A December 2015 Department of Defense (DOD) report, as
of current designs.
well as the intelligence community’s 2018 worldwide threat
assessment, said that “North Korea is committed to
Mobile ballistic missiles, which North Korea is developing,
developing a long-range nuclear-armed missile that is
and other measures also reduce U.S. detection abilities.
capable of posing a direct threat to the United States.” The
These things together suggest that their test program may
DOD report outlined two hypothetical ICBMs on which
be more than just for show or to make a political
North Korea could mount a nuclear warhead and deliver to
statement—that it may be intended to increase the
the continental United States: the KN-08 and the
reliability, effectiveness, and survivability of their ballistic
Taepodong-2, which was the base rocket for the Unha-2
missile force. North Korea has increased ballistic missile
space launch vehicle. North Korea has paraded what are
testing in recent years. These tests have demonstrated
widely considered mock-ups or engineering models of the
growing success and, coupled with increased operational
KN-08 and KN-14 ICBMs. In 2016, the intelligence
training exercises, suggest a pattern designed to strengthen
community assessed that “North Korea has already taken
the credibility of North Korea’s regional nuclear deterrent
initial steps toward fielding this [ICBM] system, although
strategy.
the system has not been flight-tested.” In July 2017, the
DPRK conducted what most have now assessed as two
A recent focus in North Korea’s ballistic missile test
ICBM tests.
program appears to be directed at developing a capability to
defeat or degrade the effectiveness of missile defenses, such
In December 2012, North Korea launched an Unha-3 to
as Patriot, Aegis BMD, and THAAD, all of which are or
deliver a satellite into space. The DOD noted that although
will be deployed in the region. Some of the 2016 missile
this space launch vehicle “contributes heavily to North
tests were lofted to much higher altitudes and shorter ranges
Korea’s long-range ballistic missile development,” the
than an optimal ballistic trajectory. On reentry, a warhead
country did not test a reentry vehicle (RV), and absent an
from such a launch would come in at a much steeper angle
effective RV, “North Korea cannot deliver a weapon to
of attack and at much faster speed to its intended target,
target from an ICBM.” North Korea launched the Unha-3
making it potentially more difficult to intercept with missile
again in February 2016, placing a satellite into earth orbit.
defenses. North Korea has demonstrated in 2017 the ability
Some observers assert that the Unha-3 could be used as an
to launch a salvo attack with more than one missile
ICBM, but no other country has deployed a space launch
launched in relatively short order. This is consistent with a
vehicle as a nuclear-armed ICBM or developed an ICBM
possible goal of being able to conduct large ballistic missile
from the technology base of a space launch program alone.
attacks with large raid sizes, a capability that could make it
Recent static engine tests of a large rocket engine in late
more challenging for a missile defense system to destroy
2016 and early 2017 suggest to some progress in their
each incoming warhead. Finally, North Korea’s progress
ICBM program, and to others progress in developing a
with SLBMs might suggest an effort to counter land-based
larger space launch vehicle.
THAAD missile defenses by launching attacks from
positions at sea that are outside the THAAD system’s radar
North Korea has demonstrated limited but growing success
field of view, but not necessarily outside the capabilities of
in its medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) program and
Aegis BMD systems deployed in the region.
its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test
program. Moreover, North Korea appears to be making
Taken together, North Korea’s progress in nuclear testing,
some progress in moving slowly toward solid rocket motors
its declared standardization of warhead designs and
for its ballistic missiles. Solid fuel is a chemically more
potential to put those warheads on MRBMs, increased
stable option that also allows for reduced reaction and
confidence in the reliability of its short-range missile, and
reload times. Successful tests of the Pukguksong-2 (KN-15)
efforts seemingly designed to degrade regional ballistic
solid fuel MRBM in 2017 led North Korea to announce it
missile defense systems suggest that North Korea may be
would now mass produce those missiles. Tests of the KN-
building a credible regional nuclear warfighting and ICBM
23 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) in May 2019
nuclear deterrent capability.
appear to be aimed at advancing solid fuel and guidance
systems.
Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation
Since the June 2018 Singapore Summit, reports have
IF10472
surfaced showing the dismantlement of a rocket engine test

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North Korea’s Nuclear and Bal istic Missile Programs



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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10472 · VERSION 15 · UPDATED

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